Abstract

AbstractWe propose a revised definition of “argument scheme” that focuses on describing argumentative performances and normative assessments that occur within an argumentative context, the social context in which the scheme arises. Our premise-and-conclusion structure identifies the typical instantiation of an argument in the argumentative context, and our critical framework describes a set of normative assessments available to participants in the context, what we call practically normative assessments. We distinguish this practical normativity from the rationally or universally normative assessment that might be imposed from outside the argumentative context. Thus, the practical norms represented in an argument scheme may still be subject to rational critique, and the scheme avoids the is/ought fallacy. We ground our theoretical discussion and observations in an empirical study of US district court opinions resolving legal questions about copyright fair use and the lawyers’ briefs that led to them, instantiating our definition of argument scheme in the “argument for classification by precedent.” Our definition addresses some criticisms the argument-scheme construct has received. For example, using our data, we show that a minimally well formed instance of this type of argument does not shift any conventional burden from the proponent of the argument to its skeptics. We also argue that these argument schemes need not be seen as dialogical.

Journal
Argumentation
Published
2023-12-01
DOI
10.1007/s10503-023-09608-7
CompPile
Search in CompPile ↗
Open Access
OA PDF Hybrid
Topics
Export

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (1)

  1. Argumentation

Cites in this index (3)

  1. Argumentation
  2. Argumentation
  3. Written Communication
Also cites 18 works outside this index ↓
  1. Alexander, L. 1996. Bad beginnings. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 145: 57–87.
    University of Pennsylvania Law Review  
  2. Atkinson, K., and T. Bench-Capon. 2021. Argumentation schemes in AI and law. Argument & Computation 12: 417–4…
    Argument & Computation  
  3. Audi, R. 2004. Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoning. Ratio 18 (2): 119–149.
    Ratio  
  4. Blair, J. A. 2012. Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair. Berlin: Sp…
  5. Brewer, S. 1996. Exemplary reasoning: Semantics, pragmatics, and the rational force of legal argument by anal…
    Harvard Law Review  
  6. Godden, D.M., and D. Walton. 2007a. A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation. Pragmatics & Cognitio…
    Pragmatics & Cognition  
  7. Godden, D.M., and D. Walton. 2007b. Advances in the theory of argumentation schemes and critical questions. I…
    Informal Logic  
  8. Hinton, M. 2021. Evaluating the Language of Argument. Berlin: Springer Nature.
  9. Larson, B. N. 2020. Coding guide & replication data for “Precedent as Rational Persuasion,” Texas Data Repo…
  10. Larson, B. N. and D. S. Morrison. 2023. Data and analysis supplement to “Reconceiving Argument Schemes as De…
  11. Lumer, C. 2022. An epistemological appraisal of Walton’s argument schemes. Informal Logic, 42(1), 203–290. ht…
  12. Rhetoric and the Rule of Law
  13. Schauer, F. 1987. Precedent. Stanford Law Review 39: 571–605.
    Stanford Law Review  
  14. Shecaira, F.P. 2016. How to disagree about argument schemes. Informal Logic 36 (4): 500–522.
    Informal Logic  
  15. van Eemeren, F. H., B. Garssen, E. C. W. Krabbe, A. F. Snoeck Henkemans, B. Verheij, and J. H. M Wagemans. 20…
  16. van Laar, J.A. 2011. Argumentation schemes from Hamblin’s dialectical perspective. Informal Logic 31 (4): 344–366.
    Informal Logic  
  17. Argumentation Schemes
  18. Weinreb, L. L. 2016. Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Unive…