Giving Reasons has the ambition of developing a new theoretical approach to argumentation that integrates logical, dialectical and rhetorical aspects. The author uses speech act theory to realize her ideal of 'a linguistic-pragmatic approach' to argumentation. After a severe criticism of the major existing approaches to the study of argumentation, the author develops what she claims to be ''a systematic and comprehensive theory of the interpretation, analysis and evaluation of arguments.''

The introduction of the concept of strategic maneuvering into the pragma-dialectical theory makes it possible to formulate testable hypotheses regarding the persuasiveness of argumentative moves that are made in argumentative discourse. After summarizing the standard pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuffels explain what the extension of the pragma-dialectical approach with strategic maneuvering involves and discuss the fallacies in terms of the extended pragma-dialectical approach as derailments of strategic maneuvering. Then they give an empirical interpretation of the extended pragma-dialectical model in which they report the testing of three hypotheses which formulate preliminary conditions for effectiveness research within the framework of the extended pragma-dialectical theory and the results of the tests they consecutively carried out.

This paper attempts to systematically characterize critical reactions in argumentative discourse, such as objections, critical questions, rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges, in order to contribute to the dialogical approach to argumentation. We shall make use of four parameters to characterize distinct types of critical reaction. First, a critical reaction has a focus, for example on the standpoint, or on another part of an argument. Second, critical reactions appeal to some kind of norm, argumentative or other. Third, they each have a particular illocutionary force, which may include that of giving strategic advice to the other. Fourth, a critical reaction occurs at a particular level of dialogue (the ground level or some meta-level). The concepts here developed shall be applied to discussions of critical reactions by Aristotle and by some contemporary authors.

‘In Context’ is aimed at giving contextualization its rightful place in the study of argumentation. First, Frans H. van Eemeren explains the crucial role of context in a reconstructive analysis of argumentative discourse. He distinguishes four levels of contextualization. Second, he situates his approach to context in the field of argumentation studies by comparing it with Walton’s approach. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing clearly between a normatively motivated theoretical ideal model and empirically-based communicative activity types. Third, van Eemeren concentrates on the ‘macro-level’ of contextualization: contextualization in institutionalized communicative activity types. He makes clear that the macro-context of a communicative activity type can be characterized argumentatively by describing the disctinctive features of the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion in the activity type concerned. Fourth, he points out what the consequences of the macrocontextualization of argumentative discourse in a certain communicative activity type are for the strategic maneuvering that may takes place and the identification of fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering. Fifth, van Eemeren draws some general conclusions regarding the role of contextualization in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.

An argumentative text can be reconstructed as an argumentative discussion between a protagonist and an antagonist. However, such a text is usually not a literal report of a discussion. It is the author of the text who determines how issues are presented, how claims are modeled, how the development of the discussion is presented. Especially when a text has embedded discourse voices that can fulfill the roles of protagonist or antagonist, the author of the text can strongly suggest a specific assignment, suppressing alternatives. In this article examples are presented that show how an author exploits linguistic means—a strategic choice of causal connectives—to suggest a specific reconstruction. The question is raised whether a derailment of this behavior of the author should be characterized as committing the fallacy of the straw man.

This paper investigates the role that the stylistic device of praeteritio (or paralipsis) can play in arguers’ attempts to reconcile their rhetorical with their dialectical aims by manoeuvring strategically when carrying out particular discussion moves of the dialectical procedure for resolving a dispute. First, attention will be paid to the ways in which praeteritio can be realized in discourse. Next, an analysis is given of the effects the use of praeteritio may have as a result of the presentational means that are employed. This analysis will be used to establish the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring with this device in the different stages of an argumentative discussion. Finally, an indication is given of how the types of strategic manoeuvring that a praeteritio can be instrumental in may derail, and in which violations of the rules for critical discussion such derailed manoeuvrings may result.

