How does the analysis and evaluation of argumentation depend on the dialogue type in which the argumentation has been put forward? This paper focuses on argumentative bluff in eristic discussion. Argumentation cannot be presented without conveying the pretence that it is dialectically reasonable, as well as, at least to some degree, rhetorically effective. Within eristic discussion it can be profitable to engage in bluff with respect to such claims. However, it will be argued that such bluffing is dialectically inadmissible, even within an eristic discussion.

This article investigates the implications of goal-legislation for legal argumentation. In goal-regulation the legislator formulates the aims to be reached, leaving it to the norm-addressee to draft the necessary rules. On the basis of six types of hard cases, it is argued that in such a system there is hardly room for constructing a ratio legis. Legal interpretation is largely reduced to concretisation. This implies that legal argumentation tends to become highly dependent on expert (non-legal) knowledge.

This book is written for upper-level undergraduate students who have completed at least one course in logic, critical thinking or argumentation. Although the title suggests that the book provides a comprehensive theory, Vorobej deals primarily with the notion of argument, with the cogency of arguments and with how to develop a charitable reading of an argument and display it in a diagram. The book is not about argument schemes, argumentation indicators, dialogue, rhetoric or logical form. Nor is the book about argument evaluation. Norms are being discussed, but from the perspective of reconstructing arguments from a text. Part one of the book is called macrostructure and deals with arguments in canonical form (where they have a conclusion and a set of premises), with the cogency of arguments and with the analysis of so-called normal arguments. Part two is about the microstructure of arguments, i.e. with the more detailed patterns of evidential support. The book contains four hundred exercises with which students can examine the notions and definitions that the book introduces. Still, the book is not merely a textbook, but can also be considered as a scholarly contribution to the study of argumentation.

Writing a good introductory textbook on argumentation and critical thinking is no easy task.What a model reader of such a book-that is, an undergraduate novice in the problematic of argumentation-needs, is probably a somewhat authoritative guidance to the field.''Authoritative'' means that a textbook should be based on clearly laid out, easily comprehensible and theoretically consistent principles, or fundamentals.''Guidance'' means that at the same time it should not present a ready-made closed doctrine, but instead leave enough room for students' own critical judgment and creativity.These two general requirements that a good textbook should meet are to a certain extent conflicting and hence the need for a skillful balancing of them: being too authoritative, or fundamental, would go exactly against the spirit of critical thinking; being too critical, open-minded and inconclusive would go against the goal of an introductory textbook.This underlying difficulty in argumentation textbook-writing is suggested by the very title of Douglas Walton's Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation.The primary goal of this textbook is ''to sharpen [a] critical attitude'' of its readers by means of ''a basic entry-level introduction to fundamentals'' (p.xi).This introduction, as Walton projects, ''is meant to be an advance over the many other textbooks on the market today that lack the kind of depth needed by a textbook that is based on an established scholarly discipline' ' (p.xi).Quite undeniably, Fundamentals provide some basic methods of critical analysis of everyday argumentation in a way which adroitly avoids the two aforementioned pitfalls of either a principled dogmatism or an inconclusive criticism.Nevertheless, I would like to argue that if it leans towards one of these dangerous extremes, then it

In this article the author develops a framework for a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of teleological argumentation in a legal context. Ideas taken from legal theory are integrated in a pragma-dialectical model for analyzing and evaluating argumentation, thus providing a more systematic and elaborate framework for assessing the quality of teleological arguments in a legal context. Teleological argumentation in a legal context is approached as a specific form of pragmatic argumentation. The legal criteria that are relevant for the evaluation of teleological argumentation are discussed and translated in terms of critical questions that are relevant for the evaluation of the various forms of teleological argumentation.

This paper explores applications of concepts from argumentation theory to mathematical proofs. Note is taken of the various contexts in which proofs occur and of the various objectives they may serve. Examples of strategic maneuvering are discussed when surveying, in proofs, the four stages of argumentation distinguished by pragma-dialectics. Derailments of strategies (fallacies) are seen to encompass more than logical fallacies and to occur both in alleged proofs that are completely out of bounds and in alleged proofs that are at least mathematical arguments. These considerations lead to a dialectical and rhetorical view of proofs.

