At the beginning of the long and contentious discussion with Callicles that makes up the second half of Plato's Gorgias, Socrates tells his fellow Athenian how delighted he is to find a worthy inte...

Most rhetorical readings of Confucius's Analects have focused on his views on eloquence, reflecting an insuppressible impulse among comparative rhetoricians to match Confucian rhetoric to Greco–Roman rhetorical framework. My reading of the text argues that Confucius was more concerned about the suasory power of the multimodality of ritual symbols than narrowly verbal persuasion. To achieve the Way for restoring social unity and peace, Confucius emphasizes the ritualization of both the self and the others through studying history and performing rituals reflectively. I suggest, as the first Chinese rhetoric par excellence, the Analects shares some similar features with epideictic rhetoric.

This article attempts to demonstrate that the so-called Special Topics in Aristotle's Rhetoric are neither idia/eidē, endoxa, the traditional logos, nor pisteis as these terms are typically understood within the Aristotelian texts. After an analysis of these important technical terms, I conclude that the material in Rhetoric 1.4–15 is neither of these. Then, analyzing 1.4 as an example section, I argue that the bulk of the material in 1.4–15 is to be understood as previously independent texts, much of which was written for a non-rhetorical context, that were then inserted into a text that has become our Rhetoric by an editor who also added his own (awkward) transitions in order to try to seam these previously independent texts into a more coherent whole. This conclusion suggests that there may not have been a systematic or coherent conception of rhetoric within the Peripatetic school even as late as the first-century BCE when Andronicus edited Aristotle's texts—including the Rhetoric—into their form that has since been transmitted to us.

This article argues that the Institutio Oratoria is Quintilian's Quintilian . The Orator's Education [Institutio Oratoria] . 5 Vols. Trans. Donald A. Russell . Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 2001 . [Google Scholar] attempt to provide an education in moral philosophy through the teaching of rhetoric as a technê. In contrast to the way Quintilian is typically portrayed, this paper presents him as a political opportunist who hoped to benefit from the Flavian emperors' distrust of philosophy by presenting a curriculum that would tame moral philosophy by teaching it in the context of rhetoric. As a demonstration of how Quintilian envisioned rhetoric's transformation of moral philosophy, the article analyzes the treatment of the relationship between the moral and the expedient in the Institutes, contrasting Quintilian's rhetorical treatment to that in philosophy, particularly in Cicero's Cicero . De Officiis . Trans., Walter Miller . Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1913 .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar] De Officiis. This analysis of the Institutes has implication for our understanding of how Quintilian's appropriation of philosophy enabled rhetoric, a practical, skills-oriented discipline, to become also the means for character formation within Roman schools and beyond.

ABSTRACT Starting from a chance quotation in William Dean Howells' “Novel-Writing and Novel-Reading,” this essay reflects on the differences (and relations) between what classical tradition would call “grammatical” and “rhetorical” approaches to discourse—and, likewise, what might be called “hermeneutic” and “productive” approaches to rhetoric. The grammatical/hermeneutic approach is oriented towards reaching an understanding of what a text says or means, or what its argument is, while the rhetorical/productive approach is characterized by the questions, How was it done? and How can I do that? It is this latter approach—the orientation toward the cultivation of productive discursive skill—that disciplinarily makes rhetoric, as opposed to a variety of philosophy or literary criticism. This notion is further aligned, on one hand, with a revisionist “sophist's history of rhetoric,” and, on the other hand, with a “sophistic” approach to rhetorical education derived from the tradition of Isocrates.

Abstract In these reflections on the symposium as an event, the author speculates about change and continuity in rhetorical scholarship over the last two decades and ponders the relationship between rhetorics of performance and citizenship. Notes 1. In Rhetoric and Poetics, Walker carefully delineates the histories of rhetoric as an instrumental or pragmatic art against which he posits his vision of rhetoric as a much older and more pervasive epideictic practices.

This essay argues that classical Greek rhetoric was informed by the ethic of competition and the aesthetic of exhibition and performance. It proposes that this rhetoric can be profitably studied in the terms of the Sophistical, Platonic, Isocratean, and Aristotelian perspectives. The essay recalls the author's early experiences with rhetoric and articulates the logic of his Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece. At the same time, it promises a theatrical play (in the spirit of Plato's Symposium) that illustrates the four perspectives.

Early in my career I studied the history of topical invention in order to discover the basis for a distinctive, substantive, and coherent theory of rhetorical argumentation. The effort reflected the dominant academic assumptions of the time, and it proved both frustrating and instructive. Eventually, I concluded that my objective was misdirected. When theoretical coherence became the goal of topical invention (as in Boethius), the topics lost connection with rhetorical interests and applications and became part of a self-contained scholastic enterprise. But when treated more loosely as precepts that helped develop a capacity for action and performance in a particular case (as in Quintilian), the topics emerged not only as more useful but as more directly connected to the distinctive characteristics of rhetorical art. This shift in emphasis for “substance” and “theory” to “action” and “performance” corresponds to a general change in attitudes toward rhetoric that has occurred during the last three decades. This change may lead to a revisionism that extends beyond the teaching of individual courses and encourages consideration of rhetoric as a curriculum.