In this paper, David Zarefsky suggests some constraints that political arguers face when trying to persuade an audience, and discusses some of the devices with which they respond to these constraints. In his treatment of these devices Zarefsky makes use of the concept of strategic manoeuvring as proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser. By taking into account the three manifestations of strategic manoeuvring-topical potential, audience adaptation and an effective presentation (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, p. 139)-he identifies and discusses several possible ways of dealing with these situational constraints. Regarding the 'activity type' (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005) of political argumentation, Zarefsky focuses on large and open-ended public debates that engage entire societies. He rightfully indicates that it seems strange to consider these kinds of political argumentation as a specific kind of institutionalised discourse: political argumentation is in principle unregulated, free-form and requires no technical expertise of its participants in the discussion. In order to be able to discuss strategic manoeuvring within this kind of political context, characteristics of political argument need first to be specified. Zarefsky mentions four characteristics that can be of help to define the genre and to establish its conventions. In these comments, I will focus on the first part of the paper, which is about these characteristics of political argumentation: as a supplement to Zarefsky's paper, I will give a tentative analysis of how the four characteristics mentioned constrain the possibilities to manoeuvre strategically. 76-77). The activity type, therefore, may

Schulz and Rubinelli's project 'Informed consent and strategic maneuvering in doctor-patient interaction' provides an excellent opportunity for studying argumentation in a specific institutional context because a medical consultation is a special communicative activity type that may involve argumentative discussion. Before engaging in empirical research regarding such a consultation it is necessary to make a conceptional analysis of this type of doctor-patient interaction. One first needs to give a general characterization of the type of interaction concerned: what is the structure of the interaction in a doctor-patient consultation in terms of speech acts, role taking and time constraints? For doing so a better understanding is required of the type of difference of opinion that will be at issue in such a consultation. What type of standpoint initiates the discussion? Which parts can be distinguished in the activity type of medical consultation and which of them are typically or potentially argumentative? What are the roles of the two participants in each of these cases? Is it the doctor or the patient who initiates the discussion by putting forward a standpoint or can this be done by either of them?

Peter Houtlosser and I planned this special issue on Strategic Maneuvering in Institutional Contexts about two years ago. At the time, Peter had already been diagnosed with cancer and he knew that his chances for survival were very slim, if not non-existent. All the same he wanted to go on with the work he loved so much: studying argumentative discourse and exchanging views about argumentation with other argumentation theorists. This is why he spent a considerable amount of the energy he had left on continuing his research and presenting his views to others. The preparations for this special issue were part of his endeavors to include as many fellow argumentation scholars as possible in the discussion and to invite them to express their views in the most pertinent way. Sadly, Peter did not live to see the final results. This is why we cannot publish this special issue together; instead, I am dedicating the issue to him and start with a brief commemoration.

During the last decade we have been working, together with colleagues interested in this endeavor, on an extension of the ''standard'' pragmadialectical theory of argumentation developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst by integrating insights from classical and modern rhetoric.This integration of rhetorical insight in a dialectical theoretical framework was motivated by our wish to improve the quality of a pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse.The integration was brought about with the help of the introduction of the notion of ''strategic maneuvering,'' which designates the balancing act of reconciling the simultaneous pursuit of dialectical and rhetorical objectives that arguers have to perform in the conduct of argumentative discourse.Even if they are in the first place out to fulfill their dialectical obligations in the explicit or implicit exchange, they may still be expected to be aiming at realizing the rhetorical aspirations that go with entering an argument; and if they are in the first place led by their rhetorical aspirations, they still cannot ignore the dialectical obligations that they have to meet when entering an argument.These considerations concerning the ''double'' concern that arguers may be assumed to have are at the heart of our efforts to develop an extended pragma-dialectical theory.They are also the starting point for this special issue of the journal Argumentation in which authors from various theoretical backgrounds -which may be quite different from our pragma-dialectical position -offer, from their specific vantage points, their ''Perspectives on Strategic Maneuvering.''The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, NWO, granted us a substantial subsidy to further develop our ideas concerning strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse, in particular by examining the strategic function of maneuvering that consists in pointing out an inconsistency in the other partyÕs position and formulating the soundness conditions applying to that way of maneuvering (research program no. 360-80-030).Apart from involving four excellent PhD students and a post-doctoral researcher in the project, this subsidy allowed us also, just as we intended, to organize a series of small-scale and clearly focused conferences dedicated to specific aspects of strategic maneuvering.At these conferences scholars of argumentation interested in any of these specific aspects could discuss their views with other interested parties and contribute in this way to the progress of our project, not in the last place by criticizing some of our points of departure and offering constructive alternatives.The first