He was professor emeritus of English at Brooklyn College, where he taught for many years and at various times directed the first-year English program, founded and directed the writing center, and directed the Scholars Program and Honors Academy. He is an exemplary figure for writing center and composition scholars because he was instrumental in establishing and conceptualizing peer tutoring in the teaching of writing. Bruffee began experimenting with peer tutoring in the 1970s as a response to the open-admissions policies that almost overnight brought hundreds of underprepared students to City University of New York campuses. Peer tutoring, he discovered, worked surprisingly well in that context. Properly prepared and situated, undergraduate student tutors

Introduction: Group projects are a common pedagogical tool for technical and professional communication courses. These projects provide students with valuable learning experiences that they would not otherwise receive working individually. However, student group projects come with some unique challenges, such as unequal distribution of work, unequal levels of learning, and perceptions of fairness. Situating the case: While many instructor-led resources and strategies exist for facilitating group projects, fewer student-empowering strategies exist. Data provide one potential way to empower students to take ownership of their team experience and make more informed decisions throughout the teamwork process. About the case: This teaching case was born out of a response to the many teamwork problems that are outlined in the literature and that the author has observed as an instructor. This teaching case describes the implementation and outcomes of a data-driven framework for decision making called collect, analyze, triangulate, and act (CAT) that the author developed. After they learned about the CATA framework, the students completed a series of data-driven exercises during the team formation, team functioning, and team evaluation stages of the team project. Perceptions of CATA's effectiveness were collected after the project ended. Methods: A mixed-methods approach, which included a survey and a series of interviews, was used to gain insights into how both team members and team leaders perceived the CATA framework. Results: Survey results indicated that students found the CATA framework helpful in many team contexts. Students expressed particularly strong opinions about how CATA aided in the fairness and accuracy of peer evaluations, was helpful for self-reflection, and was useful for making informed arguments to convince team members of a decision. Interviews with team leaders revealed that appealing to data using the CATA framework was helpful in managing the team but had limited capacity to aid in managing conflict. Conclusions: Students realized many benefits from the CATA framework, and some team leaders even felt empowered in certain instances by appealing to data. However, instructors should still consider scaffolding data literacy and teamwork skills for students to be fully prepared for successful teamwork.

94 RHETORICA capacita di attualizzare; le osservazioni etimologiche e filologiche e, infine, il ricorso al commento "interno" del testo, commentare cioé il de inventione col de inventione stesso (e, in 7 casi, con la Rhetorica ad Herennium). A seguiré si trova un esame sistemático della tradizione manoscritta del commento (cap. 3) e un'analisi delle relazioni tra i manoscritti (cap. 4). Nella costituzione del testo B. distingue due recensiones, alpha (costituita da cinque manoscritti, il cui piú importante é Túnico integro: H) e beta (sostanzialmente un solo manoscritto : T), ma quella che viene pubblicata in effetti é la recensio alpha, Túnica riconducibile integralmente direttamente a M., mentre beta é sostantanzialmente un collage di piú commenti, incluso quello di M. presente in alpha. Questa sezione si conclude con una Bibliografía selezionata e una Nota al testo, nella quale si rende conto dei criteri di presentazione del testo cri­ tico. Nella seconda parte del volume si trova il testo critico vero e proprio delle glose. II testo viene presentato da M. in una facies continua; inoltre, per agevolare la lettura, é stato formattato con capoversi e paragrafi facendo riferimento alia divisione in libri, capitoli e paragrafi del de inventione secondo Tedizione teubneriana di E. Stroebel. Gli apparati in calce al testo sono tre. II primo é l'apparato critico vero e proprio, di tipo positivo (nel quale cioé viene in primo luogo presentata la variante accolta nel testo cri­ tico); nel secondo e nel terzo si trovano soltanto alcuni cenni relativi rispettivamente alie fonti e alia fortuna (entrambi questi aspetti vengono piú ampiamente trattati nel cap. 2 dei Prolegomena). Chiude il volume una doppia serie di indici: quella dei manoscritti e quella dei nomi. Francesco Caparrotta, Bagheria (Palermo) Mari Lee Mifsud, Rhetoric and the Gift: Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Contemporary Communication (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2015), 186pp. ISBN: 9780820704852 Mari Lee Mifsud's elegant and illuminating excavation of the Homeric references in Aristotle's rhetorical theory demonstrates the enduring value of the notion of the gift for the study of rhetoric. It compellingly introduces an alternative metaphor to the familiar logics of rhetoric as an economy, a war, or a cheap trick. In so doing, it not only offers contemporary rhetoricians a ver­ satile hermeneutic that connects rhetorical scholarship to other academic pro­ jects but also reminds us of rhetoric's centrality in the social choreography of Aristotle's time as well as our own. The present review of Rhetoric and the Gift is inspired and informed by a 2016 tribute panel, organized by Marie-Odile Hobeika for the National Communication Association's annual conference, during which panelists Jane S. Sutton, John Poulakos, Nathan A. Crick, and myself offered commentary and critique. Explicating classical poiesis in rhetorike, Mifsud traces the concept of the gift (and gifting) in two interdependent registers: the gift of the pre-figuration Reviews 95 call that demands a response, and, second, the gift in the response, articulated through figuration. With attention to the registers' tension, she challenges Maicel Mauss s widely cited sociological study, which characterizes gifting as a hierarchical negotiation of power through "prestations," the metainstitutional practices that compel gift recipients "to make a return." Mifsud asks, "Can we imagine giving, not figured through cycles of obligatory return?" (p. 143). In her response to this question, we have the essence of Mifsud's contribution to rhetorical theory, for she "explores rhetoric not only at the level of the artful response hut [also] at the level of the call and response, or said another wav, at the level of the gift and rhetoric prior to and in excess of art" (p. 3). To develop the idea of rhetoric as the gift that exceeds art, Mifsud invokes Diane Davis s "preoriginary' rhetoricitv," the non-relation in which a call to "inessential solidarity " is issued. This call is by definition from an Other; or it may come as a gift from far aw ay and long ago. Like Davis, Mifsud hopes that "the theory of the gift offers a theory' of human solidarity" (p. 4), as long as it is able to resist the practices that conventionally define rhetoric: strategy, persuasion, deliberation, and consensus. Homer's gift to rhetoric, to Aristotle...