ABSTRACT In the introduction to this special issue, Hawhee sets the stage for the scholarly performances featured at the 2005 Pittsburgh symposium on ancient rhetoric by describing the context and foregrounding the lectures/essays contained in this issue. She notes the shift to questions of performing rhetoric and considers that shift in relation to disciplinary identities which, she asserts, function performatively.

Abstract This essay examines several disciplinary and pedagogical assumptions behind Aristotle's centrality in the classical rhetorical canon and calls for a reconsideration of the established hierarchical relation of Aristotle to Isocrates. Notes 1. For recent works in English see, for example, Terry Papillon; Takis Poulakos; Takis Poulakos and David Depew; Robert G. Sullivan (“Eidos/Idea in Isocrates”); and Yun Lee Too. One must also mention a new two-volume translation of Isocrates' extant works by Mirhady and Too (volume 1) and Papillon (volume 2), published by the University of Texas Press. 2. See articles by Rummel, Papillon, and Sullivan (“Eidos/Idea in Isocrates”). 3. For a more elaborate version of this argument, see chapter 2 in my Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle. 4. See David Depew's “The Inscription of Isocrates into Aristotle's Practical Philosophy” for a cogent explanation of Aristotle's hierarchical subordination of praxis to theoria and of techne to praxis. 5. A good example of scholarship in this vein is Andrea Nightingale's study Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT Though many sophists were interested in the nature and power of logos, there were strong reasons for them not to set up as teachers of the art of verbal manipulation. Whatever Aristophanes and Plato may imply, sophists would have been foolish to advertise a persuasive skill divorced from knowledge and moral authority. “Sophists without Rhetoric” Andrew Ford The aim of this chapter is to examine a particular rhetoric of socialization which has in the latter part of the twentieth century fallen from view despite its significance in Hellenic antiquity, that of Athenian law. “Legal Instruction in Classical Athens” Yun Lee Too This paper suggests a view of ancient Greek rhetoric that embraces multiple media and that emphasizes rhetorical interaction as a form of cultural reproduction through visual and spatial means, and it illustrates the importance of these elements with reference to the ancient Athenian assembly place, the Pnyx and the Greek concept of eusynoptos .

Abstract This article examines points of convergence between Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the habitus and ancient and modern depictions of art as a model of knowledge. My discussion of art is intended to engage on-going conversations on rhetorical invention and to raise new questions concerning the relationship between invention and cultural critique. Notes 1. See Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition. 2. Young maintained heuristics could be used “for carrying out many phases of composing, from the formulation of problems to various kinds of editing…” (135). 3. See Young and Becker's “Toward a Modern Theory of Rhetoric: A Tagmemic Contribution” and Lauer's exchanges with Berthoff. 4. Bourdieu provides the following definition of the habitus: “The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an expressive mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor” (72). 5. Using the analogy of the game, Bourdieu explains that “those who are caught up in them have little interest in seeing the game objectified.” The paradox, Bourdieu observes, is that those who are not caught up in the game “are often ill-placed to experience and feel everything that can only be learned and understood when one takes part in the game…” (189). See also p. 164. 6. “The truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses—whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it. … The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit between the subject structures and the objective structures, destroys self-evidence practically” (Bourdieu 168–169).

ABSTRACT Scholars who have been writing recently about the unity and composition of Aristotle's Rhetoric make either brief or no mention of the transmission and editorial history of Aristotle's texts. This essay addresses this void by first presenting and discussing Strabo's, Plutarch's, and Porphyry's accounts of the transmission and editorial history of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' texts in conjunction with discussing the list of works that Diogenes Laertius ascribes to both authors. Once the transmission and editorial history is considered, evidence is presented from the Rhetoric that may indicate two important points—the extent to which the text is a compilation of previously independent texts that were ascribed to both Aristotle and Theophrastus and that Andronicus, rather than Aristotle, may be responsible for the text as we have it.

Abstract This essay is divided into two parts, the first part showing how certain disciplinary and historiographical habits and ideologies have formed obstacles to rhetorical reading of Plato by many scholars in rhetoric. The second part reads rhetorically a dramatically related group of four Platonic dialogues, Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Sophist, and Statesman, arguing that Plato's commitment to Heraclitean ontology determines certain rhetorical, temporal, and argumentative patterns of these works.

Rhetorical Education in America, edited by Cheryl Glenn, Margaret M. Lyday, and Wendy B. Sharer. Tuscaloosa: University Alabama Press, 2004. 245 + xvi pp. Rhetorical Landscapes in America: Variations on a Theme from Kenneth Burke, by Gregory Clark. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004. 181 pp. Gorgias: Sophist and Artist, by Scott Consigny. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 242 pp.

