Argument’s Autonomy Problem

Philosophy & Rhetoric Dec 2024

John Casey Northeastern Illinois University

Abstract

ABSTRACT Autonomy is foundational to ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and it has been closely associated with argumentation. What is curious about autonomy is that it has traditionally been explained in terms of reasoning and argument: autonomy involves reasoning because, standardly, someone who’s autonomous is one who thinks things through, who has reasons for their actions. Autonomy regards argument because to respect the autonomy of someone who thinks things through, one must offer them reasons, that is, argue with them. One common thought is that provided one’s arguments meet certain criteria (e.g., they’re not sophistries or clever manipulations), then argument respects autonomy. But is this really so? No. Properly understood, argument is a kind of paternalism, for to argue with someone means to enter into and manage their stream of reasons, the very things that account for their autonomy.

Journal: Philosophy & Rhetoric
Published: 2024-12-02
DOI: 10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0276
Open Access: Closed
Topics: rhetorical theory argument

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (1)

Marshall (2025)

Arguments as Unexpected Puppies: How Respectful Arguments Can Threaten Agency

Philosophy & Rhetoric

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