ABSTRACT Freedom of speech and speech suppression have become fraught notions, and the question of what cannot be said is near the heart of the matter. In this essay, we describe some of the current challenges to free speech and then take up an exploration of a different but relevant “cannot be said”—silence—and inquire into its importance for a fuller understanding of freedom, speech, and “what cannot be said.”

ABSTRACT The notion of debate suggests an orderly controversy and so contains an implicit ideal of orderliness. This orderliness has a fluid reality but is structured by a regard for procedural equality. This ideal becomes possible in practice only to the degree that participants in debate are guided by habits and capabilities described here as dialectical virtues.

ABSTRACT Our post-truth condition is both specifically contemporary and as old as philosophy and rhetoric themselves. The condition is exacerbated by instantaneous worldwide communication through rapidly multiplying forms by very large numbers of people and other entities. It is also exacerbated by the belief that contemporary philosophy and intellectual opinion support a recognition that we are in a post-truth condition. Addressing our condition requires acknowledging that truth is not a theoretical object, that it is best approached not positively but rather apophatically, and that this apophatic way is practical, not theoretical.

ABSTRACT The contemporary study of argumentation has produced sophisticated new theories that attempt to capture norms for evaluating arguments that are much more complex and more suited to actual argumentation than the traditional logical standards. The most prominent theories also make explicit attempts to distinguish themselves from rhetorical approaches. Yet, in the case of at least three major systematic theories of argumentation, a reliance on rhetorical theory persists. Despite denials, each account ultimately grounds its norms in considerations of reception and audience. There are good reasons why these theories are attracted to rhetoric, and there are understandable factors that produce their concern about it. Ultimately, though, the rhetorical dimension of these theories is one of their major theoretical virtues and a clear sign of their staying close to the realities of argumentation.

Research Article| January 01 2010 Universalities James Crosswhite James Crosswhite Department of English University of Oregon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Philosophy & Rhetoric (2010) 43 (4): 430–448. https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.43.4.0430 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation James Crosswhite; Universalities. Philosophy & Rhetoric 1 January 2010; 43 (4): 430–448. doi: https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.43.4.0430 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressPhilosophy & Rhetoric Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2010 The Pennsylvania State University. All rights reserved.2010The Pennsylvania State University Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

This work argues that the core of a college education should be learning to write a reasoned argument. The author challenges his readers - teachers of writing and communication, philosophers, critical theorists and educational administrators - to reestablish the importance of rhetoric in education.

I am about to argue for strengthening place of in teaching of writing. Recent work in and composition is already studded with appeals to and to philosophers, and such appeals have been made for many different purposes. My own reason for pursuing in this context is for purpose of setting up productive conflict among terms philosophy, politics and rhetoric. Although part of way I measure productiveness of this conflict is by its ability to reveal interdependence of terms, I intend more specifically to argue for as way of responding to-and to some degree resisting-the inevitable politicizing of teaching of writing. Consequently my appeal to differs in purpose from Ann Berthoff's famous appeal to as study which enables us to understand relationship between, in Richards' terms, what is said and what is meant, or, in Berthoff's own words, the nexus of hermeneutics and semiotics (Counter-Response 84). This account of is strongly slanted by orientation of literary critic-to point where a of knowledge becomes equivalent to a theory of imagination (Forming 6). Berthoff puts this theoretical commitment to work in pedagogy that uses classroom as philosophic laboratory in which teachers teach students how to form by teaching them that they form (2). I share John Schilb's concern that this formulation won't be able to help clarify relation of philosophy and rhetoric (67-68) in any useful way. More to point, I also share Schilb's belief that understanding of relation of and can be enlivened by consideration of how politics can serve