ABSTRACT Speakers’ autonomy as arguers is impaired when they are not recognized as arguers, they can’t get their arguments heard, and their arguments are ignored, dismissed, or used against them. How do speakers cultivate conditions to secure their autonomy as arguers? This article submits that they marshal normative pragmatic force or the practical efficacy of normative materials. To support this claim, this article explains what speakers’ autonomy as arguers comprises. The article then describes three legitimate sources of force in arguing and characteristic approaches to addressing conditions that interfere with legitimate sources of force. Finally, this article explains how arguers marshal normative pragmatic force to cultivate conditions to secure autonomy for all.

ABSTRACT Two disciplinary stories told in mid-eighteenth-century Scotland omit an important plotline. One story is that university teaching of rhetoric transformed into belletristic criticism; another is that ideology and culture transformed to reorient rhetorical theorizing toward everyday practices by non-elites. Untold is a story of how familiar protagonists, such as Hugh Blair, clashed with antagonists, such as John Witherspoon, in the Church of Scotland. Telling that story from the antagonists’ perspectives shows that they reflected on how rhetoric ought to be practiced to manage disagreement in a democratic institution and used what amounted to Kamesian belletrism as a foil.

ABSTRACTDemanding is a fundamental rhetorical strategy for marginalized groups, but recent rhetorical theories of demanding have not explained how speakers can design demands that influence addressees to accede. Although psychoanalytic and decolonial theories have identified constitutive functions, they have not explained how speakers can design demands that pressure addressees to accede, and while speech act theories have explained specific kinds of demands, they have not synthesized insights into a model of demanding generally. We draw on normative pragmatic theory to argue that speakers design demands that generate persuasive force by openly making visible their intent to influence addressees to accede and bringing to bear a reciprocal obligation for themselves and addressees to live up to the norm of “right makes might.”

Reviews 85 Paddy Bullard, Edmund Burke nud the Art of Rhetoric, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 272 pp. ISBN 978-1-107-00657-7 In Edmund Burke and the Art of Rhetoric Paddy Bullard "proposes a theory of Burke's rhetoric" (p. 3). Bullard approaches the question "of the artfulness with which Burke wrote and spoke" (p. 21) not by superimposing the \ ocabularv of classical rhetorical handbooks on Burke's performances; not by using Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful as a source of technical, critical vocabulary; but bv looking to Burke's oeuvre to identify the rhetorical questions that preoccupied Burke and how he addressed the questions throughout his career. Readers will witness enactment of Burkean rhetorical virtues as Bullard examines Burke from perspectives as broad as classical and early modern thinking about rhetoric, to the practical occasions and stakes of Burke's political writing and speaking, to the textual dynamics of his rhetoric. The result is a compelling analysis of Burke's rhetoric that deserves to be read by scholars of eighteenth-century rhetorical theories and practices, and by any scholar interested in generating theory based on practice—indeed anv scholar who wants to read exemplary rhetorical criticism. Broadly speaking, the central question or issue that preoccupies Burke is the nature of the speaker-audience relationship. Bullard describes Burke's rhetoric as a "rhetoric of character," concerned with "who is addressing whom, on behalf of whom" (p. 5; see also pp. 7, 11). Bullard captures the dynamic nature of the relationship when he describes Burke's art of rhetoric as "an art of moral equipoise" (p. 10; see also p. 22). Put differently, "A well-established ethos giv es a speaker licence to be urgent, to abjure false delicacy, and to resist neutrality, and it allows him to do all this without renouncing the claims of equity" (p. 9). The speaker earns the audience's trust by displaying knowledge of characters and his own political judgment, and the audience grants the speaker a license to advocate with zeal. Bullard develops his analysis and argument in an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. In the introduction Bullard defends his objects of study and critical vocabulary. He chooses to focus on "the relatively small number of treatises and speeches that Burke authorized as his own (either through publication or private endorsement), while the texts of his publicly reported speeches are treated with caution" (p. 21). Readers will almost certainly find the arguments for the selection to be sound, the central one being that Burke calls for attention to, and Bullard attends to, stylistic detail because this is where the action is—where audiences experience rhetorical effects. In chapters 1 and 2, Bullard covers standard topics in writing the history of rhetoric, namely Burke's intellectual context for thinking about rhetoric and the place of rhetoric in Irish education. This is not a routine history of rhetoric that broadly covers the usual suspects but instead focuses on clas­ sical, seventeenth-century and contemporary writers who explored the idea that is at the heart of Burke's rhetoric of character: that orators are best able to 86 RHETORICA secure a good moral character in the minds of their audience by demonstrat­ ing their understanding of what moral character is" (p. 28). Bullard covers Aristotle's treatment of rhetorical ethos and its guises in Roman thinkers in­ cluding Cicero and Quintilian. He uses Locke as a critical prompt to discuss writings by Hobbes, Edward Reynolds, and La Bruyère and to trace "how the rhetorical category of ethos returned to relevance during the seventeenth century as part of a popularized prudential moralism" (p. 42) in history, psy­ chology, and character-writing. He traces the Aristotelian model's adaptions in writings about pulpit eloquence and their secular processes in Shaftesbury and Smith. Similarly, the history of eighteenth-century rhetoric education among English speakers is not commonplace but instead advances the claim that "there are several important respects in which the Irish, rather than the Scots, should be seen as the real pioneers of this new development ["the study of literature in modern vernacular languages"] in the art of rhetoric" (p...

