Abstract

By relying on Oliver Wendell Holmes's decisions as a Supreme Court Justice, I argue that aphorisms employ enthymematic reasoning and that enthymemes are best conveyed through aphorisms. Such an argument requires that I classify Holmes's decisions as aphorisms and show how Holmes explicitly rejects formal, legal rhetoric. These two moves are most clear in his First Amendment decisions, and it is these decisions that demonstrate how Holmes rethinks, broadly, the relationship between rhetoric and law. Holmes's position on the First Amendment, informed by the relationship between aphorisms and enthymemes, helps show how style is constitutive of reason.

Journal
Rhetoric Review
Published
2008-06-16
DOI
10.1080/07350190802126128
Open Access
Closed
Topics

Citation Context

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Cites in this index (2)

  1. College English
  2. Rhetoric Review
Also cites 8 works outside this index ↓
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  6. A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism
  7. Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition
  8. 10.2307/1073163
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