Research on conditional reasoning has long debated whether human rationality is best captured by logicist accounts or by pragmatically oriented approaches such as Relevance Theory, which highlight contextual and communicative factors. While the former predict reliable adherence to logical schemata (e.g., Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens), experimental evidence consistently reveals systematic deviations, such as endorsement of invalid inferences. The latter view attributes such patterns not to irrationality, but to pragmatic expectations that guide interpretation. This study contributes to this debate by examining how logical validity and pragmatic congruency jointly shape the evaluation of conditional arguments. We report two experiments employing a 2 × 2 factorial design. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conditional syllogisms framed in the standard 'if/then' format. Results showed that pragmatic violations slowed responses and, crucially, facilitated detection of logical invalidity, without hindering performance on valid arguments. Experiment 2 reformulated the same arguments using the Periodic Table of Arguments to replace 'if/then' conditionals with lever-based structures. Here, participants exhibited a generalized tendency to resist conditional inference, resulting in improved rejection of invalid arguments but reduced recognition of valid ones. Across both studies, pragmatic congruency alone did not predict accuracy, but interactions between pragmatic expectations and logical form systematically influenced evaluations. Taken together, the findings suggest that pragmatics does not override logic but modulates its accessibility: violations of pragmatic expectations invite deliberation. At the same time, semantic scaffolding, such as explicit 'if/then' cues, supports deductive reasoning. We propose that natural argumentation depends on this interplay, highlighting the need for situated accounts of logos.

Abstract The use of social media influencers as a rhetorical strategy contributes significantly to reshaping Emmanuel Macron’s public image. Aimed at countering the perception of distance conveyed in his initial Covid-19 speeches, this study explores the strategy’s rhetorical mechanisms, illustrated by a surprising encounter with two Youtubers, presented as a reward. I argue that Macron’s ethos is redefined through a deliberate balance between authority and proximity – both crucial to his image repair. The influencers’ unique format enables the implementation of this dual strategy, but they go even further by functioning as intermediaries who assist the president in adapting his discourse to align with the expectations, language, and values of their followers. In this encounter, ethos serves as both a means and an end. The collaboration between the politician and the influencers raises several critical questions: How is the strategy constructed? Who holds authority, and upon which models of authority does each party construct and articulate their discourse? How does this interaction affect the president’s style and language? What are the characteristics of their interaction? This analysis explores how influencers shape Macron’s communication and reveals distinctive features of his rhetoric within this unique format. In doing so, broader questions emerge about the boundaries between rhetoric, argumentation, and manipulation.

Discussions about multimodal argumentation have long been hindered by doubts about whether non-verbal artifacts can express propositions. The opponents of multimodal argumentation have stated that semiotic modes other than language lack the precision required to express verifiable statements about the world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the account of propositions presented in speech act theory is suitable for analyzing multimodal communication, which is why multimodal argumentation can be studied in the pragma-dialectical tradition. By connecting Searle’s approach with the pragma-dialectic argumentation schemes, I suggest that the propositional act is constructed of three, and not two, elements: referring expression, predicating quality, and proposition scheme, the latter being a characterization of the relationship between the first two. I derive proposition schemes directly from argumentation schemes, noticing that the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes actually characterize the relationship within propositions, and not between them. Based on that notion, I argue that when interacting with seemingly ambiguous multimodal artifacts, the receiver automatically chooses the most probable connection between the referring expression and the predicating quality from the list of proposition schemes, explaining why multimodal communication can be easily interpreted intuitively. Finally, I analyze several argumentative examples to illustrate how the proposition schemes can be used in reconstructing the reasoning expressed multimodally.

The role of interrogative sentences in political argumentation remains largely unexplored. This study addresses this gap by introducing a new Polish-language dataset featuring diverse examples of interrogative sentences in political discourse (election debates). The dataset serves as a unique resource for theoretical research in Argumentation Mining and Natural Language Inference through the annotation of ⟨IS, C⟩ and ⟨IS, P⟩ pairs, where IS denotes an interrogative sentence, C represents its corresponding conclusion, and P indicates a premise. The annotations primarily capture implicitly expressed argumentative structures and can serve as a benchmark for large language models (LLMs), particularly those trained on Polish-language data. Furthermore, this is the first study in Argumentation Mining where annotators independently verbalize the content of conclusions and premises conveyed through speech acts constructed with interrogative sentences. Our findings reveal that interrogative sentences in political debates most frequently function as implicature (approx. 45%), normative propositions (approx. 31%), statements expressing epistemic states (approx. 20%), and presuppositions (approx. 4%). Semantic similarity analysis confirms that annotators achieve a high level of consistency in identifying and verbalizing the content implied by interrogative sentences. The dataset provides a robust foundation for developing advanced language models and for further research into the role of interrogative sentences in political discourse.

