Abstract
It is pointed out that, both in methodology and in findings, the investigations of the Challenger disaster by a Presidential Commission and by a Congressional committee demonstrate that even in highly technical matters meaning is socially constructed. The author examines the evidence and testimony before the investigating bodies and finds that, before the launch, NASA officials construed information about O-ring charring in socially contingent ways and ultimately pressed engineers to work under similar assumptions in declaring the shuttle flightworthy. Although the two investigations examined much the same evidence, differing methodological assumptions led them to different conclusions and recommendations. It is found that both investigations emphasized procedural concerns while largely neglecting personal judgment and responsibility, even though the evidence suggests a key role for personal and social judgment. It is concluded that the field of professional communication needs to become more alert to the role of social factors in technical matters.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">></ETX>