As with On the Origin of Species, we find that the work to be considered here-The Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs-demonstrates Darwin's use of hedges to project the ethos of a cautious scientist. Hedges are linguistic elements such as perhaps, might, to a certain degree, or it is possible that. When people use hedges, they signal that they are taking a cautious stance on the truth-value of the referential matter they seek to convey. Hedges are a type of metadiscourse, a level of writing in which authors draw attention to the very art of writing itself-they discourse about their discourse (Crismore, Talking to Readers). This metadiscursive trait, however, represents only one aspect of Darwin's rhetoric. In Coral Reefs, he sculpts a key chapter into a Ciceronian form so pure that one might have to return to the Renaissance to find a parallel, and within this larger form, he strategically places hedges and other metadiscourse. He, further, employs visuals (drawings, diagrams, and maps) for persuasion at those points were the tension between his audiences preconceptions and the new theory being presented threatens to reach a dangerous level. The visuals and the metadiscursive commentary about them, also, help to establish his ethos and to build the argument for his theory of coral reefs. These elements, so perfectly embodied in Coral Reefs, were the rhetorical tools of an extremely sophisticated scientific mind which has much to pass down to our own conception of scientific writing. All too many of today's professional, academic, and textbook writers view exposition of findings as being all that is needed-and other parts of the written document, including visuals, can be handled even more perfunctorily: facts by themselves are enough, after all, according to this view. Darwin, however, believed that bald facts and blunt explanations were insufficient, as he clearly indicates in his A utobiography. There, he writes that in Origin he had first presented a short and rather vague discussion of his own innovative idea in the area of embryology. Later, other scientists got the for the new idea. Darwin felt no bitterness, for he knew that the fault had been his alone and that this fault was a rhetorical one: I failed to impress my readers; and he who succeeds in doing so deserves, in my opinion, all the credit (Barlow 125). Facts and blunt explanations were not enough-rhetorical strategies were needed to impress the reader-even (and we have some reason to say especially) professional scientists. Since, even granting the A utobiography, there will always remain a question about the precise nature of the intended audience for Origin, and since, moreover, a cloud of non-scientific, anachronistic controversy hangs over its theory of natural selection, we have turned to Darwin's work on coral reefs: this work was unquestionably intended for the professional scientists, and yet it also, like Origin, sets forth a theory that involves a historical development measured in geological time. Coral Reefs has, we think, some

The alleged death of rhetoric in nineteenth century, so often cited by historians of discipline, has always seemed paradoxical to Victorian scholars familiar with social conflicts of that century and volumes of deliberative discourse to which they gave rise. These comments on demise of rhetoric generally construe it as an academic discipline or as use of stylistic devices-definitions which have so limited research that Donald C. Stewart remarked in 1983 that the most notable feature of scholarship in nineteenth-century rhetoric is its relative absence (153).1 However, recent studies by James Berlin and Susan Jarratt have broadened investigation of rhetoric's history to include discussions of relationship between language, knowledge, and society.2 Jarratt's proposed revisionary history would investigate implicit theories of rhetoric in any texts which explore relation of knowledge to language as well as roles of community and authority in establishing truth and prescribing ethical behavior (Toward 11-14; Naming). In this essay, I wish to trace a theory of rhetoric and its ideological implications in work of Victorian prophet Thomas Carlyle.3 When estrangement between upper and lower classes caused by rise of capitalism became central subject of deliberative discourse, Carlyle gained a large readership through his incisive social criticism.4 His writing influenced an entire generation which included John Stuart Mill, Charles

(1990). Positional historiography and Margaret Fuller's public discourse of mutual interpretation. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 233-239.