Abstract Enthymemes are arguments that are not fully articulated, often omitting a connection between premise and conclusion but sometimes also other information that is crucial for their interpretation. This implicitness poses challenges for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. We use the concept of “argument form” as employed in the argument classification framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments to address this issue. By developing an algorithmic procedure grounded in this concept, we provide a method for explicating missing statements and connections condensed in enthymemes. Our approach contributes to understanding the pragmatics of argumentation, as it offers a formal framework for analysing how the interpretation of implicit elements in argumentation arises from apparent non-sequiturs. The algorithmic procedure we developed can function as a guideline for human annotation of argumentative discourse and is also suitable for implementation in (AI-assisted) annotation software for argument mining.

Abstract This essay explores synecdoche as an extended argumentative structure in Roman defenses of rhetoric. While contemporary scholarship often limits synecdoche to semantic substitution or distinguishes it from metonymy, theorists have recognized its potential as a form of argument. In Roman rhetoric, Quintilian describes synecdoche as both a trope of part-whole relations and a parallel argumentative form in Institutio Oratoria with comparable aims and lexical choices. This study examines how Roman rhetoricians, notably Quintilian and Cicero, employed synecdoche in extended arguments in defense of rhetoric. These arguments structured interconnected ideas such as categorical distinctions, hierarchical significance, and temporal sequence by employing synecdochal structures. By comparing ancient definitions and examples, this analysis reveals synecdoche’s capacity to organize complex argumentative discourse, offering a lens to scrutinize its structural and functional role.

This paper investigates the relationship between practical argumentation (PA) and Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). PA is argumentation providing justification for an agent’s action. PA has been described in terms of a three-level structure composed of practical, evaluative, and classificatory argumentation schemes. RST is a linguistic theory that models the hierarchical structure of monological discourse in terms of discourse coherence relations. RST’s Motivation relation is intended to increase an agent’s inclination to perform some action. Our investigative approach was to analyze argumentation schemes of PA in examples of RST involving Motivation and to analyze RST structure for texts that have been used as examples of PA. The results of the investigation show uses, not only of Motivation, but also RST’s Antithesis, Concession, Evaluation, and Solutionhood. In some cases the RST analysis reflects the layered composition of argumentation schemes of PA.

Abstract Metaphors abound in scientific discourse. Well-known examples include ‘the brain as a computer’ and ‘the organism as a machine’. Such metaphors, we argue, have both a theoretical and a practical aspect: they may serve as explanatory models, but also guide technological development, influence policy, reflect ideological assumptions, and reshape how we understand ourselves. These practical dimensions have prompted growing concern about the risks associated with metaphor use in science. While this concern has been widely noted, less attention has been paid to the argumentative forms such criticism may take. This article addresses that gap by reconstructing resistance to scientific metaphors—specifically computer and machine metaphors—as a form of pragmatic argumentation, in which metaphor use is challenged on the basis of its practical consequences. It further shows how such argumentation may be supported by subordinate causal arguments that appeal to the metaphor’s highlighting/hiding structure. Drawing on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, and analyzing examples from cognitive science, philosophy, and bioethics, the article demonstrates how metaphor resistance can be understood as a reconstructable form of argumentative critique—one in which metaphors become sites of normative contestation.

Abstract In contemporary literature on argumentation, it is well-established that various genres of fiction can be used to present argumentation. For instance, in political satires, authors argue why a certain political situation is undesirable. Similarly, authors of fables argue—by means of animals as characters—that certain behaviour is desirable or unacceptable. Characteristically, authors of fiction create a fictional world in which their narratives take place. This collides with the sincerity conditions of the speech act complex of argumentation: preliminary conditions that should be satisfied for argumentation to be performed correctly. Firstly, these sincerity conditions require the arguer to believe that their standpoint is acceptable. Second, the arguer should believe that the statements they make to justify their standpoint are acceptable and third, the arguer should believe that these statements constitute an acceptable justification of their standpoint. As such, when argumentation meets fiction, the sincerity conditions do not align: how can authors—as arguers—actually believe that their uttered statements are acceptable, if these statements are oftentimes not true? The aim of this paper is to show both how proponents can accept propositions in fiction while still following argumentation’s sincerity conditions.

