ABSTRACT Scholars of rhetoric have long held that there is such a thing as a “rhetorical tradition” and that that tradition began within the context of ancient Athenian democracy. Recently this tradition has been expanded to “traditions” that include “non-Western” approaches. Scholars of democracy have similarly dislodged the notion that democracy, broadly understood, developed only in ancient Greece. This essay expands our understanding of both rhetorical traditions and their relation to democracy by studying the interrelation of rhetorical and deliberative practices found in the history of India. Specifically, it explores how one highly influential school of Indian deliberation, Nyaya, grew alongside practices of public reasoning and self-rule in the gaṇa/saṁgha (so-called ancient Indian “republics”), revealing a similar, but unique, impulse to rhetoric beyond the Athenian/Western context. From this study we also gain insight into the current struggle for democracy worldwide.

ABSTRACT This article considers the relationship between rhetoric and judicial activism. A term first coined by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in 1947, the charge of judicial activism has become ubiquitous in modern political and legal discourse, frequently leveled at judicial opinions with which one disagrees. Despite focused attention from legal scholars in recent years, the term continues to defy easy definition. After surveying the relevant legal scholarship on judicial activism, this article considers a widely decried example of activism in action. Taking the 2003 case of Hillary Goodridge v. Department of Public Health as a case study, the authors examine the five judicial opinions, paying particular attention to how each justice justifies his or her decision with recourse to one of three rhetorical forms (legal analysis, the discourse of science, and public consensus). We conclude that the legitimacy of judicial activism is a function of particular rhetorical forms (and not others).

ABSTRACT Philosophers have rarely been on good terms with the city and its rulers. Among the rhetorical devices with which they have defended themselves and their discipline, few have proven more reliable than the Straussian technique of “philosophic politics.” This article calls attention to a defining moment in the history of this persuasive technique: Seneca the Younger's defense of Roman Stoicism in the mid-first century CE. In light of his public advocacy and political thought, the article concludes that an expansion of the concept of philosophic politics is in order. In addition to philosophical tracts and treatises, it should be widened to include the nonphilosophical works of their authors.

AbstractThe U.S. Congress passed the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 as a part of its assimilationist plan to remake American Indians in the image of the U.S. nation. The act helped constitute a changed Native identity as it contracted reservation lines and forced an agricultural economy onto Native reservations. The Supreme Court case Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) resulted from American Indian protests of the Dawes Act, including the argument that the assimilationist plan had been implemented against Natives' will. The resulting decision granted Congress the ultimate “plenary” power to abrogate treaties without any limits because American Indians were wards. Through an analysis of the case and Indian Commissioner reports addressing plenary power, I argue that the Lone Wolf holding served as an imperial discourse that maligned American Indian identities through a parent-child relationship. This denigration manifested through Lone Wolf's construction of American Indians as cultural wards, its reduction of Native property to commodity through a westernized economic plan, and its assimilation of Native communities into dominant U.S. culture. In addition, I contend that the Lone Wolf case solidified a wider U.S. nationalism by emboldening federal power over indigenous communities through a familial rhetorical strategy.

Abstract This essay inquires into the mechanisms that regulate construction of civic eulogies in Pericles' Funeral Oration and Rudolf Giuliani's “Citywide Prayer Service at Yankee Stadium.” The inquiry focuses upon how the speeches establish the relationship between the speaker and audience, employ rhetorical topoi, and develop argumentative strategies. In the end, it becomes clear that the speeches transact praise of the dead and exaltation of civic ideals with strikingly similar approaches.

Abstract The rise of Lech Walesa from shipyard electrician to leader of “Solidarity,” international icon of freedom, and first president of democratic Poland was closely bound up with rhetoric. Walesa's idiosyncratic verbal style galvanized the masses and successfully confronted communist propaganda. The revolution of the workers on the Baltic coast was to a large extent a revolution in language. Walesa was also a skilled negotiator. As president, however, he was a controversial figure; his conception of democracy as a continuing war of words is widely credited with spelling the end of the idealistic “Solidarity” era. Today, allegations remain that Walesa was an agent provocateur and that the Polish revolution may have been a provocation that got out of hand. Some allege that Walesa's myth was a creation of Western media, a function of people's desires, and an accident of the historical moment. While there is no proof that any of these allegations are true and the documentary record reveals Walesa's undeniable rhetorical prowess and political talent, his case provides material for reflection on the relationship between history, rhetoric, and political agency.