Abstract

Abstract I propose a distinction between evidentiary and argumentative modes of the straw man fallacy. Traditional studies of this fallacy have focused on the changes that occur when a discussant represents another’s speech acts. This places undue normative significance on the question of “How much change is too much change?”, a question that has constantly eluded theorizing. I argue that in a dualist framework, when the evidentiary mode of the fallacy is taken as a starting point, the evaluation can begin with the phenomenon of deceit (as a marker of fallaciousness) and construct critical responses without the need to demonstrate that the change induced was in some sense disproportionate. To make this point, I give both imaginary and real-life examples of such evaluations.

Journal
Argumentation
Published
2026-05-26
DOI
10.1007/s10503-026-09710-6
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