Abstract This essay offers a phenomenological assessment of the moral and rhetorical nature of acknowledgment. The dynamics of acknowledgment arise with the ontological structure of human existence, with our way of being spatial and temporal creatures whose existence, in an epideictic display, opens us to the future. From out of this openness comes a call of conscience, an evocation and a provocation that speaks to us of the importance of an essential vocation: teaching. Mitch Albom's Tuesdays with Morrie is offered as a case study of this entire process.

Abstract I identify three modern approaches used to theorize epideictic rhetoric and suggest that each approach has difficulty dealing with the category of presence assigned to the genre by Aristotle. Drawing on Thucydides and, through him, Pericles' funeral oration, I suggest that Jacques Derrida's funeral speeches provide a way of rethinking the epideictic genre's presence as rhetorical ethics. More specifically, I argue that the function of presence in epideictic rhetoric is to provide an ethical interruption, and that Derrida, as one of our most accomplished funeral orators, helps us clarify the category of presence as it is described in Aristotle's and Thucydides' discussions of epideictic oratory.

Abstract The rivalry between Plato and Isocrates has begun to receive scholarly attention, primarily because both Plato and Isocrates used the term philosophia to describe their occupation. However, the efforts to distinguish their respective uses and definitions of the term typically ignore the performative dimension of both Plato's and Isocrates’ writings and their relationship with other discourses of Athenian public culture. This essay argues that both Plato and Isocrates constructed the domain of philosophy by performing the speech genres constitutive of Greek cultural memory. To support this claim, I offer a reading of Plato's Menexenus and Isocrates’ Panegyricus, both of which were crafted in response to the same historical event, the Peace of Antalkidas. The essay demonstrates the distinct ways in which Plato and Isocrates appropriated generic conventions of the Athenian funeral oration and panegyric in order to construct the identity of a “philosopher” vis‐à‐vis his polis and to model the relationship between students of “philosophy” and discourses of their culture.

Abstract Although conventional views about nineteenth‐century rhetoric highlight a shift from oratory to composition and from classical rhetoric with origins in Cicero and Quintilian to a "new" rhetoric with origins in Campbell, Blair, and Whately (with an attendant loss of scholarship and quality), William C. Robinson's Forensic Oratory (1893) can be grouped with a growing number of works that complicate such views. Robinson continues to emphasize oratory and to derive his theory from Cicero and Quintilian, using a complex of ideas called "uniformitarianism" to justify his direct appropriation of classical ideas. The resulting rhetoric lacks neither responsible scholarship nor high quality.

Strategies of Remembrances: The Rhetorical Dimensions of National Identity Construction by M. Lane Bruner. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002. 176 pp. Darwinism, Design, and Public Education, edited by John Angus Campbell and Stephen C. Meyer. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2003. 634 pp. + xxxviii. Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle by Ekaterina V. Haskins. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004. 172 + xiii pp. Doing Our Own Thing: The Degradation of Language and Music (and Why We Should, Like, Care) by John McWhorter. Gotham Books: 2003. 276 pp. + xxiii.

these reflections on working group discussions held at the ARS meeting has quickly taken me back to Evanston in mid-September 2003 and to the extraordinarily productive and provocative work that got done there. I vividly remember listening as Jerzy Axer and then Jeffrey Walker sounded an emergent theme: rhetoric, they said, is a teaching tradition. I remember being surprised at this theme - in fact, I would not have predicted it, and that surprise took me even further back, to the disappointment I felt in having a proposal rejected for an ISHR meeting: awe do not accept papers on pedagogy, the letter said. The dismissal of pedagogy is not unique to ISHR, of course; MLA and NGA have also been reluctant to yield pedagogy a place at the disciplinary table. Even in the GGGG, which was founded on pedagogical concerns, a sometimes bitter conflict has sprung up between theory and practice, with those advocating for the crucial role of theory arguing that studies in composition/rhetoric will not prosper or mature unless the field gives up its attachment to practice, to pedagogy. So I was surprised at the primacy of pedagogy at the ARS conference, and I was heartened by it as well. As Mike Leff has since remarked, at ARS, all roads lead to teaching. In his essay in this issue, Jerry Hauser offers a retrospective explanation for the marginalization of pedagogy and teaching: the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition, grounded in the paedeia and on the capacitating the individual student to lead the life of an active and responsible citizen gave way to the model of the German research institution, with its emphasis on and valorization of discovering new knowledge. This is an elegant explanation, one that leads to Hauser's equally elegant peroration: capacitating students to be competent citizens is our birthright It has been ours since antiquity. Modern education has stripped us of We need to reclaim it. What became increasingly clear to me is that a second key term that animated the conference - performance - must also play a central role in any such reclamation. In retrospect, I realized that every keynote address touched not only on pedagogy but also on performance: the performance of teaching; the performance of civic duty and discourse; the performance of student speaking and writing; the performance of disciplinarity. As I listened and talked, the focus on performance and pedagogy seemed perfectly to bridge the rhetoric/composition and communication traditions to which

Abstract The 1896 presidential campaign included, among many other campaign techniques, a large number of songs that praised and condemned the opposing candidates, William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan. The campaign songs, whose likely purpose was to inspire the candidates’ followers, were epideictic in tone and spirit. By presenting a rhetoric that paralleled epideictic speeches, the songs enabled the opposing candidates themselves to uphold a sense of their own decorum. The songs used values as rhetorical devices; however, the songs ‘purpose was to gain a practical political end rather than to uphold moral principles.