Persuasive discourse, either as a separate mode of discourse (Kinneavy 1971) or as a distinctive part of argumentative discourse,2 frequendy remains part of the overall writing assignment for our composition students. Although we may disagree as to how to define exactly or teach persuasive discourse in writing classrooms, we have more or less followed the tradition of Western classical rhetoric with respect to our basic understanding of it--although few of us would now restrict ourselves only to discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion (Aristotle 1960: 7). For example, we teach our students different sub-types of persuasive discourse and ask them to apply ethical, emotional (pathetic) and logical proofs to their own persuasive essays; we select political speeches, polemic essays or modern advertising materials as prime examples of how different persuasive strategies and techniques can be most effectively invoked to achieve their respective objectives of winning. To varying degrees, many composition text books have adopted, and thus perpetuated this normal way of doing things with persuasive discourse.3 In so doing, however, we have--perhaps unknowingly--imparted to our students two problematic notions, which underlie much of what has been believed to be persuasive discourse. The first assumes that persuasive discourse is grounded in or predicated on conflict or confrontation, which it aims to overcome or eradicate. The second perceives audience as both external4 and oppositional, whom persuasive discourse is intended to transform or convert. It is these two notions and their probable consequences that I will discuss first in this essay. Following this discussion, I will draw upon, respectively, Grice's cooperative model of conversation (1975; 1989) and Burke's concept of (1962) to propose a new heuristic model5 of persuasive discourse, one that takes cooperation through identification as a core constituent and provides a dynamic setting that is conducive to rhetorical diversities. Finally, I will consider some potentials of this new model in our writing classrooms.

and unethical in many cases (such as in the reign of whites over blacks, Germans over Jews, and now males over females), but it nevertheless persists in our society in any number of relationships. Foucault notes that these power-structured relationships cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of (93). It is the purpose of this essay to suggest that discourse is used to promote and protect political relationships in at least two ways: first, it is used to efface the effects of domination, that is, the oppression and exploitation of subordinate groups; and second, it is used to delimit compassion and desensitize the ruling group to the suffering of the subordinate group. Successful effacing and desensitizing rhetorics make it possible for ruling groups to fail to see or be unmoved by the atrocities of domination, even when those atrocities are obvious to subjects who are not members of the ruling group. Rulers produce discourses of truth that efface and justify those atrocities. These discourses are so effective that Millett, for example, rightly incensed by the oppression of females under the patriarchal thumb, apparently failed to notice or was insensitive to the power-structure of the human/non-human animal relationship (a relation-ship in which she is one of the rulers, not one of the ruled). In fact, her very definition of political relationships-whereby one group of is controlled by another-illustrates her blindness to one of the most pervasive birthright reigns ever. We altered Millett's definition by replacing the word persons with beings and have focused our study on the use of language to efface and desensitize in the human/non-human animal relationship, as it parallels the German/Jew relationship of the mid 1800's through the fall of the Third Reich. We have categorized our findings according to Goran Therborn's Three Fundamental Modes of Ideological Interpellation. According to Therborn, ideologies subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to, and making them recognize: what exists and what doesn't, what is good and what's not, and what's possible and what's not (18). Ideology operates as discourse, establishing these three lines of defense: first, arguing that the exploitation of subordinate groups does not exist; next (if the exploitation has to be admitted), arguing that it is night that it should exist; and finally (if it must be admitted that the exploitation is unjust), arguing that it exists because it can't be stopped. Each line of defense attempts to efface exploitation or to desensitize the ruler to the suffering of the ruled.

Socrates, of course, does not mean to venerate the art of discourse here. He is telling Phaedrus that there is discourse and there is truth. Once you have gone out and dug up the truth somewhere else, you apply the art of discourse to it and fashion a persuasive argument that will permit others to partake also of the truth. Two immediate implications follow from Socrates' position. First, only when the art of discourse, rhetoric, is put to the task of selling truth to the benighted does it become real. Second, rhetoric is necessary human affairs just to the extent that humans are unable to apprehend truth directly. It is an unfortunate evil, required because we are rationally degenerate creatures. Both positions have remained very popular over the intervening two millenia. Bitzer, for instance, can still say that in the best of all possible worlds there would be communication perhaps, but not rhetoric;'I we get our truth and knowledge somewhere else, and only our lack of perfection prevents us from casting rhetoric out of the garden. But there is an important lesson those two millenia that can help us to see the Spartan's words another light: the sources of truth which rhetoric has been obliged to serve have changed dramatically-from Socrates' dialectic and Aristotle's apodeixis, to Christianity's biblical exegesis and divine revelation, to the current authority on matters of knowledge and truth, Science. This rotation of leading roles while the supporting actress, Lady Rhetoric, remains constant indicates that the real art of discourse is connected with truth not because of human degeneracy, but because of precisely the reverse, because of our spark of perfection, because we are truth-seeking, knowledge-making creatures who sometimes get it right. We occasionally do something important with rhetoric: we find truth and we build knowledge out of it. When we manage the trick, though, we are so eager to dissociate it from all the foul and inane things we also do with rhetoric that we give the process another name. But these other names are clearly just aliases for rhetoric, or for some subset of rhetorical interests. Dialectic, for instance, is essentially questing debate. Apodeixis is distinguished only by the level of rigor Aristotle demands of the argumentation, not by any qualitative difference. Exegesis is rhetorical analysis. The only possible gap to this pattern is divine revelation, whose capacity to generate truth I will leave to more knowledgeable commentators, pausing only to notice that, true or not, reports of revelation usually involve a fair amount of persuasive machinery-burning bushes, hovering spirits, and the like. In any case, science is certainly no exception.

