The aim of this paper is to distinguish some varieties of what I call ‘comparison argumentation.’ This way of arguing consists of supporting a claim about one thing on the basis of a comparison of that thing with another. The criteria that I use are the subject, the degree, and the purpose of the comparison. I do not intend to be exhaustive, but to address two specific questions: what sets arguments by analogy apart within this category and, from there, how they can be evaluated based on their distinctive features. An important aspect of my approach is the analysis of cases. I have selected a relatively large corpus of examples, mainly from the news media, and will analyse them based on argumentative connectors and other conventional indicators of comparisons.

AbstractIn this article I defend what I call a ‘particularist approach to arguments by analogy.’ Particularism is opposed to generalism, which is the thesis that arguments by analogy require a universal principle that covers cases compared and guarantees the conclusion. Particularism rejects this claim and holds that arguments by analogy operate on particular cases. I elaborate on two ideas that support this position. On the one hand, I contend that an analogy can be seen as a parallelism of argumentative relationships, drawing on the distinction between similarity and analogy (Gentner 1983) and on the meta-argumentative account of arguments by analogy (Woods and Hudak 1989). On the other hand, I argue that universal principles are not necessary neither for the analysis nor the evaluation of arguments by analogy (Govier 1989) and that, rather than being a requirement, they can be seen as by-products of good analogies.