Abstract Personal attacks, which might convey damaging accusations, can take either an explicit or an implicit form. When they are communicated implicitly, they are referred to as insinuations . Their implicit nature is said to allow speakers to evade responsibility, preserve their public image, or even conceal argumentative weaknesses. In previous studies, we found that insinuated ad hominem arguments supporting disagreement made speakers appear more persuasive and trustworthy than explicit ones. However, further exploratory analyses of our data revealed that the advantage of insinuated over explicit ad hominem arguments was either only present or more pronounced when the personal attack was fallacious. This distinction between explicitness and fallaciousness —and their possible interaction—had not been accounted for in earlier work. To investigate this interaction more systematically, we conducted four preregistered experiments examining the combined effects of explicitness and fallaciousness in ad hominem arguments. Results indicate that there is no significant interaction between fallaciousness and implicitness, regardless of whether the personal attack targets the proponent’s expertise or character. While the often-assumed persuasive benefits of insinuation do not consistently emerge—and may even undermine argumentative support in the context of disagreemen—insinuation confers social advantages, as the speaker is perceived as more trustworthy overall. Moreover, valid arguments are consistently preferred over fallacious ones—not only when it comes to supporting disagreement, but also in shaping how the speaker is perceived. This suggests that while pragmatic subtleties, such as insinuation, can enhance perceived trustworthiness, argumentative soundness remains a central criterion in both rhetorical and interpersonal judgments.

AbstractWhile the role of discourse connectives has long been acknowledged in argumentative frameworks, these approaches often take a coarse-grained approach to connectives, treating them as a unified group having similar effects on argumentation. Based on an empirical study of the straw man fallacy, we argue that a more fine-grained approach is needed to explain the role of each connective and illustrate their specificities. We first present an original corpus study detailing the main features of four causal connectives in French that speakers routinely use to attribute meaning to another speaker (puisque, étant donné que, vu que and comme), which is a key element of straw man fallacies. We then assess the influence of each of these connectives in a series of controlled experiments. Our results indicate each connective has different effects for the persuasiveness of straw man fallacies, and that these effects can be explained by differences in their semantic profile, as evidenced in our corpus study. Taken together, our results demonstrate that connectives are important for argumentation but should be analyzed individually, and that the study of fallacies should include a fine-grained analysis of the linguistic elements typically used in their formulation.