Abstract Mailloux and Leff urge us to seek a transdisciplinary ground for the study of rhetoric; this essay agrees but argues that neither Leff nor Mailloux has taken sufficient notice of the institutional and historical differences between Speech Communication and English, thus rendering the putative ground unstable. By offering an tentative account of the distinctive general orientation of Speech Communication rhetoricians, I hope to engage a substantive dialogue on the practical conditions of an interdisciplinary study of rhetoric.

Abstract In his essay “Disciplinary Identities: On the Rhetorical Paths between English and Communication Studies,”; Steven Mailloux laments the separation between rhetoricians in English and Communication and issues a call for them to join a multi‐disciplinary coalition. Mailloux tries to connect the two by studying their disciplinary histories, and I respond to his account of developments in Communication. While his history of the discipline seems flawed in detail, I argue that his main point holds true and is a matter of considerable importance: Communication‐rhetoricians generally have adhered to a scientific rather than a “rhetorical, hermenemic”; conception of disciplinarity, and this commitment has hampered their ability to enter into interdisciplinary endeavors. But there is also another significant difference between rhetoricians in the two disciplines. Communication rhetoricians, for a variety of reasons, have a weaker sense of internal disciplinarity, and I argue that an unstable disciplinary self‐conception results in a confusion between disciplinary rhetoric located at a particular academic site and the global rhetoric of disciplinarity. Dealingwith this problem presents a major problem for Communication‐rhetoricians and for those who seek to establish effective interdisciplinary ties between English and Communication.

A though there was a hiatus of several decades in the early part of the Twentieth Century in which little work was done on the rhetoric of the early Church, there has been a healthy revival of interest in the subject and the number of studies is growing rapidly. Robert Grant's Greek Apologists of the Second Century, Averil Cameron's Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, Peter Brown's The Body and Society and Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity, Harry Gamble's Books and Readers in the Early Church, George Kennedy's Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors, William Schoedel's Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of and Pheme Perkins' Ireneus and the Gnostics: Rhetoric and Composition in Adversus Haereses Book One represent only a very limited listing of recent work. Some of these works present studies of relatively long sweeps of time (Cameron, Brown, Gamble, Kennedy), while others focus on restricted time frames (Grant) or individuals (Schoedel, Perkins). I come to this body of scholarship not as an historian but as a rhetorical theorist interested in studying the rhetoric practiced by leaders within orthodoxies. The development of the early Church and the rhetoric used by those instrumental in its formation provide an excellent case study from which characteristics of such rhetoric can be gleaned and used to explain the formation of orthodoxies in our own day. A typical episode in the rhetoric of orthodoxy is to identify those who appear to be legitimate insiders, but are not, and to expose them as alien. In the last quarter of the Second Century C.E., Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, wrote an extended treatise, consisting of five books, titled Adversus Haereses, commonly titled Against Heresies in English and abbreviated as AH. 1 The purpose of this work, he says, is to protect the sheep from certain men who outwardly are covered with sheep's clothing (Irenaeus AH I, Preface, 2). The first book contains a summary of the tenets of various heretical sects, the second consists of arguments, based on reason, that destroy the validity of these heretical doctrines, and the three remaining books set forth the doctrines of the orthodox faith in contrast with the teachings of the heretics. My present objective is to investigate the rhetorical strategies employed by Irenaeus and in so doing to describe a theory of rhetorical expose. Because Against Heresies is quite long and because much of the expose portion of the work is in Book I, I have restricted my analysis primarily to that book.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes I would like to thank Thomas Willard and Theresa Enos for their comments on an early version of this essay. I also thank the RSQ readers for their insightful and constructive comments.