Abstract Although scholars have acknowledged a Stoic influence on Quintilian, they have been reluctant to see Stoicism as providing the philosophical underpinnings of the Institutes. Against this scholarly hesitance, this essay argues that Stoic ideas are at the heart of Quintilian's educational program. Quintilian's ideal orator is the Stoic Wise Man with this difference: he is trained in Ciceronian eloquence. Furthermore, Quintilian's definition of oratory is based on the Stoic view of rhetoric as an essential science that enables the orator to meet the social responsibilities inherent in the Stoic ideal of the virtuous life.

Abstract Rhetorical criticism has generally considered the public memorial speech as a moment of re‐establishing societal equilibrium and unity after the disruption of death. In the case of the Worcester Firefighters Memorial Service in 1999, however, the unifying impulses of the speakers both create a public forum for the memorial service and prevent it from cohering. While the eulogists draw on ceremonial conventions of epideictic rhetoric, the line between epideictic and deliberative rhetoric blurs as the memorial speeches become the occasion of differing, divided, and uncertain claims about how the public is constituted and who has grounds to memorialize the dead. Accordingly, we argue that neither unity nor disunity has rhetorical priority, placing the burden instead on rhetorical analysis to account for the complex relations between unity and disunity.

Abstract The pronouncements of the Delphic oracle, when employed in the Athenian boulos as guidelines for political policy, broke down traditional distinctions between myth and reason. Self and Other, and fate and agency. An examination of the public life of the Delphic oracle as recorded by rhetoricians such as Gorgias, Plato, Arisotle, and Isocrates suggests that Ancient Greek rhetoric, in praxis, resisted logical dichotomization and fostered holistic self‐fashioning via civic action. This study of the Pythias pronouncements serves as a cautionary tale for attempts to discipline rhetoric in the modern academy. It also recuperates crucial historical texts authored by women into the Greek rhetorical canon.

Abstract This essay argues that the construction of the 18th and 19th century British rhetorical theories and canon was strongly influenced by the debates between Catholic (or Anglo‐Catholic) traditionalists and Protestant critics over religious hermeneutics, by examining three specific cases, the Phalaris controversy, definitions of the enthymeme, and the reception history of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. The major figures discussed are Richard Bentley, William Temple, John Gillies, Edward Copleston, Sydney Smith, Richard Whately, James Hessey, and William Hamilton. Notes Research for this study has been supported by many sources, including a fellowship at the Tanner Humanities Center of the University of Utah, a Rocky Mountain MLA Huntington fellowship, and a First Year Assistant Professor grant from Florida State University. An NEH Summer 2002 Seminar, "The Reform of Reason,"; which I co‐directed with Jan Swearingen, provided an opportunity to revise this essay, and I owe thanks to both the NEH and the fifteen seminar participants. I also owe thanks to several libraries, including the Bodleian Library, the British Library, Cambridge University Library, Folger Shakespeare Library, Huntington Library, Rylands Library, St. Deiniol's Library, and the ILL staffs of Montana State University and Florida State University libraries. I also would like to thank Marilyn Faulkenburg, Thomas Miller, Christopher Stray, Jan Swearingen, and Karen Whedbee for many useful comments.

Abstract Aristotle's discussion of political deliberation fixes the practice in that it implicitly addresses critiques found in the writings of earlier authors such as Aristophanes, the Old Oligarch, Thucydides, Plato and Isocrates. His perspective likewise fixes political deliberation by securing its status as the central means by which the polls is able to confront the contingent and pursue the expedient. The acceptance of argument from probability, and the disciplining of that argument into proper and improper forms, made his position in favor of political deliberation tenable. Finally, his perspective fixes political deliberation in that it stands as the latest and most thorough treatment of the subject in the classical period.

Abstract The Creek colony of Thurii, founded in southern Italy around 444, BCE, was apparently planned to be a model polis. Any reconstruction of that plan must be speculative, but the stories about Thurii suggest that its design incorporated three entities not usually linked — a democratic constitution, an orthogonal street layout, and a rhetorically‐oriented educational system. In trying to understand what these things might have had to do with one another, I examine the thought of three individuals who, sources tell us, participated in the colony: the rhêtor Pericles, who apparently instigated the project; the designer Hippodamus, who supposedly laid out its streets; and the sophist Protagoras, who reportedly wrote its laws. If indeed these three collaborated on Thurii, what they may have sought there was a “bounded”; democracy, a community of free and equal citizens, governed by open, transparent, and agonistic means but guided by an unmistakable sense of rightness, something manifest not only in the town's constitution but in its educational system and built space as well.

