Over forty years have passed since five hundred participants gathered at the first conference on College Freshman Courses in Composition and Communication.l Since then our discipline has undergone unprecedented change, often characterized by moments of intense excitement, pride and astonishing growth: the watershed 1963 CCCC; the proliferation of journals, university presses and conferences; the institution of nationally recognized graduate programs in composition; the development of research communities; the addition of new rhetoric and composition positions within departments of English; and the expanding role of writing workshops and writing-across-the-curriculum projects. These years of development have also provided an opportunity and a need to look back on the issues that have defined and continue to shape our discipline. It is with this goal in mind that we have assembled the following annotated bibliography. Our purpose here is to provide a resource guide and overview for those who wish to familiarize themselves with the kinds of practices, research questions, and histories which have constituted our profession in the last forty years. The materials we collected, therefore, explore such fundamental concerns as the professionalization of composition, the formation of a canon, the interrelationship of rhetoric and composition, received histories of the field, and areas which call for further research. The the scope of this collection is necessarily limited-in both chronology and content; its focus is representative rather than definitive, descriptive rather than prescriptive. The works catalogued here were selected from several sources: ERIC searches, separately published bibliographies, conference programs and surveys, journals with annually published bibliographies, data base searches, and journal directories. We have attempted to provide a fair distribution of chronological coverage and, as is the case in more recent years, to choose the most representative works when the number of items in a given category became unwieldy. We have chosen these materials because they fit one or more of the following criteria: (1) They attempt to define our discipline; (2) They trace major shifts in theory and/or practice; (3) They present meaningful overviews of theoretical and pedagogical issues and research questions; (4) They summarize large, significant areas of research; (5) They affirm connections or establish distinctions between rhetoric and composition and other disciplines.

Classical practitioners of the art of rhetoric such as Demosthenes have long been a familiar part of the rhetorical tradition, but subsequent periods have generally been confined to the history of rhetorical theory, with little attention paid to political rhetoric or public discourse. We need to develop a more rhetorical perspective on the history of rhetoric to encompass rhetoric's dual nature as an intellectual discipline and a practical political art. Such a perspective would focus on the domain between the learned culture and the public experience, the domain where rhetorical theories are applied to discursive practices to formalize who can speak, how controversial issues are to be argued, and what political purposes such arguments serve. The eighteenth century is a dynamic period in the history of rhetoric precisely because the domain between the educated world and the public sphere was transformed by the expansion of the reading public.' Rhetoricians such as Hugh Blair were the first professors to lecture on modern culture because they taught students who came from the provinces of the English reading public.2 General histories of college English studies tend to ignore eighteenth-century rhetoricians in the assumption that the study of English is more or less synonymous with the study of literature (see Baldick, Graff, McMurty, and Palmer).3 We need more rhetorically oriented histories of modem cultural studies, not just because literature specialists have tacitly accepted the erasure of rhetoric from such studies, but also because the formation of disciplinary knowledge is a rhetorical process, and the domain of rhetoric is where disciplines set themselves off from related discourses and public audiences. Rhetoricians first introduced English into the university curriculum in the middle of the eighteenth century in Scotland, America, and elsewhere in the cultural provinces. All of the figures whom Howell has categorized as New rhetoricians came from outside the centers of English education, while Oxford and Cambridge

(1993). “The rhetorical situation revisited”. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 30-40.

