Reviews 301 Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003). While there is some evidence (pp. 1, 191) that the title of this book reflects its original scope (and that of the conference that underlies it), its actual contents range much more widely around the central figure of Quintilian. Many papers are entirely concerned with the history and analysis of rhetorical theory. Nonetheless, the papers concerning law are the most coherent group and, by and large, the most ambitiously argued. After making a few general observations on the whole volume and briefly treating the contents of the twenty-five individual papers, I will turn primarily to two questions regarding the utility of the Institutio Oratoria for lawyers which make up the most sustained topics of discussion. The essays collected here were written by scholars from diverse fields (law, classics, rhetoric, literary theory, comparative literature) and of diverse, mostly European, nationalities (Spain and Holland are particularly well represented). All papers have been rendered into what is for the most part very readable English. Also, despite their origin in a conference in 2001, most of the papers come equipped with the kind of scholarly apparatus one expects in a written work. Nearly all the papers treat a single book (or smaller segment of the text) as their subject, with a few verging on being running commentaries. Jorge Fernández Lopez studies sources of authority, both for texts and for persons. Serena Querzoli views Q.'s education project in the context of concrete evidence for contemporary educational practice. Tomás Albaladejo develops a theoretically informed analysis of the three genera of oratory, tying them to communicative function more than "occasion" (narrowly defined). Olivia Robinson investigates the opportunities and pitfalls of using Q. as a source for Roman law. Ida Mastrorosa argues Q.'s text is substantively shaped by his court-room experience. Giovanni Rossi discusses the reception of classical rhetoric by (mostly) seventeenth century Venetian lawyers (this piece has the least to do with Q. specifically). Belén Saiz Noeda treats the theory of proof within and according to Q., especially with respect to the use of topoi. Andrew Lewis clarifies a usually under-translated phrase at 5.13.7 by reference to the facts of legal procedure. Maria Silvana Celentano demonstrates the value of self-exemplification in book 6. Jeroen Bons and Robert Taylor Lane translate and analyze IO 6.2 from a philosophical point of view. Richard A. Katula discusses the means of exploiting emotion in venues (ancient and modern) in which that practice is normatively disfavored. José-Domingo Rodríguez Martín investigates the relative weight of oratory (especially pathos) and law in the Roman courtroom. (Katula's piece is to some extent "how to"; Rodríguez Martin's is relatively more historical.) David Pujante's discussion of status theory shows that dispositio is not just an afterthought to inventio, but is itself constitutive of interpretation. Maarten Henket advocates the use of Quintilianic strategies to bring more predictability to judicial law-making. Jan Willem Tellegen reinterprets the 302 RHETORICA casua Curiana by reevaluating the Quintilianic evidence. Francisco ChicoRico analyzes the virtues of style and their hidden connections to the other operations of rhetoric. The editor offers two contributions of her own. In one she offers a compelling rereading of a quoted sententia (8.5.19) by consideration of the legal context. In the other she gives a similarly constructed interpretation of a troubled passage at 9.2.65-6. Barend van Heusden gives a cognitive semantic account of the notion of figured discourse. James J. Murphy explains Q.'s plan for adult education. Sanne Taekema focuses more specifically on the motives behind Q.'s choice of canon, by way of a comparison with the goals of the modern Law and Literature movement. Peter Wiilfing gives an account of ancient and modern gestural culture. Esperanza Osaba tries to reconstruct the circumstance ofjudicial appeal alluded to at 11.1.76. Vincenzo Scarano Ussani shows how the Quintilianic perfect orator is fitted to the circumstances of the contemporary (i.e. imperial) community Willem Witteveen argues that Q.'s deep rhetoric...

Book Review| January 01 2004 Review of Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003). Andrew M. Riggsby Andrew M. Riggsby 1 University Station ##C3400, Austin, TX 78712 USA Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (2004) 22 (3): 301–304. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.2004.22.3.301 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Andrew M. Riggsby; Review of Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003).. Rhetorica 1 January 2004; 22 (3): 301–304. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.2004.22.3.301 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search This content is only available via PDF. © The International Society for the History of Rhetoric You do not currently have access to this content.

The purpose of the Roman iudicia publica (as described by legal, rhetorical, and philosophical texts and even the name of the institution) was to determine whether or not defendants had violated the various “criminal” statutes which established them. Cicero’s reports of the outcome of real cases suggest a popular expectation that jurors ordinarily attempted to carry out this task. The proliferation of distinct formal charges over time and the existence of jokes about orators fooling jurors confirm this suggestion. We are thus discouraged from imagining collusion between parties and jurors in which the formal charge is understood by all to be a pretext for a competition of oratorical skill or social standing. Roman jurors wanted to believe in their verdicts. Advocates, of course, did not simply tell the truth. Rather, they responded to popular expectations by going out of their way to emphasize the (purported) truth of their speeches.