It's Not What You Know: A Transactive Memory Analysis of Knowledge Networks at NASA

Johny T. Garner Pepperdine University

Abstract

Much of America was stunned into mourning on February 1, 2003 as the space shuttle Columbia was reported to have broken up over Texas. The ensuing investigation revealed that debris at liftoff was the cause of the crash, but the official report suggested that NASA's organizational communication was just as much to blame. This article uses transactive memory theory to argue that there were significant gaps in the knowledge network of NASA organizational members, and those gaps impeded information flow regarding potential disaster. E-mails to and from NASA employees were examined (the “To” and “From” fields) to map a network of communication related to Columbia's damage and risk. Although NASA personnel were connected with each other in this incident-based network, the right information did not get to the people who needed it. The article concludes with extensions of theory and practical implications for organizations, including NASA.

Journal
Journal of Technical Writing and Communication
Published
2006-10-01
DOI
10.2190/u636-4844-2323-w071
CompPile
Search in CompPile ↗
Open Access
Closed
Topics
Export

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (2)

  1. Technical Communication Quarterly
  2. Journal of Technical Writing and Communication

References (23)

  1. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Final Report, 2003. Retrieved September 1, 2003, from http://www.nasa.…
  2. 10.1093/oso/9780195160369.001.0001
  3. 10.2307/256396
  4. 10.1086/225469
  5. Diffusion of Innovations
Show all 23 →
  1. 10.1007/978-1-4612-4634-3_9
  2. 10.2307/30036531
  3. 10.1521/soco.1995.13.3.319
  4. 10.1177/1368430200033002
  5. 10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.1080
  6. 10.1037/0022-3514.61.6.923
  7. 10.1016/S0090-2616(01)00046-8
  8. 10.1016/S0277-9536(98)00361-X
  9. 10.2307/2393923
  10. Organizational Culture
  11. Culture and Related Corporate Realities: Text, Cases, and Readings on Organizational Entr…
  12. Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-tech Corporation
  13. Apollo, Challenger, Columbia. The Decline of the Space Program: A Study in Organizational…
  14. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
  15. 10.2307/2393390
  16. UCI-net for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis
  17. Handbook of Interpersonal Communication
  18. 10.1287/mnsc.46.5.612.12052