Hegel's Speculative Sentence

Andrew Haas National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract

ABSTRACT Almost all philosophers (and many non-philosophers) recognize the fundamental importance of the Phenomenology of Spirit. But Hegel's way of thinking and speaking—which he names, “speculative”—needs explaining. The example of “the speculative sentence” is helpful—for here, speculating means implying, that is, neither bringing meaning to presence nor keeping it in absence; but rather, speaking and thinking by implication. If the history of philosophy, however, overlooks what is implied, then it cannot grasp what is, and what is thought and said in the speculative sentence. Luckily, there is another way: implying that which can neither be said nor left unsaid, neither thought nor unthought. Reinterpreting Hegel's speculative sentence, therefore, for implication, for what is implied—and neither present nor absent—Haas demonstrates how to think and speak speculatively about thinking and speaking, substance and subject, being and becoming, whether in philosophy or not, even if we implicate ourselves thereby.

Journal
Philosophy & Rhetoric
Published
2021-10-01
DOI
10.5325/philrhet.54.3.0213
Open Access
Closed

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (1)

  1. Philosophy & Rhetoric

Cites in this index (0)

No references match articles in this index.

Also cites 4 works outside this index ↓
  1. “On Aristotle’s Concept of Improvisation.”
    Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology  
  2. Elements of the Philosophy of Right
  3. Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte
  4. Der spekulative Satz
CrossRef global citation count: 2 View in citation network →