T he critical commonplace that rhetoric simply declined in direct proportion to rise of Romanticism has thankfully come under increasing scrutiny. In 1989, for example, Susan Jarratt questioned Donald C. Stewart's observation that the most notable feature of history of rhetoric in nineteenth century was its absence (73) and established constitutive role of rhetoric in literary and critical writings of Victorian Walter Pater. More recently, Don Bialostosky and Lawrence Needham have argued that the hesitancy of of rhetoric to consider political, cultural, or material factors when discussing rhetoric and Romanticism has been due to their willingness to accept at face value what Romantic authors have said about writing. For example, they have accepted uncritically pronouncements about Romantic genius that place author outside lines of dependency and relationship-and beyond concerns of rhetoric. Consequently, they write, historians of rhetoric have been curiously ahistorical in their accounts of rhetoric and Romanticism . (8). And just last year, almost as if in response to Bialostosky and Needham's assessment, Rex Veeder demonstrated how political and rhetorical principles informed Romantic pulpit practice in nineteenth century. He finds that What Romantics suggest is that purpose of art, including art of writing, is rhetorical in that it encourages act of identification and by so doing allows auditors to transcend their world view through imaginative participation with another (316). Rather than dismissing Romantic discourses as arhetorical or contentedly relegating Romantic texts to conservative pedagogies of taste, these rightly inquire into complex political and social conditions that impelled production and reception of Romanticism. Further, they implicitly or explicitly view their work as having important institutional consequences for literary studies, rhetoric, and composition. That is, if Romanticism has often been elided from histories of rhetoric for its aesthetic affiliations, this brand of revisionist historicism takes as its primary political motive opportunity to revisit-and to qualify-such founding Romantic oppositions as imaginary and factual, reading and writing, literary and rhetorical. In words of Bialostosky and Needham, A new investigation of relationship between Romanticism and rhetoric may lead to a rapprochement between literary and rhetorical branches of English studies (as well as between English and Rhetoric departments) whose separation was founded upon and is sustained by commonplace story of end of rhetoric and rise of literature in Romantic period (5).

James L. Kinneavy, who was until this year the Blumberg Centennial Profes sor of English at the University of Texas, has been one of the major influences on the development of composition for more than 25 years. His bestknown book, A Theory of Discourse, published in 1971, is credited by many in our field with promoting the revival of rhetoric in university English That book was followed in 1976 by Aims and Audiences in Writing and Writing-Basic Modes of Organization (Both written with John Cope and J.W. Campbell). Kinneavy's theory of discourse relies on his definition of discourse as any utterance having a beginning, middle and end, and a purpose. He explained his theory graphically by means of his well-known communications triangle. this interview, conducted in May 1996 in Austin, Texas, he offers some ways that the triangle can be used in teaching writing. He also uses the trianglewith its acknowledged debt to Jakobson-to generate his theory of the major aims of discourse. Using this taxonomy, Kinneavy attempts to explain the basic organizational pattern of each aim of discourse. But Kinneavy does not wish to be known solely or even principally as a taxonomer, for, as he says, taxonomy is only a part of theory, and he has extended much of his influence as a theorist and historian of rhetoric. His 1987 book, Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith, explains how the new testament idea of faith grew out of the use of the term pisteis by Isocrates and Aristotle. Kairos is another term frequently associated with Kinneavy because of his lucid explanation of the term in his work. Kinneavy is credited with demonstrating the moral aspect of kairos, establishing a link between it and justice by arguing that to be moral and just means to observe the proper measure in action and words. At the end of the interview, with typical Kinneavian modesty in response to a question about how he looks back on his career as a scholar and teacher, he concedes that In the discipline of rhetoric, tried to recognize the importance of history and the importance of theory and the importance of the empirical. Finally, with a touch of pride, he closes with this admission: I think one of the most important contributions gave to rhetoric as a discipline was as one of the people-Corbett comes to mind; a lot of other people come to mind-who gave rhetoric a respectable name as a scholarly discipline in English departments. Few, if any, of the many members of our profession whose minds have been touched by Kinneavy would disagree.