Tullio Maranhao, Therapeutic Discourse and Socratic Dialogue. University of Wisconsin Series in Rhetoric of the Human Sciences. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986. J. Max Patrick and Robert O. Evans, eds. with John W. Wallace and R. J. Schoeck. Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm: Essays by Morris W. Croll. Woodbridge, Connecticut: Ox Bow Press, 1989. Rpt. Princeton University Press, 1966. 450 pp. Stephen M. North. The Making of Knowledge in Composition: Portrait of an Emerging Field. Upper Montclair, NJ: Boynton/Cook Publishers, 1987. 403.

The metaphor has gained much importance as of late. No longer simply a decorative feature of discourse, the trope has obtained an epistemological and ontological dimension. No longer merely a figural flourish of prose, the metaphor has acquired an important role in the study of human understanding. Hence, thanks to theoretical rehabilitation and philosophical reconsideration, metaphorical analysis has become an important and popular pursuit for many disciplines--philosophy, literary theory, linguistics, rhetoric, et al.2 While the insights generated and the discoveries made by metaphorical analysis are significant and worthy of much study, we will take as our point of departure the limits of such critical inquiry. This essay offers another perspective, a sort of theoretical intervention which examines from another angle the study of discourse. Rhetorical theory, it will be reasoned, benefits from a perspective which considers the metonymical features of discourse. As such, the comparative advantages of either metaphorical or metonymical analysis are not measured by which one is true, but rather by which one is most useful for a given project. Simply put, a metonymical perspective can recognize and explain a terrain outside the scope of metaphorical analysis. The change we consider in this essay does not render useless or inadequate previous explanations, but rather opens a space or a zone from which to critically evaluate what has been previously overlooked. As noted, the popularity and importance of the metaphor has never been greater. Whether it be conceived as function, cluster, or nature, the research has sought, and continues to seek, the habitation of the metaphor within all symbolic discourse. Indeed, it may be safe to assume that the study of metaphors remains an important and integral component of contemporary rhetorical theory. As a result of theoretician diligence and persistence, a wide array of techniques exist for the study of metaphors within discourse. For examples of such metaphorical research we turn briefly to the work of I.A. Richards, Max Black, Edwin Black, and Paul Ricoeur. Perhaps no one should figure more prominently than I.A. Richards in the reappraisal of the trope. Using the metaphor, his New Rhetoric, seeks to recover meaning, to stabilize and neutralize the somewhat figural moments of discourse.

Robert de Beaugrande, Critical Discourse: A Survey of Literary Theorists. Norwood: New Jersey, 1988. 472 pp. Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing: De construction, Composition and Influence. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988. 256 pp. Chris M. Anson, ed. Writing and Response: Theory, Practice, and Research. Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1989. 371 pp. John T. Harwood, ed. The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986. Gerald Else, Plato and Aristotle on Poetry. Edited with an introduction by Peter Burian. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986. xx + 221 pp. Donald Weber, Rhetoric and History in Revolutionary New England. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 207 pp.