Abstract This essay analyzes the web of persuasion named the “knowledge enthymeme”; in the public policy debate over mandatory newborn HIV testing in the United States and especially New York. Bringing together classical rhetorical theory and Foucault's theory of the knowledge‐power loop, the essay explains how the conceptual/argumentative frame of the knowledge enthymeme helped shape the knowledge‐power relations of mandatory newborn testing in dangerous ways. Ultimately, the knowledge enthymeme blocked more responsive approaches to testing by exaggerating the beneficial effects of testing and its knowledge, ignoring the contingenices of this knowledge, and bypassing the “situated knowledges “ of the women it targets.

Abstract Archaic lyric provided opportunities for reflection on civic power and community values before the invention of prose and the emergence of democracy in Athens with its attendant rhetorical practices. The fragments of Sappho and Alcaeus, poets of 6th‐century Lesbos, can be read along side each other for an exploration of gender difference. Sappho's evocations of memory bespeak the situation of women excluded from public spaces of political deliberation and subject to displacement and loss. Gendered practices of memory are traced from Sappho and Alcaeus through the memory systems of classical Greek and Roman rhetoricians.

Abstract This article examines two texts important in American rhetorical history, Caleb Bingham's 1794 American Preceptor and Eliphalet Pearson's 1802 abridgment of Blair's Lectures. These schoolbooks challenge accepted historiographies of late eighteenth‐ and early nineteenth‐century rhetoric in two ways: they demonstrate that neoclassicism encompassed a much greater variety of ancient figures and texts than is usually presumed, and they suggest that neoclassical rhetorics operated within a more complicated sociopolitical milieu than is commonly understood. Bingham and Pearson emerge as key figures in early American rhetorical history and their books prompt reconsideration of American neoclassicism.

Abstract At Rhetoric 3.12 Aristotle describes differences between a “written”; style, which he associates with the epideictic genre, and a “debating”; style suited to deliberative and forensic oratory. This paper argues that this seemingly unproblematic distinction constitutes a crucial indicator of the orientation of Aristotle's style theory as a whole. Passages throughout Rhetoric 3.1–12 offer precepts oriented toward the medium of writing and the reading of texts‐that is, they describe a specifically “written “ style of prose. In contrast, Aristotle largely neglects the agonistic style of practical oratory, a fact that can be taken as another indication of the literary, and literate, bias pervading Aristotle's account of prose lexis. In addition to disclosing nuances in the text of Rhetoric 3, this study contributes to our understanding of the ways in which early rhetorical theory responds to and is constrained by the circumstances of written composition and oratorical performance.

Riding the third wave of rhetorical historiography Lives of Their Own: Rhetorical Dimensions in Autobiographies of Women Activists by Martha Watson. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. 149 pp. Activist Rhetorics and American Higher Education 1885–1937 by Susan Kates. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001. 157 pp. Genteel Rhetoric: Writing High Culture in Nineteenth‐Century Boston by Dorothy C. Broaddus. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. 136 pp. The Resistant Writer: Rhetoric as Immunity, 1850 to the Present by Charles Paine. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 261 pp. Progressive Politics and the Training of America's Persuaders by Katherine H. Adams. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999. 169 pp. Terms of Work for Composition: A Materialist Critique by Bruce Horner. New York: State University of New York Press, 2000. xxvi + 308. Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric, edited by Alan G. Gross and Arthur E. Walzer. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Press, 2000. xi + 237 pp.

Abstract All but ignored by historians of rhetoric, Quintilian ‘s meditations on improvisation not only allow us to situate the Institutio Oratoria more firmly in its historical context but also require us to confront issues of performance, issues which (again) have been largely overlooked in historical studies of rhetoric. Quintilian's many references to extemporaneous speech participate in a broader argument the author advances against what he sees as the unscrupulous activities of the delatores (informers working in the service of the Emperors) and the theory of oratory implicit in their oratorical practices. In particular, Quintilian uses the topic of improvisation as an argumentative vehicle to reject the dependence of the delatores on natural ability, to parody their artless attempts at extemporization, and to promote his own educational program based on study, training, and art. Quintilian's discussion of improvisation also invites consideration of oratorical performance: the occasions upon which an orator should switch from a scripted to an improvised mode of performance, the psychological and affective experience of the orator who speaks extemporaneously, and the response of listeners who (according to Quintilian) regard the extemporized oration as more credible, more engaging, and more authentic than the one prepared in advance. For Quintilian, improvisation is the mode of performance to which all oratory should aspire.