The theme of this special issue is Post-truth. No doubt it was my exasperation with the terminological state of our collective situation that incited me in the spring of 2017 to settle upon it. What, exactly, does the hyphenated couplet mean or to what does it refer? What is its significance or sense? How is it being used, by whom, for what purpose, and with what consequences—for whom? And if, as was being asserted on nearly every side, we currently find ourselves in post-truth, how might we ever get out, presuming we may one day want as much? The original contributions by Sarah Burgess, James Crosswhite, Jason David Myres, Bradford Vivian, and Eric King Watts published herein go a long way toward answering these questions. In the pages that follow, readers will encounter five different takes on what post-truth is: a dangerously normative scene of address, a contemporary communicative environment and a series of historical philosophical movements, the discourse of the masculine hysteric, an insidious mode of governance, racism's latest word. Readers also will happen upon five different estimations of post-truth's (ab)uses and effects: the depoliticization of #MeToo, babble and echo chamber, the impotence of truth, the rationalization of authoritarian impulses and the death of democracy, and zombie relations and tribal war. As for an exodus, over the course of these pages readers will be gifted words that trace an open: kairos, apophasis, desire, pluralistic deliberation, and ideological critique.For all their significant differences—both substantive and stylistic—there is, however, at least one point on which all of the issue's contributions converge: today we do not suffer a shortfall of truth. Quite to the contrary, we are witness to its excess(es), enabled by a circuitous slippage between facts or alt-facts, knowledge, opinion, belief, and truth. Indeed, few to none today openly profess a brazen and callous disregard of truth; instead, truth tellers all! In view of that fact, I will use the remaining pages of this introduction to briefly develop a thesis and deliver a wager. Thesis: post-truth is a distinct regime of truth singularly suited to late neoliberal governance. Wager: Derrida's deconstruction of the philosopheme truth offers invaluable instruction in the possible undoing of the post-truth regime.“Each society,” Michel Foucault famously noticed, “has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth” (1994, 131). I submit that post-truth is the name for a distinct mutation in the “‘political economy’ of truth” in the United States that has been in the making at least since the 1980s, a crucial decade during which neoliberalism began to function as a normative order of reason in public, private, and personal life. Now with other modern regimes of truth, it seems to me, post-truth shares four of five “important traits” to which Foucault attributes their truth effects: “Truth” is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for [it], as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); finally, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (“ideological” struggles). (1984, 131) To wit, post-truth as cash cow for print and electronic media and fodder for year-around political campaigning and fund-raising; English Dictionary 2016 Word of the Year; interminable open- and closed-door House and Senate hearings on Russian interference in U.S. elections; the internet, Ken Ham's Creation Museum and Ark Encounter, Breitbart, and the presidential bully pulpit; the birther movement, deep state conspiracy theory, global warming and New Creationism debates, and free speech controversies on university campuses across the country.But there is, according to Foucault, a fifth feature of all modern truth regimes that is conspicuously missing from post-truth. Whereas in all the others “‘[t]ruth’ is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it” (1984, 130), in the post-truth regime, the form of scientific discourse is displaced by a discourse very different in form and in kind. Of course, what sets scientific discourse or truth claims formally apart from other modes of address is, above all else, the disappearance of the enunciative subject as well as the universalization of its audience. In other words, there is a clear correlation between the value of any scientific claim to truth and the erasure of any and all traces of the “I,” on both ends of the exchange. Not incidentally, that is not the case in the post-truth regime wherein truth value pivots on the degree to which any claim or utterance comports or resonates with individuals' affectively imbued investments, attachments, and identifications. Per the Cambridge English Dictionary, post-truth is “an adjective relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” According to the Economist, post-truths are “assertions that ‘feel true’ but have no basis in fact” (2016). The point is amplified by C. G. Prado in the introduction to his edited collection of essays titled America's Post-truth Phenomenon: When Feelings and Opinions Trump Facts and Evidence: Post-truth is the final step in the misguided move away from objective truth to relativization of truth. If truth is objective, assertions or propositions are true depending on how things are. If truth is relative, assertions or propositions are true depending on how people take things to be. Post-truth is an extreme form of relative truth because in being subjective, it makes assertions or propositions true depending only on how individuals take things to be. (2018, 2) For the time being I wish to defer the complicated issue of the “relativization of truth” in the declared interest of not being distracted from two others. That truth has been individualized or that individuals have become, to borrow a turn of phrase from Foucault, the primary and principal points of the production, application, and adjudication of truth is one important point. That emotion and personal belief are able now to outflank even objective facts and scientific knowledge is another (the claim that literature, for example, has truths to tell has long fallen on deaf ears). Their articulation is decisive: with the regime's inflection, even inflation, of the indefinitely pluralized and individualized enunciative I who, by virtue of strong feeling, is able at any moment not only to recognize or know but, also, to tell or speak the truth, truth is privatized and immanitized, its universal and transcendental dimensions nullified altogether. Hence, what is true for any one person need not be true for everyone or anyone else; what is true for anyone now need not necessarily be true later.This thinking about post-truth as a distinct and consequential mutation in the political economy of truth in the United States prepares one to appreciate an occurrence that easily could be dismissed as insignificant, not worthy of studied reflection. In June 2017 the Fox News network dropped its wildly successful marketing tagline “Fair and Balanced.” Now how is this anything more than a trivial change in—or, for consumers who never bought it, a long overdue giving up on—appearances? “A functional change in a sign-system is,” Gayatri Spivak explained some years ago, “a violent event. Even when it is perceived as ‘gradual,’ or ‘failed,’ or yet ‘reversing itself,’ the change itself can only be operated by the force of a crisis” (1987, 197). It is from this angle that the Fox News network's erasure of “Fair and Balanced” is grasped as indicative of a crisis that may be summarily described as the epistemic drift to post-truth. Telling, too, is the network's new motto, “Most Watched. Most Trusted.” The sequence of the two syntagms is curious in the least, as conventional wisdom would have them reversed for reason of causality: because Fox delivers trustworthy news, it is the most watched network. But that is not the case here: instead the motto reads, because Fox delivers the most watched news, it is (to be) trusted. Even more, conventional wisdom would suggest that when it comes to reporting the news, “most trusted [by its viewers]” (a verb) would be rephrased as “most trust-worthy [for any viewer]” (an adjective modifying the noun or the news content delivered). The movement from one marketing tagline, “Fair and Balanced” (even if only for the purpose of keeping up the appearance of disinterestedness), to the next, “Most Watched. Most Trusted,” intimates the usefulness of the post-truth regime to late neoliberal governance. It is to this relation that I now turn.Elsewhere and on more than one occasion I have written at relative length about late neoliberalism, aspiring to lend specificity to this overused and, all too often, undefined term that typically is asked to carry the considerable weight of an overdetermined context functioning as source, origin, or ground for some phenomenon in question. In the brief compass that is the special issue editor's introduction, a short and schematic summary of it will have to do.One, I follow Foucault's lead by using the term “neoliberalism” as the name for a distinct rationality and corresponding mode of governance that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century. At its most basic, I understand any rationality to be something like a mind-set or habit of thought in accordance to which persons of every sort make