Research Article| May 01 1992 Cicéron et Sénèque dans la rhétorique de la Renaissance. Christian Mouchel, Cicéron et Sénèque dans la rhétorique de la Renaissance. Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1990 (Ars rhetorica, Bd. 3); 564 pp. Jeroen Jansen Jeroen Jansen Alexanderlaan 12, 1213 XS Hilversum, Netherlands. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (1992) 10 (2): 196–200. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1992.10.2.196 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Jeroen Jansen; Cicéron et Sénèque dans la rhétorique de la Renaissance.. Rhetorica 1 May 1992; 10 (2): 196–200. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1992.10.2.196 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1992, The International Society for the History of Rhetoric1992 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Classical rhetoric's ability to inform and empower the teaching of technical writing has been for the most part ignored in technical writing textbooks. This absence is curious, given the enormous body of scholarly material affirming classical rhetoric's usefulness for that purpose. While teachers wait for textbooks with explicitly classical roots, three key concepts can provide the basic framework for incorporating classical rhetorical theory into contemporary technical writing studies.

I suspect that many people who buy sentimental greeting card verse have the same preconceived ideas about such verse that I had before I began a serious study of it a few years ago. To my mind, greeting card verse was a trite and trivial form of poetry, filled with flowery language, poetic diction, and figures of speech, appealing to emotions in excess of the occasion-artificial, affected, and insincere. To my surprise, however, I discovered that greeting card verse, although often written in meter and rhyme, is not poetry, nor is it intended to be, but a rhetorical composition, a message transmitted from one person to another. Although its rhymes and meters are frequently trite (this may account for its wholesale condemnation), the sentiments it expresses, although commonplace, are seldom trivial. It uses few figures of speech, little or no poetic diction, and almost no flowery language. Nor are its emotions in excess of the occasion. The sentiments and emotions it expresses are no different than those that you and I might express at a wedding, a graduation, an anniversary, or a birthday, or at Christmas, New Year's, or Easter-good luck, congratulations, I love you, I'm thinking of you, have a joyous holiday, and so forth. Finally, greeting card verse is neither artificial, affected, nor insincere, but straightforward, genuine, and sincere. In fact, it exemplifies beautifully an important kind of ceremonial discourse, and I can think of no better way of introducing writers to the ancient art of epideictic discourse than through a careful analysis and understanding of the rhetorical strategies used by writers of greeting card verse. Paradoxically, greeting card verse is both universal and particular. The message of greeting card verse must be general enough to fit representative rhetorical situations (Quinn 22), yet particular enough to fit immediate occasions. Like proverbs, maxims, quotations, and anecdotes, when they are decontextualized and put into collections, greeting card verse is decontextualized when it is put on racks of cards in card shops, drug stores, and supermarkets. Under appropnate circumstances, however, the person who buys greeting card verse recontextualizes it, appropriates it to his or her own intention, and sends it to someone else as a personal message. As a result, there is a dialogic relationship set up between the writer's intention and the sender's intention, between the writer's words and the sender's words. But as Mikhail Bakhtin has pointed out, do not all of the

Richard Leo Enos, ed. Oral and Written Communication: Historical Approaches. "Written Communication Annual, An International Survey of Research and Theory,” vol. 4. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990. 264 pages. Susan C. Jarratt. Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991. 181 pp., $22.50. Brandt, Deborah. Literacy as Involvement: The Acts of Writers, Readers, and Texts. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990. 151 pages. Jeanette Harris. Expressive Discourse. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1990. 206 pages.

Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured by Susan C. Jarratt. Southern Illinois University Press, 1991; pp. xxvi + 154.

Voice of Deliverance: The Language of Martin Luther King Jr. and its Sources by Keith D. Miller. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 247 pp. +. Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman by Walter Jost. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989. The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse by Kathleen E. Welch. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990; pp. viii + 186. Constructing Rhetorical Education, edited by Marie Secor and Davida Charney. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1992; pp. 432 + Preface, Index. Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages: Rhetoric, Representation and Reality by Ruth Morse. Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp.ii + 295.

(1992). A historicist recontextualization of the enthymeme. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 1-24.

