Abstract

This article explores the assumptions about science and technology held by the engineers who attempted to delay the launch of the Challenger space shuttle. These assumptions, it is argued, affected the ways in which the engineers framed the arguments used to persuade managers not to launch. Examining the decision making processes prior to the tragedy reveals three dominant conceptions of science and technology which guided the engineers' persuasive efforts, and which appear to account for why the engineers did not succeed in their attempt to influence the managers.

Journal
Journal of Technical Writing and Communication
Published
1993-04-01
DOI
10.2190/1wjk-jhv5-k071-03jt
Open Access
Closed
Topics

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (3)

  1. Journal of Technical Writing and Communication
  2. Technical Communication Quarterly
  3. Journal of Technical Writing and Communication

Cites in this index (0)

No references match articles in this index.

Also cites 3 works outside this index ↓
  1. 10.1080/00335639009383910
  2. Gouran D. S., Hirokawa R. Y., and Martz A. E., A Critical Analysis of Factors Related to Decisional Problems …
  3. 10.1080/00335638609383764
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