sense out of and conduct their daily lives, and I understand governance as the “conduct of [that] conduct,” “at a distance” and carried out by more than juridical means (Gordon 1991, 2). Despite its actually being a complex construction, neoliberalism feels natural or given by nature to those groomed in it. Like other modes of governance, neoliberalism's (soft) power to shape human activity is secured by a whole host of institutions, apparatuses, and knowledges.Now as Foucault explains in his 1979 lectures published under the title The Birth of Biopolitics, twentieth-century American neoliberalism as a rationality materializes as the effort “to use the market economy and the typical analyses of the market economy to decipher non-market relationships and phenomena which are not strictly and specifically economic but what we call social phenomena” (2008, 240). Even more specifically, then, neoliberalism is to be understood as a rationality inaugurated by a migration of economic sense making (for example, the calculus of profit and loss and the principle of laissez-faire) from the private or corporate sphere to the public sphere, from consumer relations in the strict sense to social relations in the general sense. Foucault delivers an illustrative example: In their analysis of human capital … the neo-liberals tried to explain, for example, how the mother-child relationship, concretely characterized by the time spent by the mother with the child, the quality of the care she gives, the affection she shows, the vigilance with which she follows its development, its education, and not only its scholastic but also its physical progress, the way in which she not only gives it food but also imparts a particular style to eating patterns, and the relationship she has with its eating, all constitute for the neo-liberals an investment which can be measured in time. And what will this investment constitute? It will constitute a human capital, the child's human capital, which will produce an income. What will this income be? It will be the child's salary when he or she becomes an adult. And what will the income be for the mother who made the investment? Well, the neo-liberals say, it will be a psychical income. (2008, 243–44) Summarily put, neoliberalism is a rationality that lends market sense even to so-called interpersonal relations and the micro-practices of everyday life.It is crucial to notice, however, that with neoliberalism also comes a determined and determining critique of the state. That is to say, whereas in nineteenth-century classical liberalism laissez-faire functioned as “a principle of government's self-limitation,” in post–World War II America “it is a principle turned against it” (2008, 247). Foucault elaborates: Faced with excessive governmental action, and in opposition to it, the nineteenth century sought to establish a sort of administrative jurisdiction that would enable the action of public authorities to be assessed in terms of right, whereas here we have a sort of economic that claims to action in strictly economic and market (2008, The of market analysis to is the the and, to this demand that the social be and and the of to the of from the to the and or altogether. It also is the rationality by which the of the and primary care is able to make sense. In the of the neoliberal of the state at out the with which it the and, of course, of human and individuals and private as the United she education for public education, personal and interminable for social for public of all for public and knowledge, for use for public is neoliberal of a certain of subject that is my second point. I follow Foucault in to be neoliberal primary the of the during the century and the I also take a is to say, as the primary point of of neoliberal governance. The name Foucault gives to that point of of power is of and the (2008, with to neoliberal governance, Foucault The subject is only as which does not mean that the whole subject is as In other words, the subject as does not an of any with economic It means that economic is the of one will on the of a new It also means that the becomes that power a on to the and only to the that he is That is to say, the of between the and the power on and the principle of the of power over the will be only this of of is the of and the But this does not mean that every every subject is an economic (2008, As Foucault explains in the series of is a subject of interest for the state only to the extent that its conduct is in market and Foucault points out that conduct takes in what he terms “an of on the one in the form of to a series of and, on the in the form of production, to the of or which his to the production of the of (2008, on the one to over which neoliberal have no and on the other “to the of will in their activity a an That is to say, in the market of and to upon laissez-faire makes itself as the by which individuals their and, in the Indeed, what Foucault as of the relationships of the social to the that is, the of neoliberalism is the historical of for also to function to in the care for The of course, is that as is by a in a situation Foucault with to the which happen to and with to the he for (2008, it is not to the neoliberal as but to the that virtue one of the of the neoliberal of the I use the term to a relatively but in I certain that in other and for example, in of in I will be to call late neoliberal and have their to here I to late twentieth-century neoliberalism's to and of in and the this of neoliberal governance, has the his of me that of has a general in how human and conduct in the century. As he it, very of who we of the we are and the of we have this I mean that the of the a of the of our point is to that but human has to as a the sense of the in the political but human now as a new of of in the political what is and in with this but human has been a in neoliberal political the and its terms of analysis have been to the of the has emerged the of the that is grasped at the but … in terms of its are understood less in terms of their of carried on a more in terms of a global economy of and the is a and with yet from a to the body, to be and this gives a in what of the for has the of the is and the is less about of the than it is about Hence, by I mean to point to a rationality that the or or by which or are made to and to others and those and, no by the of any social order or historical the social is for this point I the post-truth regime's with and usefulness to late neoliberal and governance is to the regime of truth whose is on the and of the enunciative I and whose is the and of truth a mode of governance whose primary is but whose primary point of of (soft) power is Indeed, at this point I might it this post-truth is the of has been asserted by more than one and on that it is to the of Foucault and or the and that we find ourselves in this we call post-truth. I one example, have the form of truth most today have no time for or and are to claims about relative other than to its form of truth is of and is in the of Michel Foucault and their from of truth, like Foucault and objective truth and truth to of truth was the in the in historical from modern to I it could be from the In fact, I will my introduction to this special issue to a with a that as a deconstruction will have something important to about how to post-truth well in of its Indeed, the been there from the in the thinking on the trace and the of the the universal of truth is also these the is to on is the It is the of the which is to say, the the not as a an and an as as the of would have it” but, instead, as by the trace of another which never as then, that is not to be grasped in the sense as on a but in the general sense as a of and made the case for in the general sense in and I the of to the the one the the the that is would not as the or opposition which gives them is the most significance of the to as the of the and functioning of an not by any would be the a in the of a trace the other as other in the no would do its and no would as the force of Derrida's is not against and for as Prado and others would have a of the of that classical will not the effort is to at the of both and be it with to or truth. and there is no of or truth the of or truth, even if all of the of or of truth are will also have been the point of Derrida's with a on the of to has this to about the of the and the the transcendental and the is not only the and to a truth whose would with all The or of being in a is no and in with it is the of As long as is or can not be in the … is not The and in this not the of possible in as that is the also is subject to even As The whole point of Derrida's analysis is the being determined and universal in an sense and are and not because are not but because the very of the universal sphere can only be in through like of this the to itself the possible to turn its the and the of the universal to relation that between truth and its also to the relation of and the and the given state of our In this particular historical the at is to against the to to the occasion of the of the in the of (the then, are five very different on the state of our post-truth as a the call to that any in our post-truth our thinking about it both and I want to all of the for their contributions to this issue and my deep to for his and of the

