Abstract

Reviews 91 Gary A. Remer, Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian Tradition of Polit­ ical Morality, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 2017. xii, 291 pp. ISBN: 9780226439167 The subjects of Remer's book are of central importance to the study of (western) rhetoric: the troubled relationship between rhetoric and morality, both in general and as approached by Aristotle, Cicero, and others; and the reception of Ciceronian ideas and their potential contemporary relevance. He proceeds in roughly chronological order. In a long introduction and a first chapter he sets the scene and favourably contrasts Cicero's approach to that of Aristotle, and in a second chapter then develops his most impor­ tant claim: that Ciceronian rhetorical morality is based on the notion of decorum. Four chapters follow on later authors and issues, and their links with Cicero: Machiavelli, Lipsius, the notion of (the orator as) a political rep­ resentative, and the relationship between rhetoric and "deliberative democ­ racy." Here, I shall mainly concentrate on the introduction and chapters 1-2, as they make up almost half the book and are meant to define the issues addressed in the rest. In these chapters, Remer argues for the value of Cicero's approach to the ethics of rhetoric, especially as compared to that of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The latter's much-discussed inclusion of emotional persuasion (pathos) is of course particularly relevant. It is problematic in ethical terms, as it suggests that he endorses emotional manipulation. In addition, it seems to be inconsis­ tent with the first chapter of the work (1.1), where Aristotle criticises contem­ porary writers on rhetoric for including emotional appeal in their "arts" (technai). Remer (42, alib.) accepts the now common solution, associated espe­ cially with Nussbaum (cf. 11-13 for nuances): Aristotle regards emotions as grounded in cognition, and recognises only emotional appeals that are based on argument; and this implies that the opportunities for manipulation are severely restricted, as emotions can again be removed by counter-arguments that is, they are "responsive to cognitive modification" (36). I am on record as rejecting such views (Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1989,17-20; 72-4), and for all of their popularity, they still seem highly dubious to me. For one thing, the fit with what Aristotle in fact says in his first chapter is not particularly good. Moreover, according to Aristotle the whole point of the emotions in a rhetorical context is that they make people change their judgements (Rhet. 2.1, 1377b30-1378a6; 1378a20-23); an angry person, e.g., is thus likely in fact to be impervious to counter-arguments. However that may be, Remer accepts the common view as a plausible interpretation of Aristotle's ideas - ideas which, however, he proceeds to criticise. He points out, e.g., that Aristotle himself sometimes recognises non-cognitive emotional responses (36-7); that Aristotle also seems to suggest the use of false arguments (43-4); and that reality shows that emotions are often not responsive to cognitive modification (44—8, including a discussion of the Willie Horton case). These points, while not all new, are valuable. More fundamentally, however, he faults Aristotle for providing only moral rules external to rhetoric (48—9), that is, 92 RHETORICA in terms developed especially by Michael Leff (Rhetoric and Public Affairs 1, 1998, 61-88), he regards Aristotle as offering a weak rather than a strong defence of rhetoric. It is such a strong, intrinsic defence that Remer claims to find in Cicero. This, however, is highly problematic. Cicero, as is well known, saw argu­ ments as generally less important than ethos, presenting the characters on one's own side favourably, and pathos, playing upon the audience's emotions (e.g., De or. 2.178). Remer fully acknowledges that Cicero, pragmat­ ically, sees "rhetorical deception" as necessary in real life. He nonetheless attempts to mitigate this "manipulative" view of rhetorical persuasion. For instance, according to De or. 2.203 Antonius, in his defence of Norbanus, employed "commonplaces" (loci) to elicit emotions. Remer asserts that he thus elicited emotions through argumentation; but the term locus is also frequently used for non-argumentative emotional appeal (e...