George Yoos was once kind enough to contribute paper to panel concerned partly with my use of the metaphor is wedge.1 Prior to that time, I had been using the metaphor only incidentally and in passing; most of the indexers of the books in which I had used it had missed it altogether. But the metaphor does encapsulate an aspect of rhetoric that I think is worth discussing in its own right. The speakers in the panel-not only Yoos, but also Carroll C. Arnold2-have already provided useful elaboration of this aspect. Here I shall discuss it further. Rhetoric, as I see it, is means-perhaps the only means-of evoking and maintaining consciousness. It accomplishes these ends by driving wedge between subject and object. For it is the instrument that objectifies stimuli or presuppositions not hitherto perceived as objects. An example of rhetoric at its most elementary level would be the question Isn't that your telephone ringing? addressed to person not hitherto conscious that his telephone was ringing. At more sophisticated level, if I have been unconsciously assuming that the death penalty is permissible punishment for some crimes, and you call that assumption into question, objectifying it as topic for discussion, you are engaging in rhetoric. In either case, you are evoking consciousness by introducing gap between subject and what can now objectively concern him. By a I simply mean whatever introduces such gap. Rhetoric has no place in transactions within systems in which there is no gap between the input of data and their acceptance. A good example is the continuity between the input of data to computer and its response to those data. The computer does not decide whether to accept the data. Of course software can be designed-and undoubtedly has been designed-providing message to the effect that certain data fed into the machine are inappropriate. But the mechanism that produces this result is merely an extension of the same mechanism through which the machine accepts other data. Consider the input ABXY. If this is acceptable, it is processed in certain way. If it is unacceptable, it is still received by the computer as input, and is processed in another way not different in principle from the first, although perhaps little more complex. The result of the second sort of processing is to produce the message ABXY is not acceptable. In neither situation, I would say, has there been use of rhetoric. For in neither case has the machine been made to stand over against its data-to take account of these data as objects. Even the machine's rejection of data fails to be an objectification of them. There was no wedge, and there is no gap. Rhetoric, as I conceive it, is the art of calling attention to situation for which objectivity is claimed. But I do not believe that any particular psychological

Abstract Karen Burke LeFevre's Invention as a Social Act Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1987. xi + 173. Chaïm Perelman, Rhetoriques. Edited with a preface by Michel Meyer. Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1989, 470 pp.

(1989). (Un)creating taste: Wordsworth's Platonic defense in the preface to Lyrical Ballads. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 333-347.

Of all the bruising confrontations between the capitalist and communist power blocks perhaps none was so staggering as the Cuban missile crisis. Most Americans patriotically rallied around our determined young president in this great moment of crisis, but there were other Americans who spoke with a different voice then who presumed to disagree with the dominant opinion. These were the voices from the left, now the old left. Their rhetorical response is my subject. By concentrating on several specimens written from a leftist perspective in response to a single event, I create a framework for analyzing the discourse of an ideology to demonstrate the influence of that ideology on and argument, together with the usefulnesses of an analytic method. Antecedent to this analysis are particular considerations about style, argument and method which lead to other considerations peculiar to the relation of political discourse to the world. Because the event focused opinion strongly, and time gives perspective, I have chosen written and oral reactions to the Cuban missile crisis. In addition to selections of written from three leftist newspapers, the National Guardian, The Weekly People, and The Catholic Worker, I have included speech samples on the same topic from Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State, as a contrast to the rhetoric of the left. To analyze this discourse I use Walker Gibson's style machine as he calls it developed to account for distinctions...in the voices addressing (115), distinctions which he breaks down into tough, sweet and stuffy talkers. Gibson's machine, consisting of sixteen grammatical-rhetorical qualities, is appended (A). Other available descriptions or classifications of or argument are Huntington Brown's deliberative, expository and prophetic, Edwin Black's exhortation and argument, and Aristotle's topics. Brown and Black analyze thought methodology with some consideration of style. The neo-Aristotelians, on the other hand, consider and thought combined into argumentative methods. I follow the classical topics in considering rhetorical argument (Rhetoric chs. 22, 23, 24; Corbett 94-132). My particular assumptions are that belief influences style, that while prose styles can be typed individual differences remain, that includes varieties of diction, syntax, and argument Further, I seek an attitude towards language, an attitude, however, influenced not by cultural or individual psychology, but by political belief. Because political writers argue, their arguments common to all rhetoric can also be typed. Argument creates patterns which shapes. For Gibson is a matter of sheer individual will, a desire for a particular kind of self-definition no matter what the circumstances (24). Political belief can condition will. For both Marie H. Nichols (75), and Edwin Black (Persona) reveals distinctive political personalities. In selecting a usable analytical methodology I had either to invent my own, or use an existing one. I chose Gibson's because we share similar concerns. I want to know what kind of voice speaks. What does the use of that voice imply? How do I determine trust? I also want to know the attitude of that voice towards subject and audience. If Gibson can help to answer these questions, then I accept his work saving the necessity of inventing yet another method, concentrating instead on the results produced. In general, stylistics seems more of a discourse on method than on results. Although we want to know what ails us, naming is not enough. To know that Dorothy Day talks tough does not suffice. We know there are other names than tough, sweet or stuffy. The point is not just to label, but to penetrate into the thought behind the voice aided by a given point of view. Gibson describes his work as primitive. Primitive, yet legitimate because applied he yields insight His method reveals attitude just as psychiatric categories, which might also be called primitive, reveal motive. If the arguments which pattern are traditional and discernible, their correlations with are not as clear. The advertiser, for example, speaks sweetly with recognizably dubious argument. Those political voices purring and storming at us must also be judged by how they argue so their trustworthiness can be determined. We can uncover falsehood by showing how a statement varies from reality--plain lying. We can discover understanding of mental illness by probing the discordance the aberrant mind creates

Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking. Kathleen Hall Jamieson. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Reviewed by Martin J. Medhurst. T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 236 pp. Reviewed by Warren Rubel. The Sophists. Harold Barrett, Novato, CA: Chandler and Sharp Publishers, 1981. 85+ix pp. Reviewed by William Benoit Electric Language: A Philosophical Study of Word Processing. Michael Heim. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1987.305 pp. Reviewed by Ronald A. Sudol. Thoreau's Comments on the Art of Writing, Richard Dillman, editor. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987. Reviewed by J. L. Campbell. Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition, Winifred Bryan Horner. New York: St. Martin's, 1988. Reviewed by James Leonard. Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis, by Robert N. Proctor. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. Reviewed by Allen Harris. Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science, Charles Bazerman. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 332 pages. Reviewed by David S. Kaufer.

Advocacy Advertising and Large Corporations: Social Conflict, Big Business Image, the News Media, and Public Policy. Prakash Sethi. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977. Pp. 355. Controversy Advertising: How Advertisers Present Points of View in Public Affairs: A Worldwide Study. New York: Hastings House, 1977. Pp. 189. Caught in the Web of Words: James A. H. Murray and the Oxford English Dictionary. Katherine Maud Elisabeth Murray. Preface by R. W. Burch‐field. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Pp. 386.