Anyone who does not simply refuse to perceive decline will hasten to claim a special justification for his own personal existence, his activity and involvement in this chaos. There are as many exceptions for one's own sphere of action, place of residence, and moment of time as there are insights into the general failure. A blind determination to save the prestige of personal existence—rather than, through impartial disdain for its impotence and entanglement, at least to detach it from the background of universal delusion—is triumphing almost everywhere. That is why the air is so thick with life theories and world views, and why in this country they cut so presumptuous a figure, for almost always they finally serve to sanction some utterly trivial private situation. For just the same reason the air is teeming with phantoms, mirages of glorious cultural figures breaking upon us overnight in spite of it all, for everyone is committed to the optical illusions of his isolated standpoint.—Walter Benjamin, “Imperial Panorama, VIII,” One-Way Street It is difficult to see the question of truth. In the imperial panorama that so concerned Benjamin, the question of truth was disappeared by a war's seemingly endless violence. In this moment, now, it appears to disappear into the midst (though not the fog, not by the long shot—of our own inattention) of endless war, a violence that drones over Hannah Arendt's worry that it is “in the nature of the political realm to be at war with truth in all of its forms” (1993, 239) and drowns out Alexandre Koyré's pressing warning that the assertion and experience of “essential enmity” renders the lie not simply a virtue but a “primary and fundamental rule of behavior” ([1943] 2017, 146).Without question, there is now (again) deep and ongoing concern for the deficient or excessive state (inside and outside the nation-state) of truth and what is to be said and done in the apparent aftermath of veracity. Post-truth has provoked—no doubt, but perhaps not always well. From the left, right, and center, it has so often led into the cul-de-sac of what Foucault called “commentary,” a proliferating reiteration that has relied on a prominent but question-begging pronouncement about the definitive meaning of a “word of the year” to foreclose if not deter inquiry into the question of truth. More than a bit of this common cause is articulated and enacted in works such as Michiko Kakutani's The Death of Truth (2018). Though nearly unreadable for the pretension that covers its conceptual confusion (including an astonishing indifference to the implications of the mythology that is explicitly claimed—perhaps incorrectly—to abide in its title), this book takes care to tick all of the “proper” boxes: consistent and unrelenting terminological conflation (for example, and with no apparent need to consider their order, post-truth = fake news = alt-facts = lying = propaganda = opinion = subjectivity = extreme relativism = denialism, etc., etc.)—check; a call to cling with unwavering faith to the banister of a monolithic “science” (the call's simplicity recalls the sole and quaint “Science Building” that adorns the campus of Bob Jones University)—check; a pronounced aversion to any inquiry that would reflect on forms of truth and how such variety may underpin and trouble the expression of truth (i.e., there is no time for either dawdling philosophy or indulgent rhetoric)—check; an incoherent and cherry-picking tirade against something named “postmodernism,” an attack that consistently conflates (and refuses to actually read) inter alia structuralism, poststructuralism, constructivism, deconstruction, and genealogy, all in order to foment (or just foam) against the specter of a deeply confused notion of “subjectivity” and then rally for a return to proper and unified reason, one that appears unable to hear anything of Arendt's claim in “Lying in Politics,” that “moral outrage” will not facilitate an interest in truth and that the nonaccidental arrival of lying into politics is indicative of the fact that much “deliberate falsehood deals with contingent facts” (6; emphasis in original; it is telling that Kakutani excludes this idea from her own quotation of Arendt, see 12–13)—check, check, and check; the expressed wish to recover a pure and proper language for public life (and, on the down low, the unquestionable virtue of pragmatic prose, aka journalism), one that will somehow (remember—there can be no rhetoric and likely no speech-action) undo America's “deep division,” a divide that is itself never queried in terms of whether it amounts to stasis or a rather self-confirming (and defeating) conceit on the part of those who prefer not to hear anything but what they want to hear—check; shoot-from-the-hip warnings about the violent and totalitarian tendencies of a post-truth world, as if truth lacks any manner of coercion and as if there is not standing disagreement (not least among victims) as to what regimes make of truth claims and the various ways in which they do and do not make claims on truth—check.If the question of truth is too often hidden and overwritten by so much chatter, including the incoherent pronouncements of those who seem to believe that having character is the same thing as expression limited to 280 characters, the question reappears in the timely and challenging contributions that compose this special issue of Philosophy & Rhetoric. Indeed, the articles that follow shed different and crucial light on the emergence, dynamics, and stakes of life in the midst of post-truth—they also forge interesting connections with other recent work in the journal, including several of the contributions published in P&R's fiftieth anniversary issue (50:4, 2017). I want to express my sincere and full gratitude to Barbara Biesecker, who correctly insisted on the need for a special issue on post-truth, imagined its form and convened a distinguished group of contributors, and then tirelessly served as the issue's editor. It is an honor and a pleasure to work with Professor Biesecker, a genuine scholar and an ever so thoughtful colleague.

