The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue

Conny Rhode

doi:10.1007/s10503-017-9432-z

Argumentation Sep 2017 Open Access

The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue

Conny Rhode University of York

Abstract

Dialogical egalitarianism is the thesis that any proposition asserted in dialogue, if questioned, must be supported or else retracted. Dialogical foundationalism is the thesis that some propositions are privileged over this burden of proof, standing in no need of support unless and until support for their negation is provided. I first discuss existing arguments for either thesis, dismissing each one of them. Absent a successful principled argument, I then examine which thesis it is pragmatically more advantageous to adopt in analytic philosophical dialogue. This requires identifying the goal of such dialogue, to the attainment of which the thesis would be so advantageous. To identify this goal, I draw on Douglas Walton’s typology of dialogues for an analysis of the types of dialogue of 110 representatively selected journal articles in current analytic philosophy. 95% of articles are found to instantiate persuasion dialogue. In light of the thus prevalent goal of persuading one’s opponent, I argue that the adoption of dialogical egalitarianism in analytic philosophical dialogue is pragmatically inescapable.

Journal: Argumentation
Published: 2017-09-01
DOI: 10.1007/s10503-017-9432-z
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Topics: argument
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Citation Context

Cited by in this index (2)

Pertierra (2022)

Adversariality in Argumentation: Shortcomings of Minimal Adversariality and A P…

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Bodlović (2019)

Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

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Cites in this index (1)

Aijaz et al. (2013)

Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness

Argumentation

Also cites 11 works outside this index ↓

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Philosophical Studies ↗
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Journal for General Philosophy of Science ↗
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Metaphilosophy ↗
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Journal of Philosophy ↗

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The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue

Abstract

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (2)

Cites in this index (1)

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