T here is a long-standing tension between the community and rheto ricians of with regard to the status of truth and the objectivity of knowledge. While neither the community nor the community of rhetorical scholars can be said to be monolithic in their views, the scientific view ascribes objective, permanent, and universal status to the facts produced by scientists, whereas the view supported by many rhetoricians describes facts as products of social conditions, and therefore marked by inter-subjectivity, transience, and situational delimitations. The classical account thus sees facts as discovered, whereas the sophistic rhetorical account portrays them as constructed (e.g., Fuller; Gaonkar; Gusfield; Latour; Latour and Woolgar; Lessl; Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey; Taylor, Defining Science).' As a variety of scholars have suggested, this bifurcation of views can be resolved into a unified perspective that accounts for the major arguments advanced by those supporting each of the classical orientations (Bambrough; Bernstein; Laudan, Explaining Success). It is possible, in other words, to see facts as both objective and situated-both faithful to material realities and responsive to social conditions (Howe and Lyne). From this unified perspective, scientists can make errors either because their contact with asocial material realities are flawed (e.g., cold fusion) or because there are flaws in their application of the linguistic and social codes that convey the character and meaning of the contact they have made with material realities. This essay explores the persistence of bad science of the latter sort by reporting and interpreting an interaction between scientists and a rhetorician, one that occurred when I sent a letter to the journal Science responding to a publication on brain sex research by Gur et al. (Sex Differences), which appeared in that journal. I was later interviewed by a reporter for a major newspaper with regard to my letter and the Gur research. The texts for this study therefore include the Gur research article, my letter, a reply to my letter by the authors of the Gur article, the two reviews of my letter solicited by the editor of Science, and the journalistic account of my letter and the scientists' publications. This essay interprets the response of these scientists and the integration of their work into the public sphere through theories of demarcation. It suggests that bad science, at least that which supports an ideology that is hegemonic in the social sphere,2 is maintained by a complex relationship beRSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly 83 Volume 26, Number 4 Fall 1996

Norms of Rhetorical Culture by Thomas B. Farrell. New Haven and London: Yale UP 1993; x + 374pp. Hermogenes On Issues; Strategies of Argument in Later Greek Rhetoric, by Malcolm Heath, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1995; pp. ix + 274. The Rhetoric of Politics in the English Revolution, 1642–1660, by Elizabeth Skerpan. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992; 264 pages. The Rhetoric of Courtship: Courting and Courtliness in Elizabethan Language and Literature; by Catherine Bates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; 236 pages. Philosophy, Rhetoric, Literary Criticism: (Inter)views edited Gary A. Olson, with a foreword by Clifford Geertz. Carbondale: Southern Illinois U P, 1994. 250 pp. Understanding Scientific Prose ed. Jack Selzer. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1993; 388 pp. Learning from the Histories of Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of Winifred Bryan Horner, ed. Theresa Enos. Southern Illinois UP; 1993; 200 pp. Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle, by Richard Enos. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1993. 159 pages.

Sean Patrick O'Rourke: Introduction On Saturday, November 20, 1993, five historians of rhetoric presented papers on the question, What is the most significant passage on rhetoric in the works of Francis Bacon? The American Society for the History of Rhetoric sponsored the panel, which was part of the Speech Communication Association's 79th annual meeting held in Miami Beach, Florida. Bacon's views on the nature and scope of rhetoric have become increasingly important. As a philosopher, historian, politician, advocate, scientist, and essayist, Bacon was well aware of the cultural uses of rhetoric, and he showed particular concern for the place of rhetoric in liberal education. Moreover, he systematized and promoted his ideas in a forceful, eloquent way. As a result, despite the judgment of many that Bacon made no original contributions to science and offered little that was pivotal in the history of jurisprudence or politics, Bacon has been a central figure in intellectual history. Certainly that remains true today. Bacon's thought is deeply relevant to the ongoing work in the rhetoric of science, his influence as a prose stylist has important implications for those concerned with the essay, and his stature and authority in the field of law make his writings a preface to the contemporary debates on the rhetoric of law. For reasons that will soon become obvious, the papers provoked a lively and enthusiastic discussion when they were presented in Miami. They are presented here in the hope that they will prove equally provocative to the readers of RSQ.