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The 9th conference of the European Association for the Teaching of Academic Writing (EATAW) was held in subtropical conditions from 19th -21st June 2017 in Egham, UK.More than 400 participants from over 40 countries gathered at Royal Holloway, University of London to deliberate 'what teachers of academic writing can offer the global academy in terms of imaginative, creative and principled responses to the increasingly international, diverse and marketised reality of higher education' (EATAW 2017).As two of the co-organisers of the conference, and guest editors of this special issue, we want to thank our colleagues in the Centre for the Development of Academic Skills and other supporting departments at Royal Holloway for the assistance and hard work that a conference of this scale required.We are also grateful for the guidance of the EATAW board and the planning committee of the 2015 conference.Lisa Ganobscik-Williams and George Ttoouli are due our deep gratitude for their expert guidance, patient understanding and timely responses, despite the competing pressures and multiple responsibilities that both they and we have experienced.Many thanks go to all those who acted as reviewers, and of course to the contributors, who offered so many compelling and thought-provoking contributions and were responsive and timely throughout the review, revision and proofreading process.The conference theme, 'Academic Writing Now: Pedagogy, Policy and Practice', was intended to generate contributions articulating a response to the shifting realities of Higher Education at the levels of policy, pedagogy and practice.The call for proposals was enthusiastically received, and the conference included 168 contributions in the form of 116 paper presentations, 8 symposia, 15 workshops, 20 poster presentations and 9 Lightning Talks.Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the themes most represented were pedagogy and practice, with some very insightful contributions on policy.Our three keynote speakers offered challenging perspectives on each of these three themes; their talks will be available on the EATAW 2017 website until autumn 2019, for those who wish to revisit them. 1 EATAW 2017 Keynote SpeechesProf. Rowena Murray launched the conference with the recognition of the expertise that our profession offers to the academy, and acknowledged the difficulties inherent in having a voice in policy.She posited the 'retreat' model that she and others have developed for academic writing as a possible means of disengaging from everyday activities to create space for policywriting.However, her problematisation of the various modes of disengagement that writers seek in order to prioritise writing not only articulated the scope of the challenge, but also identified a 1 The keynote speaker videos are among 53 videos of sessions from EATAW 2017, hosted privately on YouTube so that they will be available in perpetuity.The entire playlist can be accessed here.

