Intellectual Grandstanding: An Epistemic Bad in Argument

Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht Washington University in St. Louis

Abstract

ABSTRACT There is a growing body of literature on virtue signaling or moral grandstanding, but relatively little has been said about virtue signaling’s cousin, intellect signaling or intellectual grandstanding. This article develops a working definition of intellectual grandstanding as it occurs in argumentative contexts. With this definition in hand, this article argues that intellectual grandstanding impedes epistemic success in argument on each major model of argument today. Intellectual grandstanding in argument fails to respect other arguers, it sustains disagreements, and it produces little reliable epistemic justification. Given this convergence of reasons, the article concludes that intellectual grandstanding poses a serious epistemic problem for argumentative exchange and deserves our immediate attention.

Journal
Philosophy & Rhetoric
Published
2024-12-31
DOI
10.5325/philrhet.57.4.0390
Open Access
Closed
Topics

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  1. Philosophy & Rhetoric
Also cites 11 works outside this index ↓
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    Southwest Philosophy Review  
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