Abstract Enthymemes are arguments that are not fully articulated, often omitting a connection between premise and conclusion but sometimes also other information that is crucial for their interpretation. This implicitness poses challenges for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. We use the concept of “argument form” as employed in the argument classification framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments to address this issue. By developing an algorithmic procedure grounded in this concept, we provide a method for explicating missing statements and connections condensed in enthymemes. Our approach contributes to understanding the pragmatics of argumentation, as it offers a formal framework for analysing how the interpretation of implicit elements in argumentation arises from apparent non-sequiturs. The algorithmic procedure we developed can function as a guideline for human annotation of argumentative discourse and is also suitable for implementation in (AI-assisted) annotation software for argument mining.

AbstractIn this paper, we formulate a procedure for assessing reasoning as it is expressed in natural arguments. The procedure is a specification of one of the three aspects of argumentation assessment distinguished in the Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA) (Hinton, 2021) that makes use of the argument categorisation framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA) (Wagemans, 2016, 2019, 2020c). The theoretical framework and practical application of both the CAPNA and the PTA are described, as well as the evaluation procedure that combines the two. The procedure is illustrated through an evaluation of the reasoning of two example arguments from a recently published text.

The practice of justifying scientific explanations generates argumentative patterns in which several types of arguments may play a role. This paper is aimed at identifying these patterns on the basis of an exploration of the institutional conventions regarding the nature, the shape and the quality of scientific explanations as reflected in the writings of influential philosophers of science. First, a basic pattern for justifying scientific explanations is described. Then, two types of extensions of this pattern are presented. These extensions are derived from philosophical accounts of requirements for the quality of explanations and the choice of the best explanation from a number of candidate explanations respectively. The description of the second extension will make clear how pragmatic argumentation plays a role in argumentative patterns within the scientific domain.

In this contribution, I will develop a comprehensive tool for the reconstruction and evaluation of argumentation from expert opinion. This is done by analyzing and then combining two dialectical accounts of this type of argumentation. Walton’s account of the ‘appeal to expert opinion’ provides a number of useful, but fairly unsystematic suggestions for critical questions pertaining to argumentation from expert opinion. The pragma-dialectical account of ‘argumentation from authority’ offers a clear and systematic, but fairly general framework for the reconstruction and evaluation of this type of argumentation. The tool is developed by incorporating Walton’s critical questions into a pragma-dialectical framework.

In the preface of Defending Copernicus and Galileo, Finocchiaro (2010) carefully explains how the book differs from the other books he has written on Galileo so far. Regarding the subject matter, the new book partially overlaps with The Galileo Affair: A