Abstract

ABSTRACT Despite Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s well-known influence on argumentation studies, it is striking that their theory of argumentation no longer stands out as a living project in the field. On the one hand, critics argue that their theory is inherently relativistic and therefore incapable of aiding argument evaluation. On the other hand, critics argue that, even as a descriptive theory, it fails to sufficiently justify its own systematic ambitions. This article addresses these dual concerns by returning to one of the most neglected yet most innovative aspects of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of argumentation—its rhetorical methodology. Reconstructing two key aspects of this methodology in phenomenological terms, the author discusses that the theory of argumentation found in The New Rhetoric is a philosophically neutral framework for describing the already norm-laden practice of argumentation.

Journal
Philosophy & Rhetoric
Published
2024-06-28
DOI
10.5325/philrhet.57.1.0001
Open Access
Closed
Topics

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Cites in this index (2)

  1. Philosophy & Rhetoric
  2. Philosophy & Rhetoric
Also cites 7 works outside this index ↓
  1. “The Empirical Relevance of Perelman’s New Rhetoric.”
    Argumentation  
  2. “Perelman, ad Hominem Argument, and Rhetorical Ethos.”
    Argumentation  
  3. “Value Judgements, Justifications and Argumentation.”
    Philosophy Today  
  4. “Argumentation and the Challenge of Time: Perelman, Temporality, and the Future of Argument.”
    Argumentation  
  5. “What Makes an Argument Strong? Contrastivism in the New Rhetoric.”
    Informal Logic  
  6. “Figure, Ground and Presence: A Phenomenology of Meaning in Rhetoric.”
    Quarterly Journal of Speech  
  7. “The New Rhetoric’s Argument Schemes: A Rhetorical View of Practical Reasoning.”
    Argumentation and Advocacy  
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