First, I'd like to offer analysis of Halasek's and Bernard-Donals' utterances, but it may also be taken as rhetorical or tendentious characterization of them. If we begin with the two points of reference provided by our session's title, and Rhetorical Criticism, I think we can say that Halasek identifies herself as rhetorical critic or theorist who belongs to community of like-minded rhetorical critics and theorists, one that together poststructuralist thought, social constructivism, and writing and pedagogy. For them Bakhtin's vilification of is problem and his alternative rhetorical tradition is an opportunity. Halasek can summarize the Bakhtin attacks and distance herself from it as a definition of that is not ours and she can appropriate as much more congenial to herself and her fellow rhetoricians the rhetorical tradition of oppositional genres and discourse moves with which Bakhtin identifies the novel. She imagines Bakhtin's hostility to as consequence of his hostility to the official languages of Russia during his lifetime and imagines herself and her colleagues as also opposed to a of oppression but apparently not confronted with similar authoritarian political situation. Instead of identifying herself exclusively with parodic rhetoric opposed to an official monologic she posits dialogic rhetoric which can contemplate the tensions between polemic and rhetorics in the professional and pedagogical tasks of textual and cultural analysis. Bakhtin offers her better way of doing what rhetorical critics were already doing. Halasek welcomes Bakhtin's tension-filled genres and joyful relativity in prose that is relatively free from tension and clear about where it stands. She can separate Bakhtin's vilification of from his celebration of it, choose one side over the other, and even explain away Bakhtin's adherence to the side she rejects as function of his particular historical situation. She is at home with the listeners she posits and brings them Bakhtin they can use without having to change their minds about or politics. Bemard-Donals, on the other hand, writes tension-filled and ambivalent prose in the name of escaping from relativism and uncertainty. He is not at one with what he takes to be the community of contemporary rhetorical but sees it as plagued by the collapse of distinction between science and that he somehow wants to reassert He persists in commitment to theory or science or dialectic or history that he believes rhetorical critics like Fish and Rorty have subsumed under rhetoric, and he turns to Bakhtin not to assimilate him to the consensus in current rhetorical but to find way out of the impasse of current rhetorical theory. The Bakhtin he needs for his purposes is not the celebrant of parody and joyful relativity but the theorist of the socially constituted subject who can provide rhetorical criticism with scientific model for understanding how subjects are formed in language. In effect, he wants to substitute Bakhtin's sociolinguistics of the subject for the psychology of the subject Plato calls for in the Phaedrus as the scientific foundation for that could then know, as he put it in his

Erasmus uses female persona, named Folly, to deliver his written mock-encomium The Praise of Folly, published in 1511. Critics have taken little note of her gender, however. Walter Kaiser compares her briefly to Mother Nature (94-95), while still associating her fertility connotations with the phallus. Thomas 0. Sloane refers to her in passing as a kind of muse or other traditionally female and therefore nonrational spirit (67). It does seem somewhat anachronistic and historiographically to dwell on her gender, since, as Sloane notes, female personae were common in Renaissance written orations and dialogues, and they can be traced back through medieval and classical avatars. Female fools were not uncommon, either; William Willeford suggests that Erasmus's is derived from the fool named Mother Folly who figured prominently in carnivals of the late medieval and early Renaissance periods (177). But when I read The Praise of Folly, I can't take the persona's gender for granted, especially as she's depicted in Holbein's illustrations for an early edition of the Praise: woman in fool's cap and bells and an academic gown, speaking from rostrum to an audience of men similarly attired (see Moriae 1989). I became fascinated by this image of while doing research on Erasmus for Bruce Herzberg's and my recent anthology, The Rhetorical Tradition (1990). I couldn't figure out how to get my improper interest in the female persona into this book, however, because an anthology, while of course enacting an ideological agenda through its inclusions and exclusions, must pretend that its choices are not tendentious, that they always rely on arguments already made. Foregrounding in the anthology seemed to go too far in the direction of violation of these constraints of the anthology genre-or at least, so I was informed by my co-author and many of the readers thanked in our Preface, so I bowed to consensus. Now, however, I would like to elaborate the argument I wished had already been made, view that unabashedly articulates Erasmus and with postmodern feminist concerns. I'd like to explore the possibility that the persona of the female fool may have interesting implications for post-modern rhetors, particularly those of us who wish to espouse left-oriented or liberatory political values. My paper, therefore, will have two parts. First, I will consider the implications of Folly's gender as an aid to interpreting Erasmus's mock-encomium, notoriously difficult text. In the process of explaining the interpretive problems in The Praise of Folly, I will provide sort of anatomy of skepticism which, I believe, has bearing on the post-modern situation. Then in the second part, I will try to explain my fascination with The Praise of in terms of problems confronting contemporary rhetorical studies. The problem in which I am particularly interested is that of finding compelling version of rhetorical authority from which to speak on behalf of oppressed groups in spite of the

The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric, edited by Winifred Bryan Horner. Rev. ed. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990; pp. x + 260.