Research Article| September 01 2011 A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals Beth Innocenti Beth Innocenti University of Kansas, Communication Studies Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Philosophy & Rhetoric (2011) 44 (3): 273–290. https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.44.3.0273 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Beth Innocenti; A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals. Philosophy & Rhetoric 1 September 2011; 44 (3): 273–290. doi: https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.44.3.0273 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressPhilosophy & Rhetoric Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2011 by The Pennsylvania State University. All rights reserved.2011The Pennsylvania State University Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Abstract: Bernard Lamy's view of rhetoric in L'Art de Parler may be explained as an attempt to address religious exigencies. Lamy advises about two religious roles: theologian and preacher. Theologians' attempts to overcome ignorance and preachers' attempts to overcome willful blindness and inattentiveness in congregations help to account for why Lamy views truth as a matter of certainty rather than probability, and argument as syllogistic rather than connected to style and audience beliefs. Since Lamy conceives of a traditional sense of rhetoric—copious eloquence—as a source of religious problems, he advocates a modernized view of rhetoric to address them.

Bernard Lamy's view of rhetoric in L'Art de Parler may be explained as an attempt to address religious exigencies. Lamy advises about two religious roles: theologian and preacher. Theologians' attempts to overcome ignorance and preachers' attempts to overcome willful blindness and inattentiveness in congregations help to account for why Lamy views truth as a matter of certainty rather than probability, and argument as syllogistic rather than connected to style and audience beliefs. Since Lamy conceives of a traditional sense of rhetoric-copious eloquence-as a source of religious problems, he advocates a modernized view of rhetoric to address them.

Reading Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric from a rhetorical perspective—as an attempt to address issues relevant to religious rhetoric—I argue that Campbell's aims of preparing future ministers to preach and defending the authority of revealed religion shaped, first, his conception of inventing and presenting emotional appeals and, second, his key assumptions about reason and passion. The article adds a chapter to accounts of the relationship between reason and passion in sacred rhetorics and in rhetorical traditions more generally, and addresses the question of what Campbell's theory of rhetoric may aim to inculcate or cultivate emotionally and why.

Abstract Scholars have seldom explored relationships among Lord Kames's legal career and writings and Elements of Criticism. After considering why Kames did not write a rhetoric of legal advocacy, I argue that Kames's legal career and writings offered precedents for Elements in three areas: fulfilling social aspirations, using principles of human nature for pedagogical purposes, and using a mode of reasoning that involved abstracting principles from particular cases. I provide a more complete understanding of theElements and suggest that aims and methods of Scots law may have penetrated eighteenth-century Scottish rhetorics more broadly.

Scholars have seldom explored relationships among Lord Kames’s legal career and writings and Elements of Criticism. After considering why Kames did not write a rhetoric of legal advocacy, I argue that Kames’s legal career and writings offered precedents for Elements in three areas: fulfilling social aspirations, using principles of human nature for pedagogical purposes, and using a mode of reasoning that involved abstracting principles from particular cases. I provide a more complete understanding of the Elements and suggest that aims and methods of Scots law may have penetrated eighteenth-century Scottish rhetorics more broadly.

The recent neglect of Kames's Elements of Criticism (1762) has been due in part to disciplinary angst that has fostered two incomplete views of Elements: (1) as a work that trains readers in receptive competence and (2) as significant for primarily philosophical reasons. Reading Elements as a rhetoric of criticism, however, suggests first that it is aimed toward production of criticism-not simply reception-although the critical argumentation is oriented toward judgment in terms of universals. Second, it suggests that its significance is practical-that it appeals to readers' anxieties about the burgeoning British economy.

George Mackenzie’s “What Eloquence is fit for the Bar” (1672), perhaps unique in the early modern literature of Scots law, provides access to the state of judicial rhetoric in post-Restoration Scotland. This essay summarizes the contents of the essay and briefly relates it to his career and other writings. It shows that Mackenzie conceived of eloquence as a site of struggle for personal, professional, and international status.

Research Article| January 01 2002 Motives for Practicing Shakespeare Criticism as a “Rational Science” in Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism Beth Innocenti Manolescu Beth Innocenti Manolescu University of Kansas Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Advances in the History of Rhetoric (2002) 5 (1): 11–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2000.10500527 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Beth Innocenti Manolescu; Motives for Practicing Shakespeare Criticism as a “Rational Science” in Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism. Advances in the History of Rhetoric 1 January 2002; 5 (1): 11–20. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2000.10500527 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressJournal for the History of Rhetoric Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC2002Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Abstract A mid‐eighteenth‐century debate among three Anglican clerics on the nature and end of eloquence indicates that their views of eloquence share a significant similarity: functionalism. I summarize each participant's position; note relevant aspects of their contexts, including purposes, institutional position, and broader cultural conditions; and explore the social and political implications of their views on the nature and ends of eloquence. By doing so, I show that eloquence serves as a site of struggle for power and prestige; and that when people use the term “eloquence “ they may have significantly different views of what it means.

Abstract: Ancient Roman rhetoricians do not offer a systematic theory of vivid description in their rhetorical treatises, perhaps because it was treated at the early stages of a student's education and because it may be produced in various ways to achieve various purposes. After examining the references to vivid description scattered throughout ancient rhetorical treatises in discussions of style, amplification, narration, and proof, as well as Cicero's use of the tectinique in the Verrine orations, I suggest precepts which may have guided the means by and ends for which vivid descriptions are produced.