Abstract In numerous communicative practices, particularly in social media communication, it has become common to encounter messages pursuing a multiplicity of possible functions. They provide information, but sharing it is not their only or most important purpose. They appear to advocate for a particular viewpoint, yet no specific conclusion is stated, no argumentative or persuasive context surrounds them, and no dialectical exchanges follow or precede them. From a practical perspective, such messages, designated as “info-arguments,” are powerful strategies for advancing reasons, enabling the speaker to avoid the corresponding burden of proof. From a theoretical perspective, they challenge the pragmatic theories of meaning underlying argument reconstruction. Absent a specific context and considering the composite nature of an audience characterized by diverse backgrounds, how can we establish and justify that an info-argument conveys an argument? This paper proposes an analytical framework based on a dynamic and dialectical approach to meaning. In this view, the meaning of an info-argument is not represented as a pre-existing speaker’s intention manifested in a clear communication setting. Instead, it is regarded as a set of distinct, least defeasible interpretations characterizing various possible scenarios defined by several factors (or presumptions) that vary depending on the interlocutors’ backgrounds and values.

AbstractPresuppositions are at the same time a crucial and almost neglected dimension of arguments and fallacies. Arguments involve different types of presuppositions, which can be used for manipulative purposes in distinct ways. However, what are presuppositions? What is their dialectical function? Why and how can they be dangerous? This paper intends to address these questions by developing the pragmatic approaches to presupposition from a dialectical perspective. The use of presuppositions will be analyzed in terms of presumptive conclusions concerning the interlocutor’s acceptance of a proposition, which can be assessed as reasonable or unacceptable. Their dialectical function is described in terms of dark side commitments attributed to a collective "voice" representing what is commonly shared. For this reason, they count as attempts to include the presupposed contents into the hearer’s commitment store, which in some circumstances can reverse the burden of proof. The different manipulative strategies grounded on controversial presuppositions will be examined by showing the distinct roles that the latter play and the relationship between the degrees of presuppositional implicitness and the speaker’s burden of retraction.

ABSTRACT The logic of humor has been acknowledged as an essential dimension of every joke. However, what is the logic of jokes, exactly? The modern theories of humor maintain that jokes are characterized by their own logic, dubbed “pseudo,” “playful,” or “local,” which has been the object of frequent criticisms. This article intends to address the limitations of the current perspectives on the logic of jokes by proposing a rhetorical approach to humorous texts. Building on the traditional development of Aristotle’s almost neglected view of jokes as surprising enthymemes, the former are analyzed as rhetorical arguments. Like enthymemes, jokes are characterized by natural inferences that can be represented as topics, and quasi-formalized in argumentation theory as argumentation schemes. Like rhetorical arguments, jokes express a reason in support of different types of conclusions and proceed from distinct kinds of reasoning and semantic relations.

AbstractThe representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical connections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it.

Research Article| January 01 2009 Argument from Analogy in Law, the Classical Tradition, and Recent Theories Fabrizio Macagno; Fabrizio Macagno Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Douglas Walton Douglas Walton Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Philosophy & Rhetoric (2009) 42 (2): 154–182. https://doi.org/10.2307/25655348 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Fabrizio Macagno, Douglas Walton; Argument from Analogy in Law, the Classical Tradition, and Recent Theories. Philosophy & Rhetoric 1 January 2009; 42 (2): 154–182. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/25655348 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectivePenn State University PressPhilosophy & Rhetoric Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 2009 The Pennsylvania State University2009The Pennsylvania State University Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.