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Almost all modern historians of rhetoric have undertaken to separate the men from the boys. But while rhetoric itself was talked about among men, it was to boys, and the handbooks that we have inherited-as well as most of those that we have lost-were intended for the instruction of the young. Feminist objections to classical rhetoric as been conducted among men-not women are consonant with this analysis, but I wish to emphasize here the ageism and academic self-hatred that we support when we accept the suppression of the pedagogical aspects of the history of our profession.' The dismissal of earlier pedagogical textbooks by both traditional and revisionist historians of rhetoric seems to me to be part of post-romantic unteachability topos, which assumes that what is most important about education is what least resembles the classroom.2 This topos is reinforced by more recent one that can be equally debilitating: the fear of teaching topos, in which having taught becomes synonymous with having oppressed.3 We can see their suppression of the pedagogical focus of classical rhetoric in the choice of rhetoric texts from earlier eras that traditional historians elevate to authoritative status. At one extreme is the modern canonization of Aristotle's Rhetoric, text that was never popular as pedagogical treatise in the ancient world, and at the other the rejection of Cicero's De invenltione and the Pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herenniurn. two rhetoric handbooks widely used in schools for hundreds of years. It is to the credit of traditional historians of rhetoric who are attempting to reclaim classical rhetoric as viable and important pedagogical alternative that they have been affected by this prejudice against pedagogy more in what they say than in what they do. Corbett's Handbook of Classical Rhetoric, for example, lavishly praises Aristotle's Rhetoric but, as the title reveals, presents its pedagogical material in fashion much closer to that of the Ciceronian tradition. Thomas Sloane, making passionate appeal in College English for the reclaiming of Ciceronian invention, dismisses De inventione as a famous and regrettably enduring handbook (462) before proceeding to extrapolate pedagogical content readily available in De invenhtione from the more diffuse and less pedagogically relevant De oratore.4

The ancient sophists' investigation of physis and nomos, which took place against backdrop of unpopular and unsettling Peloponnesian War, challenged foundations of Greek society. Although essentially patriarchal nature of Greek society precludes assuming any concern for status of women, in many fundamental ways sophists' project was not unlike that of modern feminists who also question dominant definitions and categories of gendered subjectivity (Jarratt Feminism). In United States, a great deal of current feminist theory also emerged in wake of unpopular Vietnam War. War promotes and depends upon cultural bonding and social solidarity to produce patriotic fervor and unquestioning allegiance to state. In these two eras, eventual unpopularity of war-which irritated and was irritated by renegotiation of class and economic boundariesopened questions about status of citizenship, economic privilege, family life and, of course, gender roles. In both eras these changes were endorsed by many who had heretofore been excluded from many of benefits of patriarchy, but they were resisted by others who feared losing or sharing privilege. Although popular mythology insists upon illusion of progressive enlightenment, there is ample evidence to support argument that periods of progressive change have often been followed by periods of repression and even regression (Kelly). The sophists' project came to an abrupt end when their pluralistic argument and pragmatic adaptations were replaced by monolithic patriarchal certainty of Plato and Aristotle-a certainty which in various guises still operates on modern society. In Page duBois's words, Plato, in fourth century, appropriated feminine and particularly reproductive metaphors in order to reaffirm old patterns of dominance and to establish through new rationalization certain objects of knowledge, certain forms of power (2). Currently, we are experiencing a similar conservative backlasheconomic, racist, and sexist-which, as Susan Jeffords's work on Vietnam War shows, enacts the large-scale renegotiation and regeneration of interests, values, and projects of patriarchy now taking place in U.S. social relations (xi). The sophistic era was marked by intellectual excitement, but sophists' explorations were not universally acclaimed nor were they even in agreement with each other. Some of their ideas threatened members of aristocracy who were eager to undo democratic reforms, while other ideas, for example famous dictum that justice is interest of stronger, threatened democratic principles. The basis of sophistic practice and teaching was discovery and exposition of opposing and contradictory arguments-dissoi logoi-in order to provide their students with training in moral reasoning and discursive ability which would allow them to assume civic responsibility

(1992). Rhetoric, possibility, and women's status in ancient Athens: Gorgias' and Isocrates' encomiums of Helen. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 22, Feminist Rereadings in the History of Rhetoric, pp. 99-108.