Guest Editors Maria Novotny, Lori Beth De&nbsp;Hertogh, and Erin Frost&nbsp; Recent reports reveal that the U.S. has the highest rate of maternal deaths in the developed world, particularly among low-income, rural, and African American women (NPR, 2017). Changes to the Supreme Court endanger the viability of Roe v. Wade. In Iowa, a&nbsp;judge threatens to ban&hellip; Continue reading Call for Submissions: Special Issue &#8220;Rhetorics of Reproductive Justice in Public and Civic Contexts&#8221; (Closed)

Abstract: Caregiving is a critical and yet understudied area related to aging, health, and wellness. Despite the importance of caregiving in the lives of older adults, assumptions about aging “actively” or “successfully” suggest that aging is independent, not interdependent. The healthcare industry reiterates these gerontological assumptions about aging when invoking notions of skills-based health literacy. This essay is an analysis of and response to the rhetorics of literacy as used in health care. Using John Duffy’s theoretical framework for literacy development as well as scholarship in age studies and community-literacy studies, I argue that literacy has become a rhetorical construct that promotes a view of older adults as particularly draining on the healthcare system. A more productive approach would be to frame the collaborative, distributed, and mediated work of giving and receiving care in the context of Paul Prior’s concept of literate activity. Finally, with a community-literacy approach that incorporates engagement and dialogue rather than individualistic skill development, I respond to this rhetorical construct of health literacy by considering how aging, interdependence, and networked caregiving expand the notion of what contributes to healthy living and well-being as we age. Using examples from a community care coordination project, this essay shows how compositionists might work together with patients, caregivers, and professionals to reframe health literacy rhetorics and act for change.

