Can Rational Persuasion Be Epistemically Paternalistic?

Patrick Bondy

doi:10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0319

Philosophy & Rhetoric Dec 2024

Can Rational Persuasion Be Epistemically Paternalistic?

Patrick Bondy Wichita State University

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article addresses two related questions about belief, inquiry, and persuasion. The first is a question about the nature of epistemic paternalism, which is, roughly, the activity of interfering in other people’s inquiry, for their own epistemic benefit. The second question is about rational persuasion, and whether it can ever be paternalistic, or (better) whether it can be disrespectful and prima facie wrong in the same way that at least some cases of paternalism are disrespectful and prima facie wrong. The article argues that if rational persuasion is paternalistic, it is epistemically paternalistic. It then considers how best to characterize epistemic paternalism and answers a challenge to its justifiability. Finally, the article responds to George Tsai’s view that rational persuasion can be problematically paternalistic, arguing that Tsai’s central case falls short of the ideal of rational persuasion.

Journal: Philosophy & Rhetoric
Published: 2024-12-02
DOI: 10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0319
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Open Access: Closed
Topics: argument
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Can Rational Persuasion Be Epistemically Paternalistic?

Abstract

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References (18)

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