In this study, we identify the pedagogical practices the science teachers use for successfully conducting their argumentation-based science lessons and examine the process of managing informal formative assessments. For this qualitative study, we collected data via video and audio devices from classroom implementations after conducting two professional development courses on assessment practices in inquiry settings and argumentation in science classrooms. We analysed the data from the conversation analysis (CA) perspective to conduct a data-driven study. Our results show that there are multiple pedagogical practices that teachers use to achieve lesson purposes and shape lessons. These are primarily the revealing of different claims and warrants or counterarguments about the same phenomenon or situation, prompting the class to discuss different arguments, including more than one student in interaction. Regarding the nature of answers produced by students, the teachers also make implicit or explicit positive and negative assessments, avoid explicit assessments, and give content feedback as pedagogical practices and use them for managing the informal formative assessment process. The results show that the teachers perform some pedagogical practices via the information gained by the informal formative assessment process. These pedagogical practices provide them with new road maps to achieve the lesson goal by increasing classroom interactions.

AbstractThis paper introduces moral argument analytics, a technology that provides insights into the use of moral arguments in discourse. We analyse five socio-political corpora of argument annotated data from offline and online discussions, totalling 240k words with 9k arguments, with an average annotation accuracy of 78%. Using a lexicon-based method, we automatically annotate these arguments with moral foundations, achieving an estimated accuracy of 83%. Quantitative analysis allows us to observe statistical patterns and trends in the use of moral arguments, whereas qualitative analysis enables us to understand and explain the communication strategies in the use of moral arguments in different settings. For instance, supporting arguments often rely on Loyalty and Authority, while attacking arguments use Care. We find that online discussions exhibit a greater diversity of moral foundations and a higher negative valence of moral arguments. Online arguers often rely more on Harm rather than Care, Degradation rather than Sanctity. These insights have significant implications for AI applications, particularly in understanding and predicting human and machine moral behaviours. This work contributes to the construction of more convincing messages and the detection of harmful or biased AI-generated synthetic content.

AbstractIn this paper, we present a model of pathos, delineate its operationalisation, and demonstrate its utility through an analysis of natural language argumentation. We understand pathos as an interactional persuasive process in which speakers are performing pathos appeals and the audience experiences emotional reactions. We analyse two strategies of such appeals in pre-election debates: pathotic Argument Schemes based on the taxonomy proposed by Walton et al. (Argumentation schemes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), and emotion-eliciting language based on psychological lexicons of emotive words (Wierzba in Behav Res Methods 54:2146–2161, 2021). In order to match the appeals with possible reactions, we collect real-time social media reactions to the debates and apply sentiment analysis (Alswaidan and Menai in Knowl Inf Syst 62:2937–2987, 2020) method to observe emotion expressed in language. The results point to the importance of pathos analysis in modern discourse: speakers in political debates refer to emotions in most of their arguments, and the audience in social media reacts to those appeals using emotion-expressing language. Our results show that pathos is a common strategy in natural language argumentation which can be analysed with the support of computational methods.

AbstractThis study tackles hashtags as framing devices which shape public arguments and controversies in computer-mediated communication environments. It focuses on the use of thegenocidehashtag on Twitter in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war. It proposes and showcases a methodology to surface how the semantic and discourse properties of the term genocide affect its framing properties as a hashtag which bears argumentative functions, directly or indirectly calling for action.

AbstractArguments may sometimes be advanced with a non-standard function. One such function, it is suggested, is the expression of identity, a practice which may play a significant role in political representation. This paper sets out to examine a number of short addresses given at the High-Level segment of the Cop26 conference, which are considered to contain instances of such argumentation. Their content is analysed and evaluated by means of the Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA), and an attempt is made to highlight the purposes of the delegates in addressing the conference. At a more fundamental level, the goal of this work is to assess the possibility of identifying arguments as being meant largely as statements of identity or representation, and the suitability of the CAPNA or other norm-based systems for evaluating such discourse. The speakers studied include representatives from OPEC, the Trade Unions, and the leaders of Vietnam and Liechtenstein. Ultimately, the study concludes that while further work is necessary both on understanding the relationship between argument and identity in the political arena, and on the application of argument norms to representational discourse, evaluations of this kind are meaningful and informative.