Abstract Aeschines and Athenian Politics by Edward M. Harris. New York: Oxford U P, 1995. Pp. x + 233. The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis by Denise M. Bostdorff. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1994. Preface vii, 306 pp. The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume by Adam Potkay. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994; pp. 253. Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire by Peter Brown. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. 182 pages. Composition in Context: Essays in Honor of Donald C. Stewart. ed. W. Ross Winterowd and Vincent Gillespie. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois U P, 1994; xxxi; 266.

(1996). A new start toward the next millennium: A note from the editor. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 5-7.

"Philosophical bases of rhetoric and composition Ph.D. programs." Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 25(1-4), pp. 247–248 Notes The annual meeting of the Rhetoric Society of America at the CCCC in Washington, D.C. featured talks by Kathleen E. Welch, Andrea Lunsford, and Susanne Clark. The topic for the session was “The Theoretical Basis of Rhetoric/Composition Ph.D. Programs in the Discipline of English.” We are printing presentations by Andrea Lunsford and Suzanne Clark. As we went to press, Kathleen Welch's presentation was not available.

Coleridge criticism has a stormy quality about it, as if what we know about Coleridge is something we see only by flashes of lightning over some dark landscape. In Experience Into Thought, Kathleen Coburn says that Coleridge is irritating to certain tempers, perhaps especially to the curriculum-making academic mind(67). Her statement is ironic. Coleridge was always working on curriculum. His rage for a system that included the irrational and lucky graces forced him into whole courses about thinking and language, whole encyclopedias of knowledge. Still, the plan in most academic circles seems to have been to place Samuel Taylor Coleridge in the canon as a fragment of history and forget him. After long years of reading criticism about Samuel Taylor Coleridge rather than reading his works, it is time to see if there is a Coleridge worth claiming for rhetoric and composition. One problem in validating a Coleridge for our time is reading him. It seems that we have lost the habit of reading his kind of discourse. Perhaps because of his translations and readings of the German Transcendentalists, Coleridge's prose wanders and speculates, opposes its central premises, comments on itself incessantly. Composition scholars see him as an antithesis of the kind of style recommended in our classrooms and in our journals. Also, as composition studies attempt to establish territory in departmental turf wars, Coleridge becomes an easy target for those who would use him to demonstrate how literary concerns should not be included in composition pedagogy. As much as some might want Coleridge to go away, he will not. Linda Flower argues that Coleridge's inspirational model for composition is a threat to the teaching of composition (Problem-Solving). Ross Winterowd asserts that Coleridge is a primary reason for the devaluation of the literature of fact because his theory of composition or rhetoric lacks purpose (64). In both cases, eminent scholars and researchers in the field of composition are reacting to a stereotypical view of Coleridge and his works, as if the Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner and Kubla Khan represent Coleridge's philosophy and theory of composition. But there is more to Coleridge's philosophy of composition than his poems, his theory of imagination in Biographia Literaria, or his criticism suggest. Kenneth

Rhétoriques de la modernité by Manuel Maria Carrilho. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992; pp. 170. The Place of Emotion in Argument by Douglas Walton. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992, xiv; 294 pp. Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898 by Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner, with an introduction by Kenneth Laine Keiner and Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992; xiv; 297pp. Criteria of Certainty: Truth and Judgment in the English Enlightenment by Kevin L. Cope. Lexington: The UP of Kentucky, 1990; viii; 224. Writing Ourselves Into the Story: Unheard Voices from Composition Studies by Sheryl I. Fontaine and Susan Hunter. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1993; pp. 383. Novelties in the Heavens: Rhetoric and Science in the Copernican Controversy, by Jean Dietz Moss. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1993. Preface xiv, 353 pp. The Book of Memory by Mary Carruthers.Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1992; 393 pp.