There is no shortage of calls for innovation in higher education. In response to some catastrophic outside influence, whether it be budget cuts, an impending enrollment collapse, or the rapid expan...

This article refers to:The Stolen Property of Whiteness: A Case Study in Critical Intersectional Rhetorics of Race and Disability

Mentally disabled writing instructors who do not show visible signs of our psychiatrically diagnosed conditions have what is known as “sane privilege,” the ability to “pass.” If we so choose, we can teach without disclosing our often stigmatizing diagnoses to students. This article addresses a classroom incident that forced me to consider both the benefits of such disclosure and its inherent risks. I reflect on the incident and argue that I should not have stayed silent when my class burst out laughing at a student comment related to my particular mental disability. Instead, I should have disclosed my disability, thereby giving students the opportunity to engage a stigmatized “other” in a dialogic setting. As a suggestion for how to facilitate this kind of engagement, I offer the lesson plan I wish I would have followed in response to encountering stigma in the classroom.

Research Article| October 01 2018 Contributors Pedagogy (2018) 18 (3): 573–575. https://doi.org/10.1215/15314200-6937052 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Contributors. Pedagogy 1 October 2018; 18 (3): 573–575. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/15314200-6937052 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsPedagogy Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2018 Duke University Press2018 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

As my last act as outgoing book review editor for Advances in the History of Rhetoric, I am pleased to introduce a forum on Professor Darrel Wanzer-Serrano’s important 2015 work, The New York Young Lords and the Struggle for Liberation. When editor Arthur Walzer and I made the decision to host these forums, we envisioned creating a space where scholars could respond to important new works in the field. Some we expected would be provocative, inviting us to think about new possibilities in the history of rhetorical theory, criticism, and praxis. Professor Wanzer-Serrano’s book is both provocative and timely. It pushes us to think about decolonial love and the struggle of the New York Young Lords in the context of rhetoric studies and at a time when immigrant voices are fighting to be heard amidst increasing violence, dehumanization, and exclusion.