Years ago Loren Eiseley that life is most interesting on the margins. You never know what you'll find along the shore of the ocean or along the edge of a highway, or, to extend the notion into metaphor, on the peripheries of our minds or in transitional periods of history. Those of us in English departments who were working on modem rhetoric when it was new and not on literary history and criticism recognize the truth of the observation. The center of things tends to be, if not known, at least more familiar, constrained, and stable. But on the margin experience is more ambiguous and unpredictable, perhaps because it is there that different systems come together. Or perhaps because the people who work there are deliberately looking for change. Whatever the case, on the margin there are more possibilities, and change is easier. It is only on the margins, Eiseley says, that there is the possibility of Eiseley's metaphor for the new and unpredictable in the process of biological evolution. have dragons, he says, one must have change; that is the first principle of dragon lore. Otherwise everything becomes stale, commonplace, and observed (28). Recently at the Conference on College Composition and Communication, Janet Emig, Janice Lauer, and I presented papers on a panel entitled Reconsidering the Discipline: Three Perspectives on the History and Present Situation of Rhetoric and Composition. The title captures well the thrust of Janet Atwill's proposal for the panel; she had asked us to provide eyewitness accounts of the development of the New Rhetoric, at least the New Rhetoric as it was emerging in departments of English, and also do something a good deal more risky, i.e., to characterize the present state of the discipline.l As I worked on my paper, a precursor of this one, I found myself coming back again and again to how much of my own career has been on the margin of English studies. It's still true to some extent today, but at that time to work in the field of rhetoric was to really be on the margin. I doubt if any of us wanted to be marginalized in the profession; but those of us who didn't already know the score soon learned from their better adapted colleagues that rhetoric was a doubtful discipline that belonged, if anywhere, in speech departments, and that composition was not a proper academic discipline at all but merely a service that English departments performed, often with reluctance, for the rest of the academic community. Unless we also had a more respectable intellectual interest on which we could base our reputations, we were on the margin of the margin. To many of our colleagues we were beyond the fringe. I remember that I began looking into rhetoric in the late fifties and early sixties as the result of reading and being puzzled by C.S. Lewis's well-known comment that what separates the modern scholar most from the study of the Renaissance is his ignorance of classical rhetoric. At the same time, caught up in

(1990). The formation of college English: A survey of the archives of eighteenth‐century rhetorical theory and practice. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 261-286.

Persuasive discourse, either as a separate mode of discourse (Kinneavy 1971) or as a distinctive part of argumentative discourse,2 frequendy remains part of the overall writing assignment for our composition students. Although we may disagree as to how to define exactly or teach persuasive discourse in writing classrooms, we have more or less followed the tradition of Western classical rhetoric with respect to our basic understanding of it--although few of us would now restrict ourselves only to discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion (Aristotle 1960: 7). For example, we teach our students different sub-types of persuasive discourse and ask them to apply ethical, emotional (pathetic) and logical proofs to their own persuasive essays; we select political speeches, polemic essays or modern advertising materials as prime examples of how different persuasive strategies and techniques can be most effectively invoked to achieve their respective objectives of winning. To varying degrees, many composition text books have adopted, and thus perpetuated this normal way of doing things with persuasive discourse.3 In so doing, however, we have--perhaps unknowingly--imparted to our students two problematic notions, which underlie much of what has been believed to be persuasive discourse. The first assumes that persuasive discourse is grounded in or predicated on conflict or confrontation, which it aims to overcome or eradicate. The second perceives audience as both external4 and oppositional, whom persuasive discourse is intended to transform or convert. It is these two notions and their probable consequences that I will discuss first in this essay. Following this discussion, I will draw upon, respectively, Grice's cooperative model of conversation (1975; 1989) and Burke's concept of (1962) to propose a new heuristic model5 of persuasive discourse, one that takes cooperation through identification as a core constituent and provides a dynamic setting that is conducive to rhetorical diversities. Finally, I will consider some potentials of this new model in our writing classrooms.