The five canons, parts, faculties, or functions of rhetoric are among the most constant features in the systematic treatment of the art (Scaglione 14). In many respects, they constitute the basic pattern of all theoretical and critical investigations into rhetorical art and practice (Thonssen 86). The five--invention (content, discovery), disposition (arrangement, organization), style (diction, elocution), memory, and delivery (presentation)--were canonized in Latin rhetoric as inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio or actio. They were important in Greek rhetoric as heurisis, taxis, lexis, mneme, and hypocrisis. While the exact origin of the canons is unknown, the five recur in rhetorical theory from antiquity to the present, where they command attention individually and collectively. Studying rhetoric, most agree, requires studying its canons. They are the sub-disciplines of the main, the lesser arts of the greater (Connors 64). They allow separate analysis and study of a complete five-part system (Murphy 83). They are the aspects of composing which work together in a recursive, synergistic, mutually dependent relationship (Welch Paradox 5-6). In part, the very history of rhetoric consists in changing relationships and interrelationships between them (Mahony 14). The canons apply to both encoding and decoding, forming a complete system for both generating and analyzing discourse (Welch Ideology 270). They represent not only the concepts with which the rhetor must deal and which he must master, but also the aspects of the rhetorical act which the critic examines and evaluates (Thonssen 86). In speech studies, minor changes in the meanings of the five terms have been developed in various treatises, but the pattern remains the same (Thonssen 86). In composition studies, the five canons are one of two prmary theories which dominate the discipline (Welch Ideology 269). The structure which has dominated both disciplines' textbooks, however, is a truncated one. Rarely has the five-part scheme been presented completely and explicitly. In speech studies, the fourth canon--memory--has virtually been dropped and usually receives incidental treatment (Thonssen 87). In composition studies, the first three canons--invention, arrangement, style--organize the vast majority of current textbooks, but the last two--memory and delivery--are typically deleted without a word of explanation (Welch Paradox 5, Ideology 270). This deletion, when explained, has been attributed to changed conditions in the law courts (Kennedy 105), to memory's absorption under disposition (Kennedy 210; Mahony 14) and, most often, to the western world's shift from orality to literacy. The tendency has been for modern rhetorical theory to abandon, remove, neglect, limit, or misunderstand both memory and delivery. On the other hand,

Of all the bruising confrontations between the capitalist and communist power blocks perhaps none was so staggering as the Cuban missile crisis. Most Americans patriotically rallied around our determined young president in this great moment of crisis, but there were other Americans who spoke with a different voice then who presumed to disagree with the dominant opinion. These were the voices from the left, now the old left. Their rhetorical response is my subject. By concentrating on several specimens written from a leftist perspective in response to a single event, I create a framework for analyzing the discourse of an ideology to demonstrate the influence of that ideology on and argument, together with the usefulnesses of an analytic method. Antecedent to this analysis are particular considerations about style, argument and method which lead to other considerations peculiar to the relation of political discourse to the world. Because the event focused opinion strongly, and time gives perspective, I have chosen written and oral reactions to the Cuban missile crisis. In addition to selections of written from three leftist newspapers, the National Guardian, The Weekly People, and The Catholic Worker, I have included speech samples on the same topic from Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State, as a contrast to the rhetoric of the left. To analyze this discourse I use Walker Gibson's style machine as he calls it developed to account for distinctions...in the voices addressing (115), distinctions which he breaks down into tough, sweet and stuffy talkers. Gibson's machine, consisting of sixteen grammatical-rhetorical qualities, is appended (A). Other available descriptions or classifications of or argument are Huntington Brown's deliberative, expository and prophetic, Edwin Black's exhortation and argument, and Aristotle's topics. Brown and Black analyze thought methodology with some consideration of style. The neo-Aristotelians, on the other hand, consider and thought combined into argumentative methods. I follow the classical topics in considering rhetorical argument (Rhetoric chs. 22, 23, 24; Corbett 94-132). My particular assumptions are that belief influences style, that while prose styles can be typed individual differences remain, that includes varieties of diction, syntax, and argument Further, I seek an attitude towards language, an attitude, however, influenced not by cultural or individual psychology, but by political belief. Because political writers argue, their arguments common to all rhetoric can also be typed. Argument creates patterns which shapes. For Gibson is a matter of sheer individual will, a desire for a particular kind of self-definition no matter what the circumstances (24). Political belief can condition will. For both Marie H. Nichols (75), and Edwin Black (Persona) reveals distinctive political personalities. In selecting a usable analytical methodology I had either to invent my own, or use an existing one. I chose Gibson's because we share similar concerns. I want to know what kind of voice speaks. What does the use of that voice imply? How do I determine trust? I also want to know the attitude of that voice towards subject and audience. If Gibson can help to answer these questions, then I accept his work saving the necessity of inventing yet another method, concentrating instead on the results produced. In general, stylistics seems more of a discourse on method than on results. Although we want to know what ails us, naming is not enough. To know that Dorothy Day talks tough does not suffice. We know there are other names than tough, sweet or stuffy. The point is not just to label, but to penetrate into the thought behind the voice aided by a given point of view. Gibson describes his work as primitive. Primitive, yet legitimate because applied he yields insight His method reveals attitude just as psychiatric categories, which might also be called primitive, reveal motive. If the arguments which pattern are traditional and discernible, their correlations with are not as clear. The advertiser, for example, speaks sweetly with recognizably dubious argument. Those political voices purring and storming at us must also be judged by how they argue so their trustworthiness can be determined. We can uncover falsehood by showing how a statement varies from reality--plain lying. We can discover understanding of mental illness by probing the discordance the aberrant mind creates

