Research on conditional reasoning has long debated whether human rationality is best captured by logicist accounts or by pragmatically oriented approaches such as Relevance Theory, which highlight contextual and communicative factors. While the former predict reliable adherence to logical schemata (e.g., Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens), experimental evidence consistently reveals systematic deviations, such as endorsement of invalid inferences. The latter view attributes such patterns not to irrationality, but to pragmatic expectations that guide interpretation. This study contributes to this debate by examining how logical validity and pragmatic congruency jointly shape the evaluation of conditional arguments. We report two experiments employing a 2 × 2 factorial design. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conditional syllogisms framed in the standard 'if/then' format. Results showed that pragmatic violations slowed responses and, crucially, facilitated detection of logical invalidity, without hindering performance on valid arguments. Experiment 2 reformulated the same arguments using the Periodic Table of Arguments to replace 'if/then' conditionals with lever-based structures. Here, participants exhibited a generalized tendency to resist conditional inference, resulting in improved rejection of invalid arguments but reduced recognition of valid ones. Across both studies, pragmatic congruency alone did not predict accuracy, but interactions between pragmatic expectations and logical form systematically influenced evaluations. Taken together, the findings suggest that pragmatics does not override logic but modulates its accessibility: violations of pragmatic expectations invite deliberation. At the same time, semantic scaffolding, such as explicit 'if/then' cues, supports deductive reasoning. We propose that natural argumentation depends on this interplay, highlighting the need for situated accounts of logos.

Abstract Metaphors abound in scientific discourse. Well-known examples include ‘the brain as a computer’ and ‘the organism as a machine’. Such metaphors, we argue, have both a theoretical and a practical aspect: they may serve as explanatory models, but also guide technological development, influence policy, reflect ideological assumptions, and reshape how we understand ourselves. These practical dimensions have prompted growing concern about the risks associated with metaphor use in science. While this concern has been widely noted, less attention has been paid to the argumentative forms such criticism may take. This article addresses that gap by reconstructing resistance to scientific metaphors—specifically computer and machine metaphors—as a form of pragmatic argumentation, in which metaphor use is challenged on the basis of its practical consequences. It further shows how such argumentation may be supported by subordinate causal arguments that appeal to the metaphor’s highlighting/hiding structure. Drawing on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, and analyzing examples from cognitive science, philosophy, and bioethics, the article demonstrates how metaphor resistance can be understood as a reconstructable form of argumentative critique—one in which metaphors become sites of normative contestation.

AbstractArgument schemes are abstractions substantiating the inferential connection between premise(s) and conclusion in argumentative communication. Identifying such conventional patterns of reasoning is essential to the interpretation and evaluation of argumentation. Whether studying argumentation from a theory-driven or data-driven perspective, insight into the actual use of argumentation in communicative practice is essential. Large and reliably annotated corpora of argumentative discourse to quantitatively provide such insight are few and far between. This is all the more true for argument scheme corpora, which tend to suffer from a combination of limited size, poor validation, and the use of ad hoc restricted typologies. In the current paper, we describe the annotation of schemes on the basis of two distinct classifications: Walton’s taxonomy of argument schemes, and Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments. We describe the annotation procedure for each, and the quantitative characteristics of the resulting annotated text corpora. In doing so, we extend the annotation of the preexisting US2016 corpus of televised election debates, resulting in, to the best of our knowledge, the two largest consistently annotated corpora of schemes in argumentative dialogue publicly available. Based on evaluation in terms of inter-annotator agreement, we propose further improvements to the guidelines for annotating schemes: the argument scheme key, and the Argument Type Identification Procedure.