In last twenty-five years, field interpersonal communication has expanded tenaciously, establishing connections with disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and even literary studies.l Although this rapid expansion indicates current strength and vigor field, it also indicative a veritable identity crisis. Suggests Arthur P. Bochner, Interpersonal communication is a vague, fragmented, and loosely-defined subject that intersects all behavioral, social, and cultural sciences. There are no rigorous definitions that limit scope field, no texts that comprehensively state its foundations, and little agreement among its practitioners about which frameworks or methods offer most promise for unifying field. (1985, 27) There is nothing inherently wrong with vagueness, fragmentation, or loose definitions, course; Renaissance Humanism was built on such a foundation. What is unsettling about interpersonal communication's crisis character, though, is reticence exhibited by field's theorists to explore connections with distant past. Perusing footnotes, indexes, and bibliographies contemporary interpersonal communication research and pedagogy, one works back only as far as relatively recent [social scientists and other] figures such as Martin Buber, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Eric Fromm, R. D. Laing, and Eric Berne. This suspiciously brief official history is verified in Handbook Interpersonal Communication, in which Mark Knapp and Gerald Miller assert that concerted interest in study interpersonal communication processes and outcomes is relatively recent origin, and that the study interpersonal communication did not commence to bloom profusely until 1960's (8). Knapp and Miller's suggestion that the study interpersonal communication has thus far progressed only from infancy to adolescence (1 1) further supports widespread belief that discipline is extremely young. The central argument this essay-that scholars interpersonal communication, in an effort to define their discipline in modern terms, have mistakenly cut themselves off from their true roots and from much liberal-arts tradition-is built upon three principal contentions. First, interpersonal communication is not of relatively recent origin, but is, in fact, an ancient study, dating back at least as far as Plato. Second, interpersonal communication grew out a healthful, invigorating competition with ancient rhetorical theory and practice. In order to understand claims, power, and limitations one, we must have an appreciation for, or at least an understanding of, other. Third, interpersonal communication specialists, both in their research and in classroom, should highlight their field's long and enlightening battle with

Contemporary scholarship in rhetoric has recognized Ralph Waldo Emerson's interests in rhetorical theory. James A. Berlin, for example, who identifies Emerson's romantic rhetoric, in opposition to the rhetoric of the late eighteenth century, as a precursor of several modem tendencies, deals adequately with Emerson in his survey of nineteenth-century American writing instruction (42-57). Berlin's treatment of Emerson will be assumed here, qualified by Judy F. Parham's point that the tension between private and public in Emerson is a productive one (80). However, although he implies that Henry David Thoreau's position does not differ significantly from Emerson's, Berlin does not treat Thoreau's theoretical statements separately. Similarly, although dozens of literary scholars have investigated Thoreau's rhetorical practices, to my knowledge no analysis has been done on his rhetorical theory.l My intention is to show that Thoreau presents a theoretical version of eloquence distinct from Emerson's. Although this presentation is by no means unified in terms of a quintessential reduction, a consistent version does emerge across various works and personas, one fundamentally incompatible as well with the psychological rhetoric Thoreau studied in Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric and the opinions of Harvard's Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory, Edward T. Channing. Thoreau's thoughts on eloquence, I suggest, should be aligned with a much different tradition in order to highlight their unique character.

Richard has, of course, been a part of the contemporary philosophical and rhetorical scene for some time now. As, in fact, someone whose views I oppose pointed out to me recently: Rorty has been around long enough now to be attacked by any number of people for his naive view of the nature of discussion, that is, the nature of rhetoric. This same person also subsequently informed me that even (blank) [a well-known literary and rhetorical theorist whom he judged a particularly keen thinker] has moved Rorty. Needless to say, this essay is not at all about Rorty's so-called naivete (although I shall return to my colleague in the conclusion), nor is it about moving beyond anyone. It is, instead, about the usefulness of both Rortian attitudes toward philosophy and a Rormian perspective on the history of Western theories of knowledge, in illuminating the exceptional position in which rhetoric finds itself today. It is an essay about joining or, perhaps, his having already joined us, rather than about passing him--joining him, as Michael Oakeshott would have it (and as, in fact, cited by in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, in a passage which appears later in this essay), not in a universitas, a group united by mutual interests but rather in a societas, persons whose paths through life have fallen together united by civility rather than a common goal (318). That I might illustrate that this is not only a sensible but also a profitable course of action, I will in the pages following first give a brief overview of Rorty's life and published works (at least as they bear upon the possibilities of Rorty-asrhetorician or, better still, Rorty-as-harbinger-of-rhetoric), then outline what I take to be the main thrust of his work (what some would call his activity as a historian of ideas), then relate this thrust to present-day philosophy (as sees it growing and changing in the light of our awareness of that history--a central Rortian point: it is the historical-philosophical frame which gives both clarity and coherence to any explanation of where, intellectually, we have been or might go), and--finally--speak to what I at least find to be Rorty's considerable and enduring importance to the contemporary rhetorical scene. In doing the above, I may well offer more detail than is really needed by some already well-versed in Rorty's work. If this is the case, I ask the indulgence of these readers--in order that I might have the opportunity to address, and attempt to persuade, those who lack such a familiarity. First, life and works.