AbstractThis paper aims to discuss a well-known concept from argumentation theory, namely the principle of charity. It will show that this principle, especially in its contemporary version as formulated by Donald Davidson, meets with some serious problems. Since we need the principle of charity in any kind of critical discussion, we propose the way of modifying it according to the presupponendum—the rule written in the sixteenth century by Ignatius Loyola. While also corresponding with pragma-dialectical rules, it also provides additional content. This will be termed the dialectical principle of charity, and it offers a few steps to be performed during an argument in order to make sure that the participants understand each other well and are not deceived by any cognitive bias. The meaning of these results could be of great significance for argumentation theory, pragma-dialectics and the practice of public discourse as it enhances the principle of charity and makes it easier to apply in argumentation.

AbstractIn ‘The making of argumentation theory’ van Eemeren and van Haaften describe the contributions made to the five components of a full-fledged research program of argumentation theory by four prominent approaches to the discipline: formal dialectics, rhetoric/pragmalinguistics, informal logic, and pragma-dialectics. Most of these approaches do not contribute to all components, but to some in particular. Starting from the pragma-dialectical view of the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness – the crucial issue in argumentation theory – van Eemeren and van Haaften explain the positions taken by representatives from the approaches discussed and indicate where they differ from the pragma-dialectical approach. It transpires that approaches focusing on dialectical reasonableness are, next to pragma-dialectics, formal dialectics and informal logic; approaches focusing on rhetorical effectiveness are, next to pragma-dialectics, rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, and the informal logician Tindale. When it comes to the relationship between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, some interest in it is shown in rhetoric and pragmalinguistics, but only in pragma-dialectics and in Tindale’s work is it a real focus. The main difference between Tindale’s view and the pragma-dialectical view is that in pragma-dialectics the decisive role in deciding about reasonableness is assigned to a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse and in Tindale’s approach this role is assigned to Tindale’s interpretation of the Perelmanian universal audience.

AbstractConditional constructions (if–then) enable us to express our thoughts about possible states of the world, and they form an important ingredient for our reasoning and argumentative capabilities. Different types and argumentative uses have been distinguished in the literature, but their applicability to actual language use is rarely evaluated. This paper focuses on the reliability of applying classifications of connections between antecedents and consequents of conditionals to discourse, and three issues are identified. First, different accounts produce incompatible results when applied to language data. Second, a discrepancy between theory and data was observed in previous studies, which sometimes discard existing classifications for being detached from actual language use. Finally, language users construct various cognitive relations between clauses of conditionals without being able to rely on overt linguistic features, which poses problems for the annotation of conditionals in argumentation and discourse. This paper addresses these issues by means of comparing theoretical types and actual uses of conditionals, by inspecting the dispersion of types in natural-language corpora, and by conducting an experiment in which the inter-rater reliability of classifications was assessed. The results show that the reliability of classifications of conditionals when applied to language data is low. With respect to the aforementioned issues, different classifications produced incompatible results, a discrepancy between theory and data was indeed observed, and low reliability scores indicated a largely interpretative nature of types of conditionals. Given these results, suggestions for the enhancement of reliability in corpus studies of conditionals and beyond are provided to enhance future classification design.

AbstractThis paper tries to offer a descriptive account of the normative workings of evaluative fallacy charges directed to narratives. In order to do that, I first defend the continuity and mutual dependence, as based on a dynamical conception of argument, between the ‘belief conception’ and the ‘argumentative conception’ of fallacy. Then, I construe a catalogue of ‘fallacy charges’ based on both such a continuity and the variety of counterarguments explored by the theoretical framework of Argument Dialectics. And finally, I apply these ideas and distinctions in the analysis of four examples of published texts in which the charge of ‘fallacious narrative’ is issued by a discursive agent against other discursive agents’ either full-fledged narratives or narrative assumptions. The analyses confirm some of the characteristics mentioned in the