Abstract

314 RHETORICA Jean Nienkamp, Internal Rhetorics: Toward a History and Theory of SelfPersuasion (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 2001), xiv + 170 pp. In her deceptively slim volume, Internal Rhetorics, Jean Nienkamp pro­ vides historical precedents and theoretical arguments for opening up the self as a site for rhetorical study. She examines several key texts from the Classical, Enlightenment, and Modern periods to develop a theory of inter­ nal rhetoric, the concept of thinking as verbal interaction and the self as a socially constituted collection of internalized discourses. Since neither traditional nor expansive understandings of rhetoric theo­ retically preclude the extension of their studies to the self, Nienkamp sur­ mises that this aspect of rhetoric has been "eclipsed by various political, educational, and philosophical factors that have shaped thinking about lan­ guage use" (p. x). Traditional rhetoric's historical emphasis as an intentional practice for public address and the postmodern ban of vocabulary sugges­ tive of a unitary subject are two powerful predispositions against thinking of rhetoric as internal. Another, as Nienkamp emphasizes, is the Platonic division of philosophical and rhetorical reason and the long historical reign of thought over language. Nienkamp's history and theory of internal rhetoric clearly favors the epistemic rhetorics of Isocrates and the twentieth-century rhetoricians and psychologists she examines. Internal rhetoric, Nienkamp argues, unites the divisive disciplinary con­ cerns of traditional and expansive (interpretive) rhetorics by pointing to both the effects and intents of language and its use; it also reestablishes rhetoric's relations with psychology and philosophy by providing a complex rhetorical reading of the self and offering a model of moral agency in an antifoundationalist age. Central to these proposals is Nienkamp's distinction between cultivated and primary internal rhetoric. A deliberately cultivated moral rea­ soning is the form internal rhetoric takes in the Classical and Enlightenment texts examined in Part One. Associated with the intentionally crafted dis­ course of traditional rhetoric, cultivated internal rhetoric is the conscious use of a learned language to effect desired change in the self. Primary internal rhetoric is the form self-persuasion assumes in the post-Freudian Modern texts examined in Part Two. Associated with expansive rhetoric, primary internal rhetoric understands the powerful unconscious imperatives of mul­ tiple, often conflicting social discourses influencing internal rhetoric and constituting the rhetorical self. Because his representation of logos is both epistemic and ethical, Isocrates is Nienkamp's classical standard for internal rhetoric. The Socratic-PlatonicAristotelian treatments of self-persuasion, although identifying and address­ ing the divided psyche, depict the coercion of reason over the appetites rather than the linguistically interactive negotiation Nienkamp identifies as rhetor­ ical. Francis Bacon, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and Richard Whately, Nienkamp's Enlightenment figures, emphasize the highly rhetorical nature of moral reasoning, the intense, concerted interactions with reason to move Reviews 315 the will away from the passions; but they use a faculty psychology whose discrete, innate parts are more acted upon than acting. Nienkamp wants an epistemic rhetoric to underwrite her theory of thought and the self, but she returns in her conclusion to the cultivated ethical reasoning associated with traditional rhetoric to propose a theory of moral agency. Nienkamp's historical depictions of rhetorical thought and the self should prove fascinating to anyone wondering or worrying about the fate of the self in rhetoric. Rhetorical representations of thought from Homer to Ken­ neth Burke portray a psyche whose constituent parts are innate. Along with Burke, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca use the Freudian un­ conscious to unseat "the rationalist and theological ethics of earlier periods" (p. 81), but the Freudian psyche is also comprised of innate parts. Not until Nienkamp examines the psychologies of George Mead and Lev Vygotsky does her theory of internal rhetoric reflect the historicized nature of thought processes, consciousness, and the mind. Her social-constructionist rhetorical view of thought and the self is based on knowledge gained from the social sciences, an epistemological stance epistemic rhetoric refutes. The rhetori­ cal self as depicted by Nienkamp's rhetorics and philosophies is clearly a cultivated, not experiential, self. Although she proposes collaboration with psychology to redress this problem, rhetoric is incorrigibly aligned with phi­ losophy and never more so...