Abstract

Abstract In Aristotle's works, the adjective ηθικός has two principal meanings: it can, namely, refer to (1) whatever is relative to ήθος, or (2) whatever is capable of expressing ήθος. This latter sense is what the present study proposes initially to delineate, by endeavoring to evaluate precisely the nature and meaning of ήθος as it is implied in each use of the adjective. This analysis will permit a subsequent isolation of the of the particular senses illustrated in the three occurrences of ηθικός which appear in the passages of the Rhetoric devoted to the λέξις of oratory. (Rhet. III, 7, 1408 a 11, 1408 a 25, et III, 1413 b 10). In effect: (1) when the notion of λέξις ηθική involves the ήθος of the speaker, the semantic extension of this latter term exhibits certain divergences, not only with regard to the way it is characterized in the rest of the treatise, as in the definition of πίστις εν τώι ήθει τού λέγοντος, but also with regard to the doctrine in the Ethics; (2) the way in which Rhet. III, 12 conceives of υπόκρισις—with which λέξις ηθική has close and privileged associations—implies a traditional, non-Aristotelian conception of ήθος. Taking into accound the discordant character of the three above-mentioned instances provides a new resource for critical studies devoted to questions about the dating and unity of the Rhetoric.

Journal
Rhetorica
Published
2005-02-01
DOI
10.1525/rh.2005.23.1.1
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