ABSTRACTRhetoricians usually consider Plato's Republic as a work dedicated to political philosophy. As such, it is ostensibly antidemocratic and thus antirhetorical. But if we focus on the reason for the political allegory—the investigation of justice in the soul—it is clear that Plato is interested in Burke's question: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” Accordingly, this article employs the terms of Burke's pentad in order to articulate the rhetorical significance of Plato's own drama of psychic motivation. Ultimately, I read the degenerating constitutions of the Republic as a rhetorical typography that not only identifies audience types and how to influence them, but also offers a map of psychic transformation that addresses Socrates's famous challenge to rhetoric in the Phaedrus.

It is a disciplinary commonplace to identify Plato as the enemy of rhetoric. While it is also common to suggest a more complex role for Plato and his dialogues in contemporary rhetorical studies, this is often treated as a revision of his traditional role. In this article, I question the historicity of the narrative that Plato is the historical enemy of rhetoric. I investigate the role that Plato played in the rhetorical tradition from Demosthenes to Du Bois and compare it to how he is framed in the contemporary discipline - first, in disciplinary histories and second, in contemporary theory. What I find is a distinct disconnect between his traditional treatment and the contemporary construction of his place in the tradition.

ABSTRACT The Panathenaicus is often referred to as one of the weakest and most enigmatic of Isocrates’ orations. It has been criticized for lacking innovation, coherence, and rhetorical style. Furthermore, it concludes with a curious use of dialogue otherwise foreign to Isocrates. In this article, I read the dialogue alongside the apparently digressive proemium and argue not only for the speech’s internal unity, but for its creativity and intellectual complexity. I demonstrate how the Panthenaicus connects Isocrates’ Panhellenic project with his civic-minded paideia in a way that simultaneously identifies Academic philosophy and attempts to subordinate it to Isocratean philosophia.

Book Review| June 01 2018 The Rhetoric of Plato's Republic: Democracy and the Philosophical Problem of Persuasion The Rhetoric of Plato's Republic: Democracy and the Philosophical Problem of Persuasion. By James L. Kastely. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015; pp. xvii + 260. $35.00 cloth. John J. Jasso John J. Jasso Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Rhetoric and Public Affairs (2018) 21 (2): 383–386. https://doi.org/10.14321/rhetpublaffa.21.2.0383 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation John J. Jasso; The Rhetoric of Plato's Republic: Democracy and the Philosophical Problem of Persuasion. Rhetoric and Public Affairs 1 June 2018; 21 (2): 383–386. doi: https://doi.org/10.14321/rhetpublaffa.21.2.0383 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveMichigan State University PressRhetoric and Public Affairs Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. © 2018 Michigan State University Board of Trustees2018 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

ABSTRACT Among Aristotle’s arts of argumentation, two are directly linked to archai, or first principles. Analytic deduces from them and dialectic tests their veracity. This article situates rhetoric as likewise useful for philosophical investigation in Aristotle’s own system by demonstrating how the Rhetoric assigns to rhetorical practice attributes that are uniquely related to the archai—without which investigations into and based on them would be impossible. That is, given the primary nature of the first principles as described by Aristotle, the strategic use of metaphor is the only intellectual machinery he has for articulating, disseminating, and gaining acquiescence for them.