One of the major figures in this book, the Roman educator Quintilian, points out that writing -- unlike speaking -- must always be learned from a teacher since it cannot be learned by natural imitation as oral language is. He uses the example of a two-year-old who can understand and speak even though the child is years away from being able to be taught even the rudiments of the written alphabet. Writing instruction therefore plays an important role in any literate culture. This book offers a survey of the ways in which writing has been taught in Western culture, from ancient Greece to present-day America. Although there have been many studies of individual periods or specific educators, this volume provides the first systematic coverage of teaching writing over the 25 centuries from the ancient Sophists to today. It is hoped that the modern reader will find useful ideas in this account of the ebb and flow of teaching methods and philosophies over the years.

James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714-1799) enjoyed considerable recognition as a Scottish advocate and judge; however, a passion for the ancient Greeks occupied much of his attention and contributed to his lasting reputation as a man of letters. It is likely that his initial exposure to the Greek philosophers was under the tutelage of Dr. Francis Skene, a classical scholar who worked early in his career as Burnett's private tutor and then became a professor of philosophy at Marischal College where Burnett was a student. Burnett found ancient doctrines to be appealing because of their attention to first principles and he remained a devoted advocate of Greek thinking throughout his life.' Monboddo's views on the ancients and their significance for the Scottish Enlightenment are best preserved in two lengthy works. Origin and Progress of Language (1774-92) consists of six volumes and is best known to students of composition, rhetoric, and criticism for its defense of Greek literary style in general; its efforts to apply ancient doctrines of style, logic and composition to the needs of the Scottish Enlightenment; and its praise of Aristotle in particular as the philosopher who bridged the gulf separating the sophists and Plato. Ancient Metaphysics (1779-99), also six volumes, was Monboddo's second contribution to the world of letters and further proclaimed his admiration for the Greeks and his distaste for alternative schools of thought that had become popular among his contemporaries.2 By the latter years of the Eighteenth Century, Aristotle and other Greek rhetors were largely ignored by British rhetorical theorists. Even among those exponents of a classical doctrine early in the century, including John Ward (A System of Oratory, 1759) and John Holmes (The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy, 1755), it was the Roman model of rhetoric, organized around Cicero's officia that was popular. By mid-century, even Roman doctrine had been obscured by the rhetorics, reflecting new assumptions and organizing doctrine along three new lines. The psychological school, most clearly illustrated by George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), was influenced by Baconian and Lockean thinking. These theorists, using the Baconian empirical method, explored relationships between thought and expression, creating an array of new terms to account for mental processes that govern rhetorical acts.3

Research Article| August 01 1991 The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates' Funeral Oration Michael F. Carter Michael F. Carter Department of English, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina 27695. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (1991) 9 (3): 209–232. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1991.9.3.209 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Michael F. Carter; The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates' Funeral Oration. Rhetorica 1 August 1991; 9 (3): 209–232. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1991.9.3.209 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1991, The International Society for the History of Rhetoric1991 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Research Article| August 01 1991 Pro Militibus Oratio: John Adams's Imitation of Cicero in the Boston Massacre Trial James M. Farrell James M. Farrell Department of Communication, University of New Hampshire, Horton Social Science Center, Durham, New Hampshire 03824-3586. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (1991) 9 (3): 233–249. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1991.9.3.233 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation James M. Farrell; Pro Militibus Oratio: John Adams's Imitation of Cicero in the Boston Massacre Trial. Rhetorica 1 August 1991; 9 (3): 233–249. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1991.9.3.233 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1991, The International Society for the History of Rhetoric1991 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

If science is conducted within a scientific culture, then the classical concept of epideictic rhetoric should be applicable to internal scientific discourse. A theory of epideictic rhetoric as the “rhetoric of orthodoxies” is presented, along with its five rhetorical functions: education, legitimation, demonstration, celebration, and criticism. Suggestions as to how these concepts might be applied to internal scientific discourse are given, with special attention given to studies of science already completed by philosophers, sociologists, and rhetoricians.

