Thomas A. Discenna Davos Redux: Language and Ethics in the Work of Cassirer and Rhetorical Theory I As I had not expected to find it in him, I must confess that I have found a neo-Kantian here in Heidegger.1 f the history7 of Western thought is replete with individuals that one might euphemistically label as "characters," prone to extremes not only in their thought and writings but in their private lives as well, then Ernst Cassirer must be regarded as something of an outlier.2 Recognized by his contemporaries for an unerring sense of equanimity, his evenhandedness as a scholar was a value that he affirmed even when it may have perhaps been better to lay down gauntlets and more forcefully defend positions he held dear? Indeed, at the conclusion to the famous Davos Disputation, a performance was held at which the participants, Cassirer and Heidegger, were caricatured by their students, Emmanuel Levinas playing the part of Cassirer repeating "I am in a conciliatory mood" over and over while flour flowed from atop his head, and out of his pockets, a "cruel allusion to Cassirer's intellectual poverty and 1 Ernst Cassirer in Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics. 5th Ed., enlarged. Trans. Robert Taft. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 193. It should be noted that this phrase and much of Cassirer's opening remarks do not appear in the two other translations of the Davos Disputation. 2See, for instance, Simon Critchley, The Book of Dead Philosophers (New York: Vintage, 2008); Andrew Shaffer, Great Philosophers who failed at love (New York: Harper Perennial, 2011). 3This is not to suggest that such positions did not exist only that his defense ot them bore the stamp of a conciliatory attitude that balanced even the most extreme of positions. Rhetorica, Vol. XXXVII, Issue 2, pp. 189-197, ISSN: 0734-8584, electronic ISSN: 15338541 . © 2019 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website, at http://www. ucpressjoumals.com/reprintlnfo.asp. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.2019.37.2.189 190 RHETORICA defeat/'4 As much as it may be true that Levinas's caricature mocked his teacher's "failure" at Davos it is simultaneously an allusion to Cassirer's fundamental equability, a trait that permeates his work and, apparently, his very being. Thus, it seems strange, or perhaps entirely appropriate, that such a character should, in this contemporary age of extremes, be found at the center of contentious intellectual disputes regarding the meaning and importance of his philosophical legacy. Following an extended period when studies of Cassirer were, more or less, moribund save for stalwarts such as John Michael Krois and Donald Philip Verene, a renewed interest in his work seems to have taken root, though, perhaps inevitably, there seems no hope of consensus regarding what it all might mean. Now that very unCassirerean spirit of contention seems to have come to the field of rhetorical studies where in this journal two articles representing contrasting interpretations of Cassirer's intellectual contributions to our understanding of rhetoric have been published in recent years.5 My ambition in the first article was threefold: First, to con­ tribute to the literature surrounding the now famous debate between Cassirer and Heidegger at Davos by reading it as an instantiation of the ongoing conversation between rhetoric and philosophy; second, through such a reading to question recent efforts to appropriate Heidegger's work for advancing metaphysi­ cal claims for rhetorical work; and, finally, and most importantly, to initiate a conversation among rhetoricians concerning the utility of Cassirer's work by offering "a case for reading Cassirer's philos­ ophy of symbolic forms as both a metaphysical and normative ground for a rhetorical theory whose central purpose is to construct a decent, cultured, and critical humanism."6 In respect to these goals the first essay seems to have been mostly successful. While they have little to say about the context of Davos, Bengtson and Rosengren seem to accept, in their "contrastive critique" to my article my major contention that...

This essay takes up a discussion concerning the 1929 debate between the philosophers Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger by reading it as an instatiation of an ongoing dilemma within the field of rhetoric. I argue that the Davos meeting may be productively read through the lens of rhetorical theory and that such a reading can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of this event. The essay concludes by making a case for Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms as a normative ground for a rhetorical theory whose central purpose is to construct a decent, cultured, cosmopolitan, critical humanism.

This essay takes up a discussion concerning the 1929 debate between the philosophers Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger by reading it as an instatiation of an ongoing dilemma within the field of rhetoric. I argue that the Davos meeting may be productively read through the lens of rhetorical theory and that such a reading can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of this event. The essay concludes by making a case for Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms as a normative ground for a rhetorical theory whose central purpose is to construct a decent, cultured, cosmopolitan, critical humanism.