building on some common ground with the audience. Aristotle's concept of the enthymeme as a fundamental source of persuasion requires the audience to grant or accept the premises of the rhetor. Aristotle says that a speaker should start from opinions accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize (1395b). Similarly, for Kenneth Burke the key term in rhetoric is identification, which is established between a persuader and an audience by finding some substance or underlying ground in common (consubstantiality) (I 969, 19-23). But what if there is little or nothing in common between a speaker and an audience? What if the audience does not accept the value system of the speaker? How could a speaker proceed in such an extreme case? As Wayne Booth explains, classical rhetoric offers little help, for it assumes

The metaphor has gained much importance as of late. No longer simply a decorative feature of discourse, the trope has obtained an epistemological and ontological dimension. No longer merely a figural flourish of prose, the metaphor has acquired an important role in the study of human understanding. Hence, thanks to theoretical rehabilitation and philosophical reconsideration, metaphorical analysis has become an important and popular pursuit for many disciplines--philosophy, literary theory, linguistics, rhetoric, et al.2 While the insights generated and the discoveries made by metaphorical analysis are significant and worthy of much study, we will take as our point of departure the limits of such critical inquiry. This essay offers another perspective, a sort of theoretical intervention which examines from another angle the study of discourse. Rhetorical theory, it will be reasoned, benefits from a perspective which considers the metonymical features of discourse. As such, the comparative advantages of either metaphorical or metonymical analysis are not measured by which one is true, but rather by which one is most useful for a given project. Simply put, a metonymical perspective can recognize and explain a terrain outside the scope of metaphorical analysis. The change we consider in this essay does not render useless or inadequate previous explanations, but rather opens a space or a zone from which to critically evaluate what has been previously overlooked. As noted, the popularity and importance of the metaphor has never been greater. Whether it be conceived as function, cluster, or nature, the research has sought, and continues to seek, the habitation of the metaphor within all symbolic discourse. Indeed, it may be safe to assume that the study of metaphors remains an important and integral component of contemporary rhetorical theory. As a result of theoretician diligence and persistence, a wide array of techniques exist for the study of metaphors within discourse. For examples of such metaphorical research we turn briefly to the work of I.A. Richards, Max Black, Edwin Black, and Paul Ricoeur. Perhaps no one should figure more prominently than I.A. Richards in the reappraisal of the trope. Using the metaphor, his New Rhetoric, seeks to recover meaning, to stabilize and neutralize the somewhat figural moments of discourse.