James Boyd White in Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the explains one of his uses of the term rhetoric, of which, he contends, the language of law is species (33): A judge's or lawyer's language, he notes, is argumentatively constitutive of the language it employs; such language is not only instrumental in arguing but announces, in effect, Here in this language is the way this and similar cases should be talked (34). Legal professionals thus shape language behavior; the dynamics of such processes and similar ones are the objects of White's attention and analysis in the several studies included in Heracles' Bow and in When Words Lose Their Meaning. White's analyses of the rhetorical nature of the law embody detailed suggestions which, if realized, could work positive influences. He frequently makes statements like the following: Law should take as its most central question what kind of we should be, with what values, motives, and aims (42). Indeed, in White's thinking, law and rhetoric are to be seen as linked in broad shaping process, one which promises to build a of certain sort, set of shared relations, attitudes, and meanings. To view law as rhetoric might enable us to attend to the spiritual or meaningful side of our collective life (42-43). The points made by White in his essays embody praiseworthy aims; in the present essay, I will illuminate one type of aim in exploring White's claims concerning law and rhetoric operating in communities of certain sort, those of the U. S. Constitution. When Words Lose Their Meaning presents the legal and epistemological basis for the communities of the Constitution in reading of Justice John Marshall's Supreme Court decision of McCulloch v. Maryland. This decision, White contends, activated the inert Constitution of the United States and, in effect, exercised reconstitution of culture and community (247). The issues he treats are complex and of interest to rhetoricians. The discussion here will emphasize U. S. Constitution that establishes variety of communities engaged in rhetorical practices. The variety occurs along with number of benefits, because the Constitution's communicants are invited to act in most cases while free of specifications and directives. Such an invitation leaves room for communicator to consider specific circumstances, to engage in the activity Aristotle designated in terms of blank paradigm, that is, to find the available means of persuasion in given case (7). White in his confrontation of several paradoxical issues suggested by McCulloch v. Maryland raises the sorts of questions which he asks in his other essays, questions about communities and the nature of the texts with which they are associated. He is interested in the boundaries, strengths and limitations of the Constitution and of the nature of its rhetorical communities.

Oral and Written Communication: Historical Approaches. Edited by Richard Leo Enos. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990. Pp.vi + 264. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Newly Translated, with Introduction, Notes and Appendices by George Kennedy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, xvi + 335 pp. Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge by Greg Meyers. Madison: Wisconsin UP, 1990. Ethics in Human Communication by Richard L. Johannesen. 3rd Edition. Waveland Press, 1990. Voices of the Mind: A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action by James V. Wertsch. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991. 147 pp. + references and name and subject index. Thomas Henry Huxley: Communicating for Science by J. Vernon Jensen. Newark: University of Delaware, 1991. Pp. 253. The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry. Edited by Herbert W. Simons. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. xii + 388.

Symbols in the prehistoric Middle East - developmental features preceding written communication, Denise Schmandt-Besserat a historical view of the relationship between reading and writing, Edward P.J.Corbett sophistic formulae and the emergence of the Attic-Ionic grapholect - a study in oral and written composition, Richard Leo Enos the auditors' role in Aristotelian rhetoric, William M.A.Grimaldi a sophistic strain in the medieval ars praedicandi and the scholastic method, James L.Kinneavy the illiterate mode of written communication - the work of the medieval scribe, Denise A.Troll rhetoric, truth and literacy in the Renaissance of the 12th century, John O.Ward Quintillian's influence on the teaching of speaking and writing in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, James J.Murphy l'enseignement de l'art de la premiere rhetorique - rhetorical education in France before 1600, Robert W.Smith technological development and writer-subject reader immediacies, Walter J.Ong a rhetoric of mass communication - collective or corporate discourse, Lynette Hunter.

It has been twenty years since Richard Young, Alton Becker and Kenneth Pike brought out their challenging and revolutionary book, Rhetoric: Discovery and Change. Though cast in the mold of a rhetorical handbook, Rhetoric: Discovery and Change (like many of the best rhetorical handbooks, including Aristotle's Rhetoric) attempted to do more than relay the accumulated rhetorical wisdom of its age in a predigested form suitable for students. It was an attempt to synthesize a complete rhetorical system, a system that in some ways built on and in some ways departed from the classical model. Arguing that Profound changes are taking place in the system of Western values that has for centuries guided conduct (8), Young, Becker and Pike wanted to rethink rhetoric from its foundations, using concepts borrowed from problem-solving theory, game theory, dialogic communication, linguistics, and Carl Rogers' nondirective therapy. Out of these materials they created a rhetoric that they claimed offered new goals, new ways of creating ideas, and new ways of managing the rhetor-audience relationship. I would like to focus primarily on Young, Becker and Pike's use of principles. I see this as their most interesting, possibly most enduring, and certainly most controversial contribution to modern rhetoric, a contribution that escapes the bounds of the eighteen pages in which they explicitly discuss Rogers and subtly but pervasively dominates the entire work. The propriety and the pedagogical utility of Young, Becker and Pike's Rogerian rhetoric has been debated before, by Andrea Lunsford, Diane C. Mader, and Lisa Ede among others. This debate has centered chiefly on two questions: whether rhetoric as developed by Young, Becker and Pike is genuinely different from Aristotelian rhetoric and on whether it is fair to its main source, therapy. This debate is far from trivial and it is far from closed; this article to some extent will continue it. But it is time to step back and, from our twenty-year vantage point, ask some larger questions that enclose and put into perspective these more local questions of fairness to sources. To do so, let us look at Young, Becker and Pike's version of rhetoric both in its historical context and in the context of the larger rhetorical sys-