Chapman/Tate descriptive survey of 38 doctoral programs in rhetoric and composition has given us valuable information about these programs, which, for the most part, have sprung up only within the last ten years. survey, published in the Spring 1987 Review (124-86), revealed our programs' deep structure; it also has raised some questions about the definition, development and direction of our doctoral programs in rhetoric and composition. Few of the 38 programs that sent written materials for the survey listed classical rhetoric as core requirement, and almost half listed no history of rhetoric courses. However, 35 of the 38 programs listed theories of composition course. Because the availability of, as well as the teaching approach to, classical rhetoric can show the foundations on which our programs are built and the theoretical directions they may be taking, I prepared questionnaire on the classical rhetoric course offered in English departments, mailed it to 41 doctoral programs in rhetoric and composition, and eventually received 37 completed questionnaires. survey results not only reveal some foundations and direction of our programs in rhetoric and composition but also point out areas for further study. Does the program offer course in classical rhetoric and, if so, is the course part of the core requirement were two of the primary survey questions. Twenty-eight out of the 37 programs (76%) that sent written materials reported they offer course either in classical rhetoric or wherein substantial part is devoted to classical Eight (23%) do not offer the course, but in six of these eight the course is offered in Speech Communication. Two programs reported that the course is listed but not taught. And two programs reported the course is not offered at all. Four programs reported that the course offered in the English Department is also offered in Speech Communication. 76 percent of programs offering the course differ from the Chapman/Tate percentages because some of the 28 programs defined theirs as course in classical rhetoric where only one-third, about five weeks, or less, is devoted to classical These courses are, in the words of one respondent, a rush through rhetoric. Some courses, titled Rhetoric and (or Composition and Rhetoric), are actually topic courses that can take any focus. In one program it depends on who teaches the course whether it is history of rhetoric or the teaching of composition. Course names are quite varied. Only six are called History of Rhetoric, and two are named History and Theories. (The naming of one course title, survey respondent told me, has long and hilarious story. In 1976 the course had been The of Rhetoric, but that's the title of Richards' book, so the title was changed to Philosophy of Composition, which became the title of Hirsch's book, so the program changed it to its present title, The Rhetorical Tradition and the Teaching of Composition, at which point Knoblauch and Brannon appeared.) Other course titles are Theory and Practice of Rhetoric, Classical and Modern Discourse, Major Rhetorical Texts, Historical Studies, Rhetoric of Written Discourse. I was somewhat surprised that more of the course names didn't have the word written in the title to distinguish the course from the one offered in Speech for the last 75 years. Perhaps crossing departmental lines in the teaching of rhetoric is not the problem it was in the 70's. This subject itself would make an interesting study. classical rhetoric course is core requirement in 50 percent of the programs in contrast to the 91 percent of programs requiring composition theory. (In one program classical rhetoric is required, but it's offered only in Speech Communication.) These percentages suggest that we cannot assume the study of classical rhetoric as foundational for composition studies in our doctoral programs. In fact, it is possible for student to have Ph.D. specialty in rhetoric and composition without having had course in classical question here for further study is, then, how are we to define the rhetoric/composition speialist? next series of survey questions I asked focused on the frequency of the course offering, length of time it has been offered in the program, qualifications of the faculty who teach it, average enrollment and area of stuident specialty. In the majority of programs, the course is offered every other year and has been offered only within the last ten years. Usually, only one person teaches the course, faculty