Abstract It has generally been assumed that Aristotle's Rhetoric was unknown or insignificant in nineteenth century England. This article shows that it was an important text in the period and argues that the pattern of publication of translations, editions, and student aids concerning Aristotle's Rhetoric reflects a pedagogical movement beginning with a broadly humanistic tradition of the Noetic school at Oriel College, Oxford at the beginning of the nineteenth century and ending with a more philologically oriented approach at Cambridge towards the end of the century. Among the authors discussed are John Gillies, Thomas Taylor, Edward Copleston, Richard Whately, Prime Minister Gladstone, Daniel Crimmin, Theodore Buckley, James Hessey, James Rogers, Richard Claverhouse Jebb, Edward Cope, and J. E. C. Welledon.

The Establishment of Modern English Prose in the Reformation and the Enlightenment by Ian Robinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 218 + xv pp. Voices in the Wilderness: Public Discourse and the Paradox of Puritan Rhetoric by Patricia Roberts‐Miller. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999. 209 + xiii. The View from On the Road: The Rhetorical Vision of Jack Kerouac by Omar Swartz. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999. 130 pp. Electric Rhetoric: Classical Rhetoric, Oralism, and a New Literacy by Kathleen E. Welch. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 256 pages. Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres by Gerard A. Hausen Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1999. 335p. A Short Rhetoric for Leaving the Family by Peter Dimock. Normal, Illinois: Dalkey Archive Press (Illinois State University), 1998. 118 pp.

Abstract This essay argues that the genealogy of the schism between poetics and rhetoric can be understood best by contrasting the attitudes of Plato and Aristotle towards the social impact of the poetic tradition with those of Isocrates. Plato seeks to discipline the process of poetic and political enculturation by splitting mimesis as representation from mimesis as performative imitation and audience identification. Aristotle completes Plato's Utopian project by constructing a hierarchy wherein representational mimesis of the tragic plot in the Poetics is central to a philosophical life, while mimesis as performative imitation of style in the Rhetoric is of marginal utility. In so doing, he counters Isocrates’ performative conception of speech education, according to which identification and performance both activate and sustain one's civic identity.

Abstract Rhetoric of science has come a long way in understanding the role of analogy in scientific language and thought. Further progress is hindered, however, by the analytic and methodological limitations native to classical rhetoric. Accordingly, I turn to cognitive psychology for an adequate theory of analogy through which to remedy this stalled research program. Using Dedre Gentner's Structure Mapping theory of analogy, I investigate the role of the Saturnian analogy in Hantaro Nagaoka ‘s theory of atomic structure and show how the analogy constrained him, serving sometimes as an asset to his argument and other times as a serious liability.

r he three essays that follow offer readings of one of the most popular and l widely known rhetorical performances of recent times, the Earl of Spencer's 1997 funeral eulogy for his sister Diana, Princess of Wales (text reproduced in Appendix). Each section of the paper offers a reading of the address through a critical lens derived from the rhetorical theory of a different canonical theorist, respectively (and chronologically) George Campbell, Richard Whately, and Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Three questions animate this project. The first concerns the relationship of theory to criticism. Neither Campbell, Whately, nor the Belgians discusses the role of rhetorical criticism or offers an apparatus that facilitates it, although each of their theories includes tenets applicable to criticism. How well do their theoretical tenets work at the level of criticism; do any of these theorists introduce concepts that analysis of rhetorical practice might challenge? The second question concerns influence. The three theorists we chose are particularly interesting from this perspective because all of them, to varying degrees, are selfconscious about their debts to the rhetorical tradition. Campbell cites and affirms the contributions of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, Whately incorporates Campbell, and the Belgians incorporate Whately incorporating Campbell. What is the nature of this influence? Are the differences among these theorists differences of perspective or of emphasis? We are aware of the complexities surrounding the question of influence since it was broached by T.S. Eliot in Tradition and the Individual Talent, subsequently complicated by Harold Bloom, and more recently challenged by Michel Foucault. Our purpose is not to arbitrate these quite different views (which raise their own questions about the nature of influence) but to prompt a discussion of the nature of influence within the rhetorical tradition. The third question concerns the idea of progress in rhetorical theory. In what sense can each of the theorists be said to have made an advance over his predecessors? Does rhetorical theory progress as science typically progresses, by making obsolete that which it builds on? Or does rhetoric resemble philosophy, a discipline in which responses to a relatively constant problem set seem to benefit from their predecessors' work without replacing it?

Comparative Rhetoric by George A. Kennedy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (1998): ix + 238 pp. Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition by Janet M. Atwill. Cornell UP, 1998. xvi; 235 pp. Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric edited by Richard Leo Enos and Lois Peters Agnew. New Jersey: Hermagoras Press of Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998.265 pp. Rhetoric and the Arts of Design by David S. Kaufer and Brian S. Butler. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996.322 pp. The Rhetoric Canon edited by Brenda Deen Schildgen. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1997.251 pp.

(1999). Aristotle on epideictic: The formation of public morality. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 5-23.