The five canons, parts, faculties, or functions of rhetoric are among the most constant features in the systematic treatment of the art (Scaglione 14). In many respects, they constitute the basic pattern of all theoretical and critical investigations into rhetorical art and practice (Thonssen 86). The five--invention (content, discovery), disposition (arrangement, organization), style (diction, elocution), memory, and delivery (presentation)--were canonized in Latin rhetoric as inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio or actio. They were important in Greek rhetoric as heurisis, taxis, lexis, mneme, and hypocrisis. While the exact origin of the canons is unknown, the five recur in rhetorical theory from antiquity to the present, where they command attention individually and collectively. Studying rhetoric, most agree, requires studying its canons. They are the sub-disciplines of the main, the lesser arts of the greater (Connors 64). They allow separate analysis and study of a complete five-part system (Murphy 83). They are the aspects of composing which work together in a recursive, synergistic, mutually dependent relationship (Welch Paradox 5-6). In part, the very history of rhetoric consists in changing relationships and interrelationships between them (Mahony 14). The canons apply to both encoding and decoding, forming a complete system for both generating and analyzing discourse (Welch Ideology 270). They represent not only the concepts with which the rhetor must deal and which he must master, but also the aspects of the rhetorical act which the critic examines and evaluates (Thonssen 86). In speech studies, minor changes in the meanings of the five terms have been developed in various treatises, but the pattern remains the same (Thonssen 86). In composition studies, the five canons are one of two prmary theories which dominate the discipline (Welch Ideology 269). The structure which has dominated both disciplines' textbooks, however, is a truncated one. Rarely has the five-part scheme been presented completely and explicitly. In speech studies, the fourth canon--memory--has virtually been dropped and usually receives incidental treatment (Thonssen 87). In composition studies, the first three canons--invention, arrangement, style--organize the vast majority of current textbooks, but the last two--memory and delivery--are typically deleted without a word of explanation (Welch Paradox 5, Ideology 270). This deletion, when explained, has been attributed to changed conditions in the law courts (Kennedy 105), to memory's absorption under disposition (Kennedy 210; Mahony 14) and, most often, to the western world's shift from orality to literacy. The tendency has been for modern rhetorical theory to abandon, remove, neglect, limit, or misunderstand both memory and delivery. On the other hand,

As Otto A. L. Dieter argues in his landmark essay, (1959), Greek concepts of motion provided classical rhetoricians with a theoretical framework for analyzing and conducting rational argument.' The various ways in which motion can be considered contrary, the different grounds on which contrary motions come to rest, the array of faults impeding contrary motions--all these distinctions, borrowed from the philosophic study of kinesis (movements) and metabolai (changes in Being), were applied by rhetoricians to describe and facilitate amphisbetesis, or the moving apart of opposing assertions. Stasis theory, then, provided a paradigm essential to the two phases of the rhetorical process: Noesis (Cogitation) and Poiesis (Production). This paradigm allowed the rhetorician to reflect upon--and upon reflection, to judge--whether a conflict of wills and a contest of assertions truly existed, and therefore, whether the matter under dispute was properly rhetorical. Likewise, the paradigm allowed him to anticipate the question to be resolved, the strategies of accusation or defense most likely to be adopted by the opponent, and consequently, the posture or strategy best suited to winning the dispute. If it is true that theories of classical rhetoric have survived because of their utility, then stasis theory has proven indispensable: for over 2000 years it has survived within the canon of rhetorical theory.2 Its most recent incarnation has taken place during the past four decades. Motivated first by historical interest, rhetorical scholars are now reconstituting stasis theory for much the same reason that prompted its formalization in the second century B.C.: the need to find an overarching paradigm that shapes the vast array of distinctions belonging to rhetorical theory into a practical system, one capable of identifying and resolving current communication problems.3

Allan Bloom's controversial book The Closing of American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished Souls of Today's Students2 has attracted popular attention to a position that already had been gaining currency among critics of American higher education. These critics charge that we educators are failing our students individually and our community collectively by failing to teach morality--by failing to attend to role our disciplines play for students and practitioners in formation of their character. But questions as complicated and momentous as whether education in a discipline should aim to develop moral character, how it should do so, and how it can do so without damaging spirit and skills of free inquiry are hardly such simple questions as they are often depicted, including by Bloom. This is especially true for a discipline so frequently accused of complicity with evil, or even inherent immorality, as rhetoric. Indeed question of rhetoric's role in formation of character presents a genuine dilemma, one that is often corrupted in public controversies about moral education. On one hand, professors of rhetoric have no apparent special training in such ethical issues, nor is it clear why they would have special obligations. One does not have to be Allan Bloom or Carnegie Commission or even William Bennett to believe that all educators have some general obligation to influence their students for better, but it is not clear why or how this should devolve in a special way on teachers of reading, writing and speaking. It could do so only if ethical issues were found to be somehow intrinsic to rhetoric itself, to what we must teach if we are to succeed in teaching rhetoric at all--intrinsic, perhaps, to its evolution as a discipline and a practice, or to one of its fundamental functions. But how can this be squared with our notions of rhetoric as a neutral instrument? On other hand, contemporary rhetoricians have made it at least as clear that rhetoric has inescapable connections to human character, that these connections by their nature may be objects of distinctively rhetorical inquiry, that such inquiry may sustain and extend critical discourse, and that it may produce knowledge, including moral knowledge. For as Kenneth Burke has taught us, rhetoric is essentially involved in the definition of man, and admits of analysis in terms of those motives through which human characters are constituted and realized.3 Moreover, as Wayne Booth has explained, formation of self occurs in a field of selves; we are made of, as we make, company we keep.4 If our character is so significantly at stake in our rhetoric, then process of understanding rhetoric better would seem to hold some possibilities for better understanding of character. Or put more practically: if character realizes and reveals itself significantly in rhetoric, knowledge achieved in rhetorical education and critical discourse arising from it may make some issues in formation of our characters more a matter of our informed, free, ethically charged choice. But what does all this have to do with our alleged responsibility to inculcate a particular morality?

