This paper studies the persuasive strategies in Pro Lege Manilia in conversation with contemporary rhetorical theory, drawing especially on the perspective of constitutive discourse and the interaction between what is in the text and what is outside. Prior receptions of Pompey by internal audiences double as sites of panegyric image construction, which was itself then instrumentalized to influence external groups. The speech self-referentially thematizes this production of authority, disclosing its rhetorical mechanisms as both performed and performative text. Cicero himself, in the process of proclaiming Pompey, crucially participates in the manufacture and mediation of the image, and in constituting ideological cohesion.

This paper studies the persuasive strategies in Pro Lege Manilla in conversation with contemporary rhetorical theory, drawing especially on the perspective of constitutive discourse and the interaction between what is in the text and what is outside. Prior receptions of Pompey by internal audiences double as sites of panegyric image construction, which was itself then instrumentalized to influence external groups. The speech self-referentially thematizes this production of authority, disclosing its rhetorical mechanisms as both performed and performative text. Cicero himself, in the process of proclaiming Pompey, crucially participates in the manufacture and mediation of the image, and in constituting ideological cohesion.

Truth-construction and -mediation are theorized both by Thucydides xyngrapheus and by the internal rhetores in his History, with tensions between these perspectives highlighting rhetorically significant moments of political communication. The historian posits the (negative) configuration “contest - pleasure - hearing - untruth - useless” as contrastive foil to his own model of “rigorous enquiry - pleasure disavowed - seeing - truth - useful.” Cleon the demagogue, in a process of rhetorical “contaminatio” or creative fusion, artfully (mis)appropriates and instrumentalizes this model in his critique of Athenian assembly culture, embedding the signature Thucydidean categories in a spirited anti-Thucydidean argument. His distinctive approach, conflating Thucydidean categories and noteworthy Peri-clean echoes, marks him as both anti-Pericles and anti-Thucydides, and signals a counter-model to the historian’s own schema of truth-construction. As such, Cleon’s tirade fits into the History’s wider concern with the corruption of political discourse over the course of the war.

Truth-construction and -mediation are theorized both by Thucydides xyngrapheus and by the internal rhetores in his History, with tensions between these perspectives highlighting rhetorically significant moments of political communication. The historian posits the (negative) configuration “contest – pleasure – hearing – untruth – useless” as contrastive foil to his own model of “rigorous enquiry – pleasure disavowed – seeing – truth – useful.” Cleon the demagogue, in a process of rhetorical “contaminatio” or creative fusion, artfully (mis)appropriates and instrumentalizes this model in his critique of Athenian assembly culture, embedding the signature Thucydidean categories in a spirited anti-Thucydidean argument. His distinctive approach, conflating Thucydidean categories and noteworthy Periclean echoes, marks him as both anti-Pericles and anti-Thucydides, and signals a counter-model to the historian's own schema of truth-construction. As such, Cleon's tirade fits into the History's wider concern with the corruption of political discourse over the course of the war.

Abstract This paper analyses Demosthene' self-fashioning in the Philippic cycle as rhetorical process, focussing crucially on the role of foresight as constituent of symbouleutic authority and justification for his uncompromising political line. To legitimate his role as adviser, Demosthenes needed continually to proclaim his own competence. In the early days and before Philip was a major issue, Demosthenes constructs his foresight through “entechnic” arguments based on probability. Over time, self-referential passages that invoke his own prior interventions become notable sites of quasi-“atechnic” self-justification. These are further enhanced by a group of mutually reinforcing images that articulate the need for prudent foresight.

This paper analyses Demosthenes’ self-fashioning in the Philippic cycle as rhetorical process, focussing crucially on the role of foresight as constituent of symbouleutic authority and justification for his uncompromising political line. To legitimate his role as adviser, Demosthenes needed continually to proclaim his own competence. In the early days and before Philip was a major issue, Demosthenes constructs his foresight through “entechnic” arguments based on probability. Over time, self-referential passages that invoke his own prior interventions become notable sites of quasi-“atechnic” self-justification. These are further enhanced by a group of mutually reinforcing images that articulate the need for prudent foresight.