ABSTRACT Speakers’ autonomy as arguers is impaired when they are not recognized as arguers, they can’t get their arguments heard, and their arguments are ignored, dismissed, or used against them. How do speakers cultivate conditions to secure their autonomy as arguers? This article submits that they marshal normative pragmatic force or the practical efficacy of normative materials. To support this claim, this article explains what speakers’ autonomy as arguers comprises. The article then describes three legitimate sources of force in arguing and characteristic approaches to addressing conditions that interfere with legitimate sources of force. Finally, this article explains how arguers marshal normative pragmatic force to cultivate conditions to secure autonomy for all.

ABSTRACTDemanding is a fundamental rhetorical strategy for marginalized groups, but recent rhetorical theories of demanding have not explained how speakers can design demands that influence addressees to accede. Although psychoanalytic and decolonial theories have identified constitutive functions, they have not explained how speakers can design demands that pressure addressees to accede, and while speech act theories have explained specific kinds of demands, they have not synthesized insights into a model of demanding generally. We draw on normative pragmatic theory to argue that speakers design demands that generate persuasive force by openly making visible their intent to influence addressees to accede and bringing to bear a reciprocal obligation for themselves and addressees to live up to the norm of “right makes might.”

Research Article| September 01 2011 A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals Beth Innocenti Beth Innocenti University of Kansas, Communication Studies Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Philosophy & Rhetoric (2011) 44 (3): 273–290. https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.44.3.0273 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Beth Innocenti; A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals. Philosophy & Rhetoric 1 September 2011; 44 (3): 273–290. doi: https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.44.3.0273 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressPhilosophy & Rhetoric Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2011 by The Pennsylvania State University. All rights reserved.2011The Pennsylvania State University Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The recent neglect of Kames's Elements of Criticism (1762) has been due in part to disciplinary angst that has fostered two incomplete views of Elements: (1) as a work that trains readers in receptive competence and (2) as significant for primarily philosophical reasons. Reading Elements as a rhetoric of criticism, however, suggests first that it is aimed toward production of criticism-not simply reception-although the critical argumentation is oriented toward judgment in terms of universals. Second, it suggests that its significance is practical-that it appeals to readers' anxieties about the burgeoning British economy.

Abstract A mid‐eighteenth‐century debate among three Anglican clerics on the nature and end of eloquence indicates that their views of eloquence share a significant similarity: functionalism. I summarize each participant's position; note relevant aspects of their contexts, including purposes, institutional position, and broader cultural conditions; and explore the social and political implications of their views on the nature and ends of eloquence. By doing so, I show that eloquence serves as a site of struggle for power and prestige; and that when people use the term “eloquence “ they may have significantly different views of what it means.