Sophisms and Contempt for Autonomy

Katharina Stevens

doi:10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0333

Philosophy & Rhetoric Dec 2024

Sophisms and Contempt for Autonomy

Katharina Stevens University of Lethbridge

Abstract

ABSTRACT Argumentation theory tends to treat the distinction between intentional and unintentional fallacies—sophisms and paralogisms—as unimportant for the evaluation of argumentation. The article author believes this is so because argumentation theory tends to be focused on the epistemic functions of argumentation and fallacious arguments pose the same threat to the production of epistemic goods whether they are intentional or not, so the distinction is not needed for the epistemic evaluation of argumentation. This article argues that argumentation has a special connection to respect for autonomy, one that enables it to also produce distinctly moral goods. Sophisms, but not paralogisms, spoil these goods. Worse—sophisms produce potentially continuing moral harms, while paralogisms do not. Therefore, the paralogism/sophism distinction should be reintegrated into argumentation theory’s evaluative toolbox.

Journal: Philosophy & Rhetoric
Published: 2024-12-02
DOI: 10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0333
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Open Access: Closed
Topics: argument assessment
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Sophisms and Contempt for Autonomy

Abstract

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References (20) · 2 in this index

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