Book Review| January 01 2008 How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical MythologyPlato the Myth Maker How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical MythologyBrisson, Luc; Tihanyi, C.Plato the Myth MakerBrisson, Luc; Naddaf, G. Margaret D. Zulick Margaret D. Zulick Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Philosophy & Rhetoric (2008) 41 (3): 300–304. https://doi.org/10.2307/25655319 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Margaret D. Zulick; How Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical MythologyPlato the Myth Maker. Philosophy & Rhetoric 1 January 2008; 41 (3): 300–304. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/25655319 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressPhilosophy & Rhetoric Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2008 The Pennsylvania State University2008The Pennsylvania State University Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

he question of the existence of a Hebrew concept of per­ suasion arises as a subordinate pofrit in James BCinneavy's book, The Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith. Kmneavy's thesis is that the Christian notion of TTIO-TIC, faith as dis­ tinct from the Hebrew concept of faithfulness or trust, 'emunâ, owes its origin the Greek concept of TTIO-TIC, beUef as persuasion or proof. In the process of proving this thesis, Kinneavy cites G. Berfram's Hebrew supplement Rudolf Bultmann's essay on -rreidu} in the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Berfram comments that bibUcal Hebrew has no word corresponding TTeidu), to persuade (Bultmann 1). From this, and from the con­ cordance the Septuagint which indeed shows that no Hebrew verb was franslated with Greek ireido) in its active fransitive form, Kirmeavy draws the conclusion that this apparent lack is conceptual—that what is lacking is an awareness of a reflective and analytical concept of persuasion as such (54). In my opinion, this conclusion, whUe not in itself incorrect, is unwarranted by the evidence Kinneavy attests, which instead points a more specifie difference between disparate concepts of persuasion, whether pragmatic and impUdt, as in the Hebrew fradition, or reflective and analytical, as in the Greek.