First, I'd like to offer analysis of Halasek's and Bernard-Donals' utterances, but it may also be taken as rhetorical or tendentious characterization of them. If we begin with the two points of reference provided by our session's title, and Rhetorical Criticism, I think we can say that Halasek identifies herself as rhetorical critic or theorist who belongs to community of like-minded rhetorical critics and theorists, one that together poststructuralist thought, social constructivism, and writing and pedagogy. For them Bakhtin's vilification of is problem and his alternative rhetorical tradition is an opportunity. Halasek can summarize the Bakhtin attacks and distance herself from it as a definition of that is not ours and she can appropriate as much more congenial to herself and her fellow rhetoricians the rhetorical tradition of oppositional genres and discourse moves with which Bakhtin identifies the novel. She imagines Bakhtin's hostility to as consequence of his hostility to the official languages of Russia during his lifetime and imagines herself and her colleagues as also opposed to a of oppression but apparently not confronted with similar authoritarian political situation. Instead of identifying herself exclusively with parodic rhetoric opposed to an official monologic she posits dialogic rhetoric which can contemplate the tensions between polemic and rhetorics in the professional and pedagogical tasks of textual and cultural analysis. Bakhtin offers her better way of doing what rhetorical critics were already doing. Halasek welcomes Bakhtin's tension-filled genres and joyful relativity in prose that is relatively free from tension and clear about where it stands. She can separate Bakhtin's vilification of from his celebration of it, choose one side over the other, and even explain away Bakhtin's adherence to the side she rejects as function of his particular historical situation. She is at home with the listeners she posits and brings them Bakhtin they can use without having to change their minds about or politics. Bemard-Donals, on the other hand, writes tension-filled and ambivalent prose in the name of escaping from relativism and uncertainty. He is not at one with what he takes to be the community of contemporary rhetorical but sees it as plagued by the collapse of distinction between science and that he somehow wants to reassert He persists in commitment to theory or science or dialectic or history that he believes rhetorical critics like Fish and Rorty have subsumed under rhetoric, and he turns to Bakhtin not to assimilate him to the consensus in current rhetorical but to find way out of the impasse of current rhetorical theory. The Bakhtin he needs for his purposes is not the celebrant of parody and joyful relativity but the theorist of the socially constituted subject who can provide rhetorical criticism with scientific model for understanding how subjects are formed in language. In effect, he wants to substitute Bakhtin's sociolinguistics of the subject for the psychology of the subject Plato calls for in the Phaedrus as the scientific foundation for that could then know, as he put it in his

Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin Luther King Jr. and its Sources by Keith D. Miller. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 247 pp. +. Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman by Walter Jost. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989. The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse by Kathleen E. Welch. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990; pp. viii + 186. Constructing Rhetorical Education, edited by Marie Secor and Davida Charney. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1992; pp. 432 + Preface, Index. Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages: Rhetoric, Representation and Reality by Ruth Morse. Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp.ii + 295.

readers a philosophical endorsement of rhetoric, an argument for narrative, a hypotactical defense of parataxis, and a serious discussion of playfulness. The one exception to this cryptodialectical commentary is Jarratt's second chapter. There she skillfully avoids the binary trope of mythos-logos, rejects convincingly the logic of linear historical progress, and demonstrates nicely how the sophistical affinity for nomos shifts our attention from a questionable and outdated dichotomy to a field large enough to include both binary terms and meaningful enough to transcend their differences. Dismissing neither mythos nor logos, nomos appropriates both, and in so doing invents something other that problematizes the already familiar. Unfortunately, the story of nomos is only half of a larger sophistical story. The other, opposing half, the story of physis, finds itself associated only with the philosophers. Insofar as Antiphon's and Hippias' arguments for physis support part of her agenda, this omission or misassociation is all the more perplexing. In the 1850's George Grote observed that the sophists were the mainstream intellectuals in their culture and Plato an eccentric reformer. True, many historians of philosophy reversed this historical reality, making Plato the intellectual king and the sophists his unworthy subjects. Now Jarratt urges historians of rhetoric to give the sophists, women, and teachers of English composition a more prominent role in the new histories of rhetoric. Recent works by Vickers, Conley, and Bizzell are already doing what she is urging. If Jarratt is looking for more recognition as a historian of rhetoric, a feminist intellectual, and a teacher of college composition, she has a great deal more support than she may realize.