Patricia P. Matsen, Philip Rollinson, Marion Sousa, eds. Readings from Classical Rhetoric. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990. viii + 382 pages. Roderick P. Hart. Modern Rhetorical Criticism. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little Brown, 1990. iv + 542 pages. Susan Miller. Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition. Southern Illinois University Press, 1990. 267 pages. Bruce Lincoln. Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual, and Classification. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 238 pages. Gregory Clark. Dialogue, Dialectic, and Conversation: A Social Perspective on the Function of Writing. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990. xix + 93 pages. Lawrence J. Prelli. A Rhetoric of Science: Inventing Scientific Discourse. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989. xi + 320 pages. Kathleen E. Welch. The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990. 186 pages.

A standard in its field, this new edition provides the most up-to-date current thinking on rhetoric.

Conversations on the WrittenWord: Essays on Language and Literacy, Jay L. Robinson John Schilb Expressive Discourse, Jeannette Harris Douglas Hesse The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg Theresa Enos Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 3rd ed., Edward P. J. Corbett Cheryl Glenn Singular Texts/Plural Authors: Perspectives on Collaborative Writing, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede John Trimbur Learning to Write in Our Nation’s Schools: Instruction and Achievement in 1988 at Grades 4, 8, and 12, Arthur N. Applebee et al. Paul W. Rea The Future of Doctoral Studies in English, Andrea Lunsford, Helen Moglen, and James F. Slevin Joseph J. Comprone

(1991). Isocrates and Plato on rhetoric and rhetorical education. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 60-71.

(1991). Aristotle and the stasis theory: A reexamination. Rhetoric Society Quarterly: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 53-59.

Years ago Loren Eiseley that life is most interesting on the margins. You never know what you'll find along the shore of the ocean or along the edge of a highway, or, to extend the notion into metaphor, on the peripheries of our minds or in transitional periods of history. Those of us in English departments who were working on modem rhetoric when it was new and not on literary history and criticism recognize the truth of the observation. The center of things tends to be, if not known, at least more familiar, constrained, and stable. But on the margin experience is more ambiguous and unpredictable, perhaps because it is there that different systems come together. Or perhaps because the people who work there are deliberately looking for change. Whatever the case, on the margin there are more possibilities, and change is easier. It is only on the margins, Eiseley says, that there is the possibility of Eiseley's metaphor for the new and unpredictable in the process of biological evolution. have dragons, he says, one must have change; that is the first principle of dragon lore. Otherwise everything becomes stale, commonplace, and observed (28). Recently at the Conference on College Composition and Communication, Janet Emig, Janice Lauer, and I presented papers on a panel entitled Reconsidering the Discipline: Three Perspectives on the History and Present Situation of Rhetoric and Composition. The title captures well the thrust of Janet Atwill's proposal for the panel; she had asked us to provide eyewitness accounts of the development of the New Rhetoric, at least the New Rhetoric as it was emerging in departments of English, and also do something a good deal more risky, i.e., to characterize the present state of the discipline.l As I worked on my paper, a precursor of this one, I found myself coming back again and again to how much of my own career has been on the margin of English studies. It's still true to some extent today, but at that time to work in the field of rhetoric was to really be on the margin. I doubt if any of us wanted to be marginalized in the profession; but those of us who didn't already know the score soon learned from their better adapted colleagues that rhetoric was a doubtful discipline that belonged, if anywhere, in speech departments, and that composition was not a proper academic discipline at all but merely a service that English departments performed, often with reluctance, for the rest of the academic community. Unless we also had a more respectable intellectual interest on which we could base our reputations, we were on the margin of the margin. To many of our colleagues we were beyond the fringe. I remember that I began looking into rhetoric in the late fifties and early sixties as the result of reading and being puzzled by C.S. Lewis's well-known comment that what separates the modern scholar most from the study of the Renaissance is his ignorance of classical rhetoric. At the same time, caught up in

