In addition to the need to correct a significant number of typographical errors, a few factual mistakes, and a few translation omissions, Kennedy explains in his “Prooemion” that the impetus for th...

This article attempts to demonstrate that the so-called Special Topics in Aristotle's Rhetoric are neither idia/eidē, endoxa, the traditional logos, nor pisteis as these terms are typically understood within the Aristotelian texts. After an analysis of these important technical terms, I conclude that the material in Rhetoric 1.4–15 is neither of these. Then, analyzing 1.4 as an example section, I argue that the bulk of the material in 1.4–15 is to be understood as previously independent texts, much of which was written for a non-rhetorical context, that were then inserted into a text that has become our Rhetoric by an editor who also added his own (awkward) transitions in order to try to seam these previously independent texts into a more coherent whole. This conclusion suggests that there may not have been a systematic or coherent conception of rhetoric within the Peripatetic school even as late as the first-century BCE when Andronicus edited Aristotle's texts—including the Rhetoric—into their form that has since been transmitted to us.

ABSTRACT Scholars who have been writing recently about the unity and composition of Aristotle's Rhetoric make either brief or no mention of the transmission and editorial history of Aristotle's texts. This essay addresses this void by first presenting and discussing Strabo's, Plutarch's, and Porphyry's accounts of the transmission and editorial history of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' texts in conjunction with discussing the list of works that Diogenes Laertius ascribes to both authors. Once the transmission and editorial history is considered, evidence is presented from the Rhetoric that may indicate two important points—the extent to which the text is a compilation of previously independent texts that were ascribed to both Aristotle and Theophrastus and that Andronicus, rather than Aristotle, may be responsible for the text as we have it.

AbstractThis essay examines the inconsistencies in the discussion of proofs in Rhetoric 1.1 and 1.2. Recent commentators have attempted to reconcile these inconsistencies by claiming that ethos and pathos are to be understood as rational, inferential, or cognitive aspects of Aristotle's conception of rhetorical proof, thus linking the proofs in 1.2 to those in 1.1. In sharp contrast, I contend that the rift between the two conceptions of rhetorical proofs is even greater than most commentators acknowledge. I argue that there are two completely different conceptions of rhetorical proofs that cannot be reconciled in these two sections of the Rhetoric, that the inconsistencies are due to the tumultuous transmission and editorial history of the corpus Aristotelicum (and not to any of Aristotle's developmental views on rhetoric), and that the transmission and editorial history of the text needs to play a much more important role in our interpretation of the Rhetoric than it has hitherto.

This essay examines the inconsistencies in the discussion of proofs in Rhetoric 1.1 and 1.2. Recent commentators have attempted to reconcile these inconsistencies by claiming that ethos and pathos are to be understood as rational, inferential, or cognitive aspects of Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical proof, thus linking the proofs in 1.2 to those in 1.1. In sharp contrast, I contend that the rift between the two conceptions of rhetorical proofs is even greater than most commentators acknowledge. I argue that there are two completely different conceptions of rhetorical proofs that cannot be reconciled in these two sections of the Rhetoric, that the inconsistencies are due to the tumultuous transmission and editorial history of the corpus Aristotelicum (and not to any of Aristotle’s developmental views on rhetoric), and that the transmission and editorial history of the text needs to play a much more important role in our interpretation of the Rhetoric than it has hitherto.

This essay engages two contemporary views as to the authorial purposes of the Rhetoric. Advocates of one view maintain that Aristotle valued democracy and understood rhetoric to be a form of positive civic or democratic discourse and that the Rhetoric was written to express this view, while others suggest that Aristotle's purpose in writing the Rhetoric was to instruct members of the Academy and Lyceum in the "necessary evil" of using rhetoric to deal with the ignorant masses. In response, I demonstrate that the first view is clearly not supported by the Aristotelian texts and that the second view needs to expand the contexts within which the Rhetoric is understood to include the long and turbulent transmission and editorial history of the Aristotelian corpus before any purpose or intent can be ascribed to Aristotle without so much qualification as to make the ascription essentially meaningless.

Contrary to a prevailing view within rhetoric and composition circles that finds a positive view of rhetoric in the Phaedrus, I contend that Plato mockingly denounces rhetoric in the Phaedrus. To support this claim, I argue that the Phaedrus is an unmistakable response to Isocrates' Against the Sophists and needs to be understood as part of this dynamic dialogue and that in the Phaedrus Plato is distinguishing his philosophical method, as he conceives it, from Isocrates' pseudo-philosophical method (as conceived by Plato). I provide parallels between Against the Sophists and the Phaedrus and then explain the distinction between Isocrates' and Plato's respective conceptions of what the philosopher is and should do and between each writer's philosophical method.