Allan Bloom's controversial book The Closing of American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished Souls of Today's Students2 has attracted popular attention to a position that already had been gaining currency among critics of American higher education. These critics charge that we educators are failing our students individually and our community collectively by failing to teach morality--by failing to attend to role our disciplines play for students and practitioners in formation of their character. But questions as complicated and momentous as whether education in a discipline should aim to develop moral character, how it should do so, and how it can do so without damaging spirit and skills of free inquiry are hardly such simple questions as they are often depicted, including by Bloom. This is especially true for a discipline so frequently accused of complicity with evil, or even inherent immorality, as rhetoric. Indeed question of rhetoric's role in formation of character presents a genuine dilemma, one that is often corrupted in public controversies about moral education. On one hand, professors of rhetoric have no apparent special training in such ethical issues, nor is it clear why they would have special obligations. One does not have to be Allan Bloom or Carnegie Commission or even William Bennett to believe that all educators have some general obligation to influence their students for better, but it is not clear why or how this should devolve in a special way on teachers of reading, writing and speaking. It could do so only if ethical issues were found to be somehow intrinsic to rhetoric itself, to what we must teach if we are to succeed in teaching rhetoric at all--intrinsic, perhaps, to its evolution as a discipline and a practice, or to one of its fundamental functions. But how can this be squared with our notions of rhetoric as a neutral instrument? On other hand, contemporary rhetoricians have made it at least as clear that rhetoric has inescapable connections to human character, that these connections by their nature may be objects of distinctively rhetorical inquiry, that such inquiry may sustain and extend critical discourse, and that it may produce knowledge, including moral knowledge. For as Kenneth Burke has taught us, rhetoric is essentially involved in the definition of man, and admits of analysis in terms of those motives through which human characters are constituted and realized.3 Moreover, as Wayne Booth has explained, formation of self occurs in a field of selves; we are made of, as we make, company we keep.4 If our character is so significantly at stake in our rhetoric, then process of understanding rhetoric better would seem to hold some possibilities for better understanding of character. Or put more practically: if character realizes and reveals itself significantly in rhetoric, knowledge achieved in rhetorical education and critical discourse arising from it may make some issues in formation of our characters more a matter of our informed, free, ethically charged choice. But what does all this have to do with our alleged responsibility to inculcate a particular morality?

New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism. By George A. Kennedy. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Figures of Literary Discourse. By Gérard Genette. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Intro. Marie‐Rose Logan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Verbal Style and the Presidency: A Computer‐Based Analysis. By Roderick P. Hart. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, Inc., 1984. The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric. Winifred Bryan Horner, Editor. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1983. Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse. Ed. Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, and Andrea A. Lunsford. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizxng of the Word. By Walter J. Ong, S. J. London and New York: Methuen, 1982.

Abstract In their writings about one of the most important cornerstones in the edifice of psychoanalysis, Freud's interpretation of his Irma Dream, Freud and Erikson act as apologists for the modern patriarchy. Using the rhetorical persona of the progressive, scientific hero, Freud and Erikson cast themselves as protagonists in the drama of modernization. Their rhetorical structures, syntax, and diction reveal their sexism. The strategy of their discourses invites their audience to believe that the audience is witnessing scientific discoveries in the making; the rhetoric of Freud and Erikson suggests that their discourse is not patriarchal rationalization, but rational analysis, the drama of the scientific method applied for progress. Their interpretation of Freud's Irma Dream disassociates Freud from women, assigning separate behaviors for rational, progressive males and irrational, traditional females. But the truth of the Irma Dream is that it associates Freud with females and reveals the irresponsibility of both his pharmacological and psychological prescriptions.

(1983). The faculties and the ends of discourse. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 19-20.

This chapter draws distinctions somewhat unorthodox in discussing terms such as and with respect to rhetorical action. It suggests that the rules and conventions of linguistics and speech act theory are inadequate for a complete account of rhetorical phenomena. The chapter argues that the rules, conventions, and constraints of rhetorical action differ from those operating in conversation or dialogue. It also argues that in view of the fact that rhetorical action and strategies are in large part determined by constraints generated by aim, media, audience, and situation, rhetorical action is in large part not constrained by rules and conventions that are universal to human action or the language used. The chapter examines the effect that although linguistic conventions and rules, including speech act theory, are incidental to defining the felicity of certain rhetorical genre and modes, the main thrust of the art of rhetoric and rhetorical strategy deals with constraints not grounded in conventions and rules.

(1979). Speech acts and rehtorical action. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 23-27.

The Plural I: The Teaching of Writing. William E. Coles, Jr. With a Foreward by Richard Larson. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1978. Prose Style and Critical Reading. Robert Cluett. New York: Columbia University, 1976. Pp. 316. The Language of Adam: On the Limits and Systems of Discourse. Russell Fraser. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Pp. 255. THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE AND THE ASSAULT ON AMBIGUITY

Understanding Discourse: The Speech Act and Rhetorical Action, Karl R. Wallace. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1970. Ideology, by L. B Brown. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973. 208 pp. $2.95. Ideology, by L. B Brown. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973. 208 pp. $2.95.