Abstract

AbstractThis article presents an analysis and evaluation of what I call the “I’m not stupid” argument. This argument has ancient roots, which lie in Aristotle’s famous description of the weak man’s and strong man’s arguments. An “I’m not stupid” argument is typically used in a context of accusation and defense, by a defendant who argues that they did not commit the act of which they have been accused. The analysis of this type of argument takes the shape of an argumentative pattern, which displays a full-fledged representation of its argumentation structure. It is based on a collection of ten contemporary instances of the “I’m not stupid” argument. Although ten instances constitute a small collection, the wide variation in the argumentative elements that they express explicitly or leave implicit made it possible to identify five new key premises in comparison with previous analyses of the weak man’s and strong man’s arguments (Walton, Tindale and Gordon 2014 in Argumentation 28:85–119, 2014; Walton 2019 in Argumentation 33:45–74, 2019). These new premises show that the crucial point of an evaluation of this argument is the arguer's supposedly rational character in making a gain-loss calculation. They also show that we need empirical data to strengthen our analyses of argument schemes and argumentation structures.

Journal
Argumentation
Published
2023-12-01
DOI
10.1007/s10503-022-09592-4
CompPile
Open Access
OA PDF Hybrid
Topics
Export

Citation Context

Cited by in this index (1)

  1. Philosophy & Rhetoric

References (31) · 4 in this index

  1. Lawyers and litigants in ancient Athens
  2. Argumentation
  3. Cicero. 2006; 1st ed. 1949. On Invention. English translation by H.M. Hubbell. The Loeb Classical Library 386…
  4. Fairchild, William D. 1979. The argument from probability in Lysias. Classical Bulletin 55: 49–54.
    Classical Bulletin
  5. Freese, John H. 1975. Aristotle: The “art” of rhetoric. English translation of Aristotle’s text; Loeb Classic…
Show all 31 →
  1. Gagarin, Michael. 1990. The nature of proofs in Antiphon. Classical Philology 85: 22–32.
    Classical Philology  
  2. Persuasion Greek rhetoric in action
  3. Gagarin, Michael. 2001. Did the Sophists aim to persuade? Rhetorica 19: 275–291.
    Rhetorica  
  4. Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, law, and justice in the age of the sophists
  5. A companion to Greek rhetoric
  6. Rhetorica
  7. Hoffman, David, C. 2003. Reversing perceptions of probability through self-referential argument: Interpretati…
  8. van Hoogstraten, Diederik. 2009. Noem me oplichter, maar geen schurk [Call me a crook, but not a villain]. In…
  9. Proceedings of the seventh conference of the International Society for the Study of Argum…
  10. Scrutinizing Argumentation in Practice
  11. Jansen, Henrike (submitted manuscript). Revisiting reverse eikos: Dialectical evaluation of a rhetorical argument.
  12. The art of persuasion in Greece
  13. A new history of classical rhetoric
  14. Aristotle: On rhetoric. Translated with an introduction, notes, and appendices
  15. Kraus, Manfred. 2007. Early Greek probability arguments and common ground in dissensus. In Dissensus and the …
  16. Rackham, Harris. 1965; 1st ed. 1937. [Aristotle:] Rhetoric to Alexander. English translation of this text. Th…
  17. Rhetorica ad Herennium. 2004; 1st ed. 1954. English translation by Harry Caplan. The Loeb Classical Library 4…
  18. Schmitz, Thomas A. 2000. Plausibility in the Greek orators. American Journal of Philology 121: 47–77.
    American Journal of Philology  
  19. Sloane, Thomas O. 2001. Encyclopedia of rhetoric. Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press.
  20. Reason’s dark champions. Constructive strategies of sophistic argument
  21. Prototypical argumentative patterns
  22. Argumentation: Analysis and evaluation
  23. Argumentation, communication, and fallacies A pragma-dialectical perspective
  24. Argumentation
  25. Argumentation schemes
  26. Argumentation