T his paper is an effort-which none of the characters in the dialogue maketo listen carefully to Socrates' most famous attack on rhetoric. This locus classicus is found in the Gorgias within the opening pages (461-466) of Socrates' conversation with Polus. In it he charges that rhetoric, Gorgias' skill, is a defective art and no more than base sucking up or flattery. He completes his condemnation by likening rhetoric, as Shakespeare's Faulconbridge does, a millennium and a half later, to sweet, sweet poison for the age's tooth, (King John, I, I), a debased confection in place of healthy food. It is not only characters in the dialogue who fail to make a searching inquiry into Socrates' condemnation. Many rhetors since that time, smarting from the sting of what Plato has Socrates say about rhetoric, have taken the passage as unproblematically expressing a blanket condemnation of rhetoric. But I believe it is not necessary to read Socrates' condemnation of rhetoric in that fashion, and I attempt a reading in which the condemnation is less absolute. In the interest of disclosure I should say that I undertake this analysis in an Aristotelian spirit. My interest in the passage began with Aristotle's allusion to it in the opening sentence of his Art of Rhetoric (1354a) and continues to be guided by what I believe Aristotle has to teach about rhetoric. It is also guided by a realization that Plato, a dramatic poet, achieves his effect, in dramas that have little overt action, almost entirely by rhetoric, that is, by the creation of a coherent voice through which we approach each character. Whatever Plato's ultimate understanding of the relation of wisdom and art (Roochnik), any argument that Plato has contempt for rhetoric must, sooner or later, deal with his constant and loving use of it in his work. The passage in question forms the first part-about a fifth of the bulk-of Socrates' dialogic encounter with Polus. This paper is thus limited to reflection on a fragmentary part of that encounter, for Socrates' condemnation of rhetoric emerges in four Stephanus pages. Nevertheless, it is a fragment that, like all of the pieces of a Platonic dialogue, spirals into place in the larger encounter and beyond that in the dialogue as a whole. I argue that our assessment of Socrates' argument is decisively affected by our grasp of the dramatic context in which it appears in several decisive ways. One obvious event that demands dramatic explanation is Polus' intervention in what had been a discussion between Gorgias himself and Socrates and his subsequent ineptness. Indeed, Polus is so inept that the pages barely qualify as part of a conversation, or at least a conversation with Polus. What we have is

A though there was a hiatus of several decades in the early part of the Twentieth Century in which little work was done on the rhetoric of the early Church, there has been a healthy revival of interest in the subject and the number of studies is growing rapidly. Robert Grant's Greek Apologists of the Second Century, Averil Cameron's Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, Peter Brown's The Body and Society and Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity, Harry Gamble's Books and Readers in the Early Church, George Kennedy's Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors, William Schoedel's Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of and Pheme Perkins' Ireneus and the Gnostics: Rhetoric and Composition in Adversus Haereses Book One represent only a very limited listing of recent work. Some of these works present studies of relatively long sweeps of time (Cameron, Brown, Gamble, Kennedy), while others focus on restricted time frames (Grant) or individuals (Schoedel, Perkins). I come to this body of scholarship not as an historian but as a rhetorical theorist interested in studying the rhetoric practiced by leaders within orthodoxies. The development of the early Church and the rhetoric used by those instrumental in its formation provide an excellent case study from which characteristics of such rhetoric can be gleaned and used to explain the formation of orthodoxies in our own day. A typical episode in the rhetoric of orthodoxy is to identify those who appear to be legitimate insiders, but are not, and to expose them as alien. In the last quarter of the Second Century C.E., Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, wrote an extended treatise, consisting of five books, titled Adversus Haereses, commonly titled Against Heresies in English and abbreviated as AH. 1 The purpose of this work, he says, is to protect the sheep from certain men who outwardly are covered with sheep's clothing (Irenaeus AH I, Preface, 2). The first book contains a summary of the tenets of various heretical sects, the second consists of arguments, based on reason, that destroy the validity of these heretical doctrines, and the three remaining books set forth the doctrines of the orthodox faith in contrast with the teachings of the heretics. My present objective is to investigate the rhetorical strategies employed by Irenaeus and in so doing to describe a theory of rhetorical expose. Because Against Heresies is quite long and because much of the expose portion of the work is in Book I, I have restricted my analysis primarily to that book.

