Abstract I propose a distinction between evidentiary and argumentative modes of the straw man fallacy. Traditional studies of this fallacy have focused on the changes that occur when a discussant represents another’s speech acts. This places undue normative significance on the question of “How much change is too much change?”, a question that has constantly eluded theorizing. I argue that in a dualist framework, when the evidentiary mode of the fallacy is taken as a starting point, the evaluation can begin with the phenomenon of deceit (as a marker of fallaciousness) and construct critical responses without the need to demonstrate that the change induced was in some sense disproportionate. To make this point, I give both imaginary and real-life examples of such evaluations.

AbstractA convincing argument can change a discussant’s commitment regarding the acceptability of a claim, but the same effect can be achieved by examining evidence. Observing objects or events that count as evidence for or against the acceptability of a statement can change one’s commitment regarding that statement. If we speak of fallacies in the realm of convincing through argumentation, can we speak of fallacies in the realm of convincing through evidence? In this paper, we defend an affirmative answer. We introduce and discuss the conceptual implications of evidentiary fallacies as fallacies committed when evidence is fabricated or suppressed during an attempt to resolve disagreement using proof. We then apply the notion of evidentiary fallacy to two real-life examples of mis-executed evidentiary procedures. We conclude that the notion of evidentiary fallacy can contribute to a more comprehensive fallacy theory and can foster new and broadly applicable critical skills.