This book consists of a collection of narratives on the subject of scientific writing skill needs compiled by the author through more than 100 interviews with senior scientists, emerging (early career) scientists, and recent Ph.D. graduates, all of whom would be appropriate audiences of the book. It is an interesting amalgam of opinions from the scientific community about technical writing, its importance, the breadth of writing opportunities, and the authors’ enjoyment—or lack thereof. While oriented toward science, it could easily be expanded to the entire spectrum of STEM fields. Through her informal approach, the author achieves her purpose of exposing diverse opinions on the need for and acceptance of technical writing within the scientific community. While the book might not fit nicely into a technical writing course, it can provide valuable insight into technical writing needs beyond university undergraduate and graduate students. The author, through the use of interviews and narrative summaries, has provided a view of technical writing as accomplished by three levels of scientists, where personal opinions of the scientists are supported by the level of success achieved by the individual respondent. This book could be used for a course in technical writing in a number of ways, especially at the undergraduate level, either as a reference text or as the primary text for the course. To begin with, the material in the book is based upon the contributors’ years of experience. In some cases, that could mean many years of technical writing not only within a particular field of interest, but in other genres or subject matters, based upon the individual’s experiences. A professor teaching the technical writing class may have limited experience in the world of publishing papers, books, or other technical matter. An assignment for a class could be to pick one of the respondents in the book, and develop a detailed description of his or her beliefs and approaches to technical writing. Such an assignment could then lead into a class discussion on the importance of technical writing in one’s career as supported by the text.

<bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Background:</b> This study investigates linguistic characterizations in the form of linguistic co-occurrence patterns in discussion sections of English research articles (RAs) in an engineering discipline (i.e., chemical engineering) and linguistic variations that distinguish discussion sections of high-impact articles from those in low-impact articles. <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Research questions:</b> 1. What underlying linguistic characterizations are salient in RA discussions in chemical engineering? 2. Are there any differences in the identified linguistic characterizations of discussion sections between high- and low-impact RAs? <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Literature review:</b> In the process of composing RAs, the discussion section is a difficult and challenging part-genre to write. The rhetorical organization of RA discussions has been examined extensively through Swales's English for Specific Purposes genre analysis. However, the linguistic characterizations of RA discussion sections remain unclear and the question of whether discernible differences exist between discussions of high- and low-impact RAs in a specialized engineering discipline remains unanswered. <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Methodology:</b> This study used Biber's multidimensional (MD) analysis method. In response to the first research question, factor analysis (in this study, principal component analysis) was adopted to identify the linguistic characterizations in the form of linguistic co-occurrence patterns (“dimensions”) in 213 RA discussion sections extracted from chemical engineering RAs. To answer the second question, the independent t-test was implemented to compare the high- and low-impact RA discussion sections in the identified dimensions. <bold xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">Results and conclusions:</b> Six linguistic characterizations in the form of linguistic co-occurrence patterns were identified in RA discussion sections: 1. involvement and interactivity, 2. non-narration versus narration, 3. evaluative statements with further explanations and elaborations, 4. informational density, 5. stating results/claims, and 6. expression of denial relationships toward statement or experimental findings. The results suggest the linguistic characterizations in RA discussion sections and interesting differences in the high- and low-impact RA discussion sections, especially in Dimensions 1, 3, and 5. Reasons for the linguistic variations in the identified dimensions are discussed, followed by the pedagogical implications for reading or writing RAs for international scientific communication.

Abstract In 1937, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal hung on the whims of a deeply divided Supreme Court. His ninth fireside chat argued for legislation that would grant FDR enough new justices to shift the Court in favor of the New Deal. Facing entrenched opposition to his unpopular plan, Roosevelt presented the president as a constitutional authority who must act in response to the crisis of the Great Depression to drive the three-horse team of government toward recovery. Throughout the text, Roosevelt worked to create a sense of urgency and asked the nation to see this moment as the time for decisive action. This study examines the flow of kairos in the speech, tracing timeliness in Roosevelt’s argument for swift action targeting the Court to safeguard economic recovery. Although Roosevelt did not expand the Court, his language lives on as a model for subsequent executives and part of our public constitutional discourse.

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Soundwriting Pedagogies argues that sound is an undervalued mode of writing instruction. It offers practical strategies, creative applications, insightful theories, soundings out, and lots of examples to encourage the use and value of soundwriting in composition, writing, rhetoric, and communication classrooms. Throughout this collection, contributors draw on the affordances of sound to theorize and share practices, so that they (and readers) can make sense in ways that might not work in traditional, alphabetic written prose. Crank it up.