Michael Paul Rogin, "Ronald Reagan,”; the Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 366pp. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 209pp. Gerald Graff. Professing Literature: An Institutional History. University of Chicago Press, 1987. viii+315 pp. $24.95. Joseph Vining, The Authoritative and the Authoritarian, University of Chicago Press, 1986. In Search of Justice: The Indiana Tradition in Speech Communication. Richard J. Jensen and John C. Hammerback (editors). Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1987. 311 Pp. Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith: An Inquiry. James L. Kinneavy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. ix + 186. Literary Patronage in Greece and Rome. Barbara K. Gold. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987. Pp. xii + 267. Introduction to Rhetorical Theory. Gerard A. Hauser. New York: Harper and Row, 1986. The Variables of Composition: Process and Product in a Business Setting. Glen J. Broadhead and Richard C. Freed. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986. 169 Pp.

Before selecting the most significant passage for rhetorical theory in the work of I. A. Richards, two prerequisites seem necessary. First is a criterion or standard upon which to base a selection. The title itself (which was assigned), suggests the criterion of impact: a passage from Richards that has proven so important that it must be included in any serious discussion of rhetorical theory. Upon that basis, the passage chosen for this essay is found in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. In Chapter V, Richards writes, is the omnipresent principle of language. (1) There are to be sure other passages on metaphor that could have been chosen. This one, however, was selected because its insistence upon the ubiquity of metaphor in language necessitates using other Richardian statements about metaphor in order to make a full explanation about its importance.

Verbal Style and the Presidency: A Computer‐Based Analysis. By Roderick P. Hart. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, Inc., 1984. The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric. Winifred Bryan Horner, Editor. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1983. Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse. Ed. Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, and Andrea A. Lunsford. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizxng of the Word. By Walter J. Ong, S. J. London and New York: Methuen, 1982.

(1984). Gertrude Buck's rhetorical theory and modern composition teaching. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 14, No. 3-4, pp. 95-104.

Serious Entertainments: The Writing of History in Twelfth—Century England. Nancy F. Partner. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. 289. $18.00. Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature; An Exploration. Edited by Don M. Burks. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii + 115. $7.50. Basic Writing: Essays for Teachers, Researchers, Administrators. L. N. Kasden and D. R. Hoeber, editors. Urbana, Illinois: NCTE Publication, 1980. Pp. 185. Justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning. Chaim Perelman. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980. Pp. xiii & 181. Introduction by Harold J. Berman. Homer and the Oral Tradition. G. S. Kirk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Pp. viii & 223.

Perelman, Chaim. L'Empire rhétorique; rhétorique et argumentation. Collection “Tour Demain,” Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1977. Perelman, Chaim and Olbrechts‐Tyteca, L. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Trans, by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969. First paperback edition, 1971.

(1978). Burke's dramatism and action theory. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 8-15.

THE RHETORIC OF RELIGION, Kenneth Burke. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1970, 327 pp.

With Good Reason. S. Morris Engel, Nev York; St. Martin's Press, 1976; and Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric. Howard Kahane. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971. The Rhetoric of Renaissance Poetry. Eds. Thomas O. Sloan and Raymond B. Waddington. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1974. A Review and Counter‐Review: Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic: Studies in the Basic Disciplines of Criticism. Wilbur Samuel Howell, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975.