Research Article| August 01 1990 The "Great Triangle" in Early Greek Rhetoric and Poetics John T. Kirby John T. Kirby Department of Classics and Comparative Literature, Purdue University, Stanley Coulter Hall, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907 Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (1990) 8 (3): 213–228. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1990.8.3.213 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation John T. Kirby; The "Great Triangle" in Early Greek Rhetoric and Poetics. Rhetorica 1 August 1990; 8 (3): 213–228. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1990.8.3.213 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search Copyright 1990, The International Society for the History of Rhetoric1990 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Accordingly when Aristotle observed that Isocrates succeeded in obtaining a distinguished set of pupils by abandoning legal and political subjects and devoting his discourses to empty elegance of style, he himself suddenly altered almost the whole of his own system of training, and quoted a line from Philoctetes with a slight modification: the hero in the tragedy said that it was a disgrace for him to keep silent and barbarians to speak, but Aristotle put in suffer Isocrates to speak; and consequently he put the whole of his system in a polished and brilliant form, and linked the scientific study of facts with practice in style (Cicero, 1942, III.139; see also Philodemus, 1920, p. 329; or Quintilian 1920, III.i.14).

The crossing of poetry and oratory developed naturally for Philip Sidney, as it did for Aristotle (Murrin 8). Because of Sidney's classical education at Shrewsbury, his years at Christ Church College in Oxford, and his exposure to continental philosophy during his European travels, his poetry and prose embody a unique interpretation of classical Greek philosophy and oratory. In fact, J. E. Spingarn states:

Research Article| May 01 1990 Cicero's Pro Archia and the Responsibilities of Reading William Malin Porter William Malin Porter Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (1990) 8 (2): 137–152. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1990.8.2.137 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation William Malin Porter; Cicero's Pro Archia and the Responsibilities of Reading. Rhetorica 1 May 1990; 8 (2): 137–152. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1990.8.2.137 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1990, The International Society for the History of Rhetoric1990 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Persuasive discourse, either as a separate mode of discourse (Kinneavy 1971) or as a distinctive part of argumentative discourse,2 frequendy remains part of the overall writing assignment for our composition students. Although we may disagree as to how to define exactly or teach persuasive discourse in writing classrooms, we have more or less followed the tradition of Western classical rhetoric with respect to our basic understanding of it--although few of us would now restrict ourselves only to discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion (Aristotle 1960: 7). For example, we teach our students different sub-types of persuasive discourse and ask them to apply ethical, emotional (pathetic) and logical proofs to their own persuasive essays; we select political speeches, polemic essays or modern advertising materials as prime examples of how different persuasive strategies and techniques can be most effectively invoked to achieve their respective objectives of winning. To varying degrees, many composition text books have adopted, and thus perpetuated this normal way of doing things with persuasive discourse.3 In so doing, however, we have--perhaps unknowingly--imparted to our students two problematic notions, which underlie much of what has been believed to be persuasive discourse. The first assumes that persuasive discourse is grounded in or predicated on conflict or confrontation, which it aims to overcome or eradicate. The second perceives audience as both external4 and oppositional, whom persuasive discourse is intended to transform or convert. It is these two notions and their probable consequences that I will discuss first in this essay. Following this discussion, I will draw upon, respectively, Grice's cooperative model of conversation (1975; 1989) and Burke's concept of (1962) to propose a new heuristic model5 of persuasive discourse, one that takes cooperation through identification as a core constituent and provides a dynamic setting that is conducive to rhetorical diversities. Finally, I will consider some potentials of this new model in our writing classrooms.

