Abstract

AbstractThe debate on the a fortiori and the universal that took place between April 1914 and April 1919 in the journal Mind has a double interest for argumentation theorists. First, the discussion is an example of a philosophical polylogue that exhibits the characteristics of a quasi-engaged dialogue (Blair Blair, J. A. (2012 [1998]). “The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument”. Argumentation 12, pp. 325–339. Reprinted in J.A. Blair, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation, pp. 231–244. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.), confirming Blair’s hypothesis that journal papers and scholarly monographs can be analyzed as turns in non-engaged or quasi-engaged dialogues. It could be said that philosophical argumentation is dialectical but not dialogical. Second, the debate is a discussion in argumentation theory. Generalism in the theory of argument claims that the very possibility of arguing depends on a suitable supply of general rules that specify what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from what kinds of data, while particularism denies this. Although the terminology may be alien, I will also show that the debate on the a fortiori and the universal was a debate on generalism and particularism.

Journal
Argumentation
Published
2022-12-01
DOI
10.1007/s10503-022-09580-8
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Citation Context

Cited by in this index (1)

  1. Argumentation

Cites in this index (2)

  1. Argumentation
  2. Argumentation
Also cites 24 works outside this index ↓
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