T his paper deals with the embodiment in Cicero's De Oratore of a particular rhetorical method. The method is referred to by the Romans as controversia and by the Sophists before them as antilogic and involves the conduct of argument by placing two or more opposing claims in juxtaposition. I will argue that instead of discussing controversia in a formal manner, by abstracting its general nature and detailing its logical parts (diaeresis), Cicero chooses to dramatize controversia in order to transcend abstract principles and allow his students direct access to argument in action. In a word, Cicero chooses to perform the subject, and in so doing to give substance or body to theory and pedagogy. In the process, he also pursues his own most cherished philosophical objective, which is to bring res and verba, the thing and the word into synthesis. I will further suggest that the rhetoric of embodiment which Cicero develops in De Oratore is replete with interesting pedagogical implications. Like much of Cicero's published work, De Oratore was intended to serve as a model for imitation by others (see Axer 59). In this case, the text models both a particular set of rhetorical principles and a distinctive pedagogical stance for teaching them. I am particularly interested in what the pedagogy of De Oratore has to say to us today about an appropriate approach to the teaching of argumentation.' But before I begin with Cicero, De Oratore, antilogic, controversia, and the rhetoric of embodiment, I would go back even further in history, from Rome to the eastern Mediterranean, from the eloquence of Cicero to the arguments of Odysseus, that other man famous for dealing with contention (Odyssey 1.2). You will recall that when Odysseus leaves Calypso after seven years as a captive on her paradisal island, he sails away on a log raft which breaks up in a large storm sent by Poseidon. When it looks as though he is doomed to drown, he laments that all he has accomplished on his way home will perish with him. Would that I had died on the fields of Troy, he cries, where all my deeds would have been noted, praised, and preserved (5.306-12). What Odysseus is concerned with here is his kleos: his fame, honor, stature, renown, that standard heroic obsession that one's reputation will ring out under heaven (8.74f; cf. Thalmann 60-69). Instead of a life of adventure marked by kleos, however, Odysseus in Book V is faced with death at sea, a death unmarked and lonely (5.312). What is notable for us in this episode is that kleos appears only to exist in the reports on one's life; i.e. it requires discourse to give it substance, enough substance to transcend the event itself. Consequently, when Odysseus arrives on land and is taken by Nausikaa to the Phaiakian court, he acts the part of a poet as well as a hero (11.68-69) by recounting his adventures and in the process giving form to his kleos. Discursive enactment, therefore, becomes the only way in which the unforgettable experi-

(1998). Writing the third‐sophistic Cyborg: Periphrasis on an [in]tense rhetoric. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 51-72.

Few correspondences have enjoyed the widespread readership of the paternal lletters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, fourth earl of Chesterfield. Never actually intended for the public eye, the epistles were written for the explicit purpose of preparing the Earl's son, Philip Stanhope, for a distinguished career in politics. Following the tradition of the courtesy book established in Cicero's De Officiis and further developed in Castiglione's Ii Cortegiano, Chesterfield infused Renaissance courtly rhetoric with Enlightenment pragmatism, rendering it more accessible and applicable to everyday life than ever before. First published posthumously in 1774, the expansive collection of letterswhich extended from 1737, when the lad was a mere five years old, to his protege's untimely death in 1768-became a standard manual for self-improvement. Despite the condemnation of moralists such as Samuel Johnson, who quipped that the letters teach the morals of a whore, and the manners of a dancing master, twelve editions were brought out in England and Ireland by 1803. On the Continent, the letters were soon published in various forms in Leipzig (1774-76), Paris (1775), Amsterdam (1786), and Vienna (1800), with Spanish and Italian translations coming out in the mid-nineteenth century. The first American edition was published in 1779. In both Europe and America, new editions, abridgements, selections, adaptations, and even parodies of the letters have been popular since the their original publication. In the United States, for example, an adaptation entitled Principles of Politeness was published over twenty times before 1820. In the twentieth century, several significant editions have been issued, including texts by Everyman Library (1929; last reprinted in 1986) and Oxford's World's Classics (1929; most recent edition, 1992). The Earl's letters no longer find their way to aspiring lads' nightstands, yet it is interesting to note that twenty quotes from them are included in the sixteenth edition of Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (1992). Because discussion of oratorical prowess-which Chesterfield believed was essential for success in civic life (see Son 1: 521)-pervades the letters, his characterization of persuasion has long been scrutinized by students of rhetoric. In the nineteenth century, Thomas De Quincey praises the Earl as so accomplished a judge [of rhetoric] (111), yet most scholars of our era express skepticism toward the Earl's advice, downplaying his commitment to the full scope of

African‐American Orators: A Bio‐Critical Sourcebook, edited by Richard W. Leeman. Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood, 1996; xxvi+452. Rhetoric and Political Culture in Nineteenth‐Century America, edited by Thomas W. Benson. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1997. 200 pp. Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science, edited by Alan G. Gross & William M. Keith. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press. 1997. 371 pp. Reading in Tudor England, by Eugene R. Kintgen. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996; 235 pages. Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory, edited by Christopher Lyle Johnstone. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996. Paper, 196 pp.

Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition: From Plato to Postmodernism by James L. Kastely. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. Sage, Saint, and Sophist: Holy Men and Their Associates in the Early Roman Empire by Graham Anderson. London & New York: Routledge, 1994.289 pp. Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, by Gary Reiner. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996; 318 pp. The Rhetoric of Law edited by Austin Sarat and Thomas L. Kearns. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994, 332 pp. Green Culture: Environmental Rhetoric in Contemporary America edited by Carl G. Herndl and Stuart C. Brown. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1996.315 pp.