In last twenty-five years, field interpersonal communication has expanded tenaciously, establishing connections with disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and even literary studies.l Although this rapid expansion indicates current strength and vigor field, it also indicative a veritable identity crisis. Suggests Arthur P. Bochner, Interpersonal communication is a vague, fragmented, and loosely-defined subject that intersects all behavioral, social, and cultural sciences. There are no rigorous definitions that limit scope field, no texts that comprehensively state its foundations, and little agreement among its practitioners about which frameworks or methods offer most promise for unifying field. (1985, 27) There is nothing inherently wrong with vagueness, fragmentation, or loose definitions, course; Renaissance Humanism was built on such a foundation. What is unsettling about interpersonal communication's crisis character, though, is reticence exhibited by field's theorists to explore connections with distant past. Perusing footnotes, indexes, and bibliographies contemporary interpersonal communication research and pedagogy, one works back only as far as relatively recent [social scientists and other] figures such as Martin Buber, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Eric Fromm, R. D. Laing, and Eric Berne. This suspiciously brief official history is verified in Handbook Interpersonal Communication, in which Mark Knapp and Gerald Miller assert that concerted interest in study interpersonal communication processes and outcomes is relatively recent origin, and that the study interpersonal communication did not commence to bloom profusely until 1960's (8). Knapp and Miller's suggestion that the study interpersonal communication has thus far progressed only from infancy to adolescence (1 1) further supports widespread belief that discipline is extremely young. The central argument this essay-that scholars interpersonal communication, in an effort to define their discipline in modern terms, have mistakenly cut themselves off from their true roots and from much liberal-arts tradition-is built upon three principal contentions. First, interpersonal communication is not of relatively recent origin, but is, in fact, an ancient study, dating back at least as far as Plato. Second, interpersonal communication grew out a healthful, invigorating competition with ancient rhetorical theory and practice. In order to understand claims, power, and limitations one, we must have an appreciation for, or at least an understanding of, other. Third, interpersonal communication specialists, both in their research and in classroom, should highlight their field's long and enlightening battle with

George Kimball Plochmann & Franklin E. Robinson, A Friendly Companion to Plato's GORGIAS. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988. 415 pp. Perspectives on Literacy. Edited by Eugene R. Kintgen, Barry M. Kroll, and Mike Rose. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988. Pp. xix + 476.

Research Article| February 01 1990 Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium Thomas M. Conley Thomas M. Conley Department of Speech Communication, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 244 Lincoln Hall, 702 South Wright Street, Urbana, Illinois 61801 Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Rhetorica (1990) 8 (1): 29–44. https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1990.8.1.29 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Thomas M. Conley; Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium. Rhetorica 1 February 1990; 8 (1): 29–44. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1990.8.1.29 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentRhetorica Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1990, The International Society for the History of Rhetoric1990 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Socrates, of course, does not mean to venerate the art of discourse here. He is telling Phaedrus that there is discourse and there is truth. Once you have gone out and dug up the truth somewhere else, you apply the art of discourse to it and fashion a persuasive argument that will permit others to partake also of the truth. Two immediate implications follow from Socrates' position. First, only when the art of discourse, rhetoric, is put to the task of selling truth to the benighted does it become real. Second, rhetoric is necessary human affairs just to the extent that humans are unable to apprehend truth directly. It is an unfortunate evil, required because we are rationally degenerate creatures. Both positions have remained very popular over the intervening two millenia. Bitzer, for instance, can still say that in the best of all possible worlds there would be communication perhaps, but not rhetoric;'I we get our truth and knowledge somewhere else, and only our lack of perfection prevents us from casting rhetoric out of the garden. But there is an important lesson those two millenia that can help us to see the Spartan's words another light: the sources of truth which rhetoric has been obliged to serve have changed dramatically-from Socrates' dialectic and Aristotle's apodeixis, to Christianity's biblical exegesis and divine revelation, to the current authority on matters of knowledge and truth, Science. This rotation of leading roles while the supporting actress, Lady Rhetoric, remains constant indicates that the real art of discourse is connected with truth not because of human degeneracy, but because of precisely the reverse, because of our spark of perfection, because we are truth-seeking, knowledge-making creatures who sometimes get it right. We occasionally do something important with rhetoric: we find truth and we build knowledge out of it. When we manage the trick, though, we are so eager to dissociate it from all the foul and inane things we also do with rhetoric that we give the process another name. But these other names are clearly just aliases for rhetoric, or for some subset of rhetorical interests. Dialectic, for instance, is essentially questing debate. Apodeixis is distinguished only by the level of rigor Aristotle demands of the argumentation, not by any qualitative difference. Exegesis is rhetorical analysis. The only possible gap to this pattern is divine revelation, whose capacity to generate truth I will leave to more knowledgeable commentators, pausing only to notice that, true or not, reports of revelation usually involve a fair amount of persuasive machinery-burning bushes, hovering spirits, and the like. In any case, science is certainly no exception.