Erasmus uses female persona, named Folly, to deliver his written mock-encomium The Praise of Folly, published in 1511. Critics have taken little note of her gender, however. Walter Kaiser compares her briefly to Mother Nature (94-95), while still associating her fertility connotations with the phallus. Thomas 0. Sloane refers to her in passing as a kind of muse or other traditionally female and therefore nonrational spirit (67). It does seem somewhat anachronistic and historiographically to dwell on her gender, since, as Sloane notes, female personae were common in Renaissance written orations and dialogues, and they can be traced back through medieval and classical avatars. Female fools were not uncommon, either; William Willeford suggests that Erasmus's is derived from the fool named Mother Folly who figured prominently in carnivals of the late medieval and early Renaissance periods (177). But when I read The Praise of Folly, I can't take the persona's gender for granted, especially as she's depicted in Holbein's illustrations for an early edition of the Praise: woman in fool's cap and bells and an academic gown, speaking from rostrum to an audience of men similarly attired (see Moriae 1989). I became fascinated by this image of while doing research on Erasmus for Bruce Herzberg's and my recent anthology, The Rhetorical Tradition (1990). I couldn't figure out how to get my improper interest in the female persona into this book, however, because an anthology, while of course enacting an ideological agenda through its inclusions and exclusions, must pretend that its choices are not tendentious, that they always rely on arguments already made. Foregrounding in the anthology seemed to go too far in the direction of violation of these constraints of the anthology genre-or at least, so I was informed by my co-author and many of the readers thanked in our Preface, so I bowed to consensus. Now, however, I would like to elaborate the argument I wished had already been made, view that unabashedly articulates Erasmus and with postmodern feminist concerns. I'd like to explore the possibility that the persona of the female fool may have interesting implications for post-modern rhetors, particularly those of us who wish to espouse left-oriented or liberatory political values. My paper, therefore, will have two parts. First, I will consider the implications of Folly's gender as an aid to interpreting Erasmus's mock-encomium, notoriously difficult text. In the process of explaining the interpretive problems in The Praise of Folly, I will provide sort of anatomy of skepticism which, I believe, has bearing on the post-modern situation. Then in the second part, I will try to explain my fascination with The Praise of in terms of problems confronting contemporary rhetorical studies. The problem in which I am particularly interested is that of finding compelling version of rhetorical authority from which to speak on behalf of oppressed groups in spite of the

Oral and Written Communication: Historical Approaches. Edited by Richard Leo Enos. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990. Pp.vi + 264. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Newly Translated, with Introduction, Notes and Appendices by George Kennedy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, xvi + 335 pp. Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge by Greg Meyers. Madison: Wisconsin UP, 1990. Ethics in Human Communication by Richard L. Johannesen. 3rd Edition. Waveland Press, 1990. Voices of the Mind: A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action by James V. Wertsch. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991. 147 pp. + references and name and subject index. Thomas Henry Huxley: Communicating for Science by J. Vernon Jensen. Newark: University of Delaware, 1991. Pp. 253. The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry. Edited by Herbert W. Simons. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. xii + 388.

The alleged death of rhetoric in nineteenth century, so often cited by historians of discipline, has always seemed paradoxical to Victorian scholars familiar with social conflicts of that century and volumes of deliberative discourse to which they gave rise. These comments on demise of rhetoric generally construe it as an academic discipline or as use of stylistic devices-definitions which have so limited research that Donald C. Stewart remarked in 1983 that the most notable feature of scholarship in nineteenth-century rhetoric is its relative absence (153).1 However, recent studies by James Berlin and Susan Jarratt have broadened investigation of rhetoric's history to include discussions of relationship between language, knowledge, and society.2 Jarratt's proposed revisionary history would investigate implicit theories of rhetoric in any texts which explore relation of knowledge to language as well as roles of community and authority in establishing truth and prescribing ethical behavior (Toward 11-14; Naming). In this essay, I wish to trace a theory of rhetoric and its ideological implications in work of Victorian prophet Thomas Carlyle.3 When estrangement between upper and lower classes caused by rise of capitalism became central subject of deliberative discourse, Carlyle gained a large readership through his incisive social criticism.4 His writing influenced an entire generation which included John Stuart Mill, Charles