ABSTRACT The article distinguishes between “anthropomorphism” and the “anthropomorphism accusation,” a term coined to describe the value-laden assumption that using so-called human terms to talk about nonhumans is always inaccurate and always to be avoided. Analyses of scientific papers and op-eds in botany, evolutionary biology, and microbial science reveal an almost pathological avoidance of anthropomorphism as well as the deeply political foundation of the avoidance—that is, while critiques of anthropomorphism are couched in concerns for accuracy, the critics themselves generally give up a measure of accuracy and instead make a morality case. Analyses of posthumanist rhetoric and science studies texts reveal a tendency to deflect the anthropomorphism accusation without consideration for the conceptual ground that is being ceded in the deflection. The article calls for posthumanist writers not to deflect, but rather to accept the accusation in order to begin making space to deploy the affinity-seeking moves that get called anthropomorphism.