In this article, the first to analyze the role of analogy in Edward Thorndike's educational vision, I argue that the feat of Thorndike's analogy-making was his ability to launch an experimental science of child learning without having had access to children. That the origin of American pedagogical science rests on Thorndike's animals stands as a palpable example of the power of analogy to serve a constitutive function in scientific invention. In Thorndike's case, the social consequences were considerable: His juxtaposition of the child and the animal, his fusing of the two in the concept of the animal-child mind, led him to reason that infants, like animals, were incapable of having ideas, and children, though fully capable, still learned best in many cases through the process of rote memorization and drill.

This essay offers the first analysis of analogy in research-level mathematics, taking as its case the 1837 treatise of William Rowan Hamilton. Analogy spatialized Hamilton's key concepts—knowledge and time—in culturally familiar ways, creating an effective landscape for thinking about the new algebra. It also structurally aligned his theory with the real number system so his objects and operations would behave customarily, thus encompassing the old algebra while systematically bringing into existence the new.

This article examines the role of the liquid drop analogy in George Gamow's theory of nuclear structure and his subsequent derivation of nuclear energy. It argues that the correspondences constituting the analogy served distinct but cooperative ends, requiring Gamow to posit a relatively simple nuclear geometry that set him apart from his contemporaries, mostly shell theorists, and led to his successful derivation of nuclear energy in the fall of 1928.

Finding itself at the center of highly publicized legal and political deliberations over fairness in testing, personnel credibility, and legal liability, the training department at a North American transit authority adopted a genre system that enabled the production of objective evidence of job competence, which was then used to make objective decisions about who passed and failed various training programs. The ongoing genre-structured activity of the department involved not only the regularization of organizational texts but also the regularization of social interaction mediated by those texts, which, while producing the types of interpretively stable documents required for successful public deliberation, led to a shift in authority and social relations within the department that instigated considerable resentment and loss of morale among many veteran instructors.

Genres, although aligning people to joint activity and joint attention, shape the substantive material or information represented within the bounded space of the text. Each genre creates a space that prompts the production of particular kinds of information to populate that space. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 that mandated the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was invented out of a perceived social need for greater information about the effects of human activity on the environment. The EIS has since spawned a constellation of related genres, has created a large informational market to fulfill the requirements of these genres, and has led to a proliferation of information. The set of relations among genre, information, and activity found in this one sphere of environmental information are suggestive of how information is produced and used in generic forms.

One of the signatures of scientific writing is its ability to present the claims of science as if they were “untouched by human hands.” In the early years of experimental education, researchers achieved this by adopting a citational practice that led to the sedimentation of their cardinal method, the analysis of variance, and their standard for statistical significance, 0.05. This essentially divorces their statistical framework from its historical conditions of production. Researchers suppressed their own agency through the use of passive voice and nominalization. With their own agency out of the way, they imbued the methods, results, and presentational devices themselves with the active agency of the situation through the use of personification. Such a depiction creates the impression that the researchers and audience stand on equal epistemic ground as interested witnesses to the autonomous activity of a third party, the method, which churns out the brute facts of science.

Few concepts in the social sciences have wielded more discriminatory power over the status of knowledge claims than that of statistical significance. Currently operationalized as a = 0.05, statistical significance frequently separates publishable from nonpublishable research, renewable from nonrenewable grants, and, in the eyes of many, experimental success from failure. If literacy is envisioned as a sort of competence in a set of social and intellectual practices, then scientific literacy must encompass the realization that this cardinal arbiter of social scientific knowledge was not born out of an immanent logic of mathematics but socially constructed and reconstructed in response to sociohistoric conditions.

In their macroscopic approach to analogy, rhetorical studies project the latent assumption that sound analogical reasoning is a universal property of human consciousness rather than a socioculturally inherited practice that varies over time and place. After drawing briefly from landmark work in the social sciences to show notable cases of cultural variation in analogical reasoning, I present Lev Vygotsky's concept of internalization and Dedre Gentner's structure mapping theory of analogy as fruitful theoretical and methodological avenues through which to detect sociocultural variation in analogical reasoning practices in science.

Abstract Rhetoric of science has come a long way in understanding the role of analogy in scientific language and thought. Further progress is hindered, however, by the analytic and methodological limitations native to classical rhetoric. Accordingly, I turn to cognitive psychology for an adequate theory of analogy through which to remedy this stalled research program. Using Dedre Gentner's Structure Mapping theory of analogy, I investigate the role of the Saturnian analogy in Hantaro Nagaoka ‘s theory of atomic structure and show how the analogy constrained him, serving sometimes as an asset to his argument and other times as a serious liability.

The redefinition of logos as an appeal to logic is a mistaken association found all too often in the technical communication classroom. Logic inheres in all three proofs of persuasion; moreover, Aristotle used logos within the context of classical rhetoric to refer to the argument or speech itself. In this light, the proofs of persuasion represent the set of all logical means whereby the speaker can lead a “right-thinking” audience to infer something. If that something is an emotion, the appeal is to pathos; if it is about the character of the speaker, the appeal is to ethos; and if it is about the argument or speech itself, the appeal is to logos. This interpretation reinstates all three proofs of persuasion as legitimate, logical means to different proximate ends and provides a coherent definition of logos, consonant with Aristotle's Rhetoric, to the next generation of technical communicators.