In this paper, David Zarefsky suggests some constraints that political arguers face when trying to persuade an audience, and discusses some of the devices with which they respond to these constraints. In his treatment of these devices Zarefsky makes use of the concept of strategic manoeuvring as proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser. By taking into account the three manifestations of strategic manoeuvring-topical potential, audience adaptation and an effective presentation (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, p. 139)-he identifies and discusses several possible ways of dealing with these situational constraints. Regarding the 'activity type' (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2005) of political argumentation, Zarefsky focuses on large and open-ended public debates that engage entire societies. He rightfully indicates that it seems strange to consider these kinds of political argumentation as a specific kind of institutionalised discourse: political argumentation is in principle unregulated, free-form and requires no technical expertise of its participants in the discussion. In order to be able to discuss strategic manoeuvring within this kind of political context, characteristics of political argument need first to be specified. Zarefsky mentions four characteristics that can be of help to define the genre and to establish its conventions. In these comments, I will focus on the first part of the paper, which is about these characteristics of political argumentation: as a supplement to Zarefsky's paper, I will give a tentative analysis of how the four characteristics mentioned constrain the possibilities to manoeuvre strategically. 76-77). The activity type, therefore, may

Schulz and Rubinelli's project 'Informed consent and strategic maneuvering in doctor-patient interaction' provides an excellent opportunity for studying argumentation in a specific institutional context because a medical consultation is a special communicative activity type that may involve argumentative discussion. Before engaging in empirical research regarding such a consultation it is necessary to make a conceptional analysis of this type of doctor-patient interaction. One first needs to give a general characterization of the type of interaction concerned: what is the structure of the interaction in a doctor-patient consultation in terms of speech acts, role taking and time constraints? For doing so a better understanding is required of the type of difference of opinion that will be at issue in such a consultation. What type of standpoint initiates the discussion? Which parts can be distinguished in the activity type of medical consultation and which of them are typically or potentially argumentative? What are the roles of the two participants in each of these cases? Is it the doctor or the patient who initiates the discussion by putting forward a standpoint or can this be done by either of them?

I consider Sally Jackson's analysis of ''black box arguments,'' on the most abstract level, as a valuable contribution to an ongoing discussion on a very important issue: how to find a rational and critical way between the two extremes of, on the one hand, uncompromising dogmatism and, on the other, endless scepticism in our deliberations. Philosophers of science and argumentation theorists alike have persistently been trying to properly diagnose and solve this difficulty central to their disciplines. Therefore, those of the tentative conclusions of an open, transparent box of 'science in action' which are based on reliable methods and compelling evidence cease to be controversial and become widely accepted through a consensus of a community of scientists. In this way, a contested hypothesis turns into an accepted result, which serves as a black box device-its inner workings are no longer open to scrutiny, and the only thing we can do is to 'input' questions and obtain authoritative 'output' answers.

In his paper, Thomas Goodnight contributes to the discussion on strategic manoeuvring within institutional argumentative exchanges starting from the idea that the obligations imposed and possibilities provided by the particular institution in which the exchange takes place define the way arguers resolve their differences of opinion. Argumentative exchanges between doctor and patient involving direct-toconsumer drug advertising are given as an example.

Peter Houtlosser and I planned this special issue on Strategic Maneuvering in Institutional Contexts about two years ago. At the time, Peter had already been diagnosed with cancer and he knew that his chances for survival were very slim, if not non-existent. All the same he wanted to go on with the work he loved so much: studying argumentative discourse and exchanging views about argumentation with other argumentation theorists. This is why he spent a considerable amount of the energy he had left on continuing his research and presenting his views to others. The preparations for this special issue were part of his endeavors to include as many fellow argumentation scholars as possible in the discussion and to invite them to express their views in the most pertinent way. Sadly, Peter did not live to see the final results. This is why we cannot publish this special issue together; instead, I am dedicating the issue to him and start with a brief commemoration.

Any well-structured argumentative exchange must be preceded by some preparatory stages. In the pragma-dialectical four-stage model of critical discussion, the clarification of issues and positions is relegated to the confrontation stage and the other preparatory matters are dealt within the opening stage. In the opening stage, the parties involved come to agree to discuss their differences and to do so by an argumentative exchange rather than by, say, a sequence of bids and offers. They should also come to agree on the rules of dialogue, on roles, on logical principles, on types of argument, and on the propositions that can be used as basic premises. All in all, a lot of work needs to be done before the first topical argument can be put forward. Especially the opening stage seems prone to further disagreements and protracted discussions, e.g., about the admissibility of particular kinds of argument or particular basic premises. There is also the problem that a successful opening stage threatens to settle matters beforehand and thus put the argumentation stage out of business. The paper suggests some measures that could alleviate the workload of the opening stage, without making the argumentation stage otiose.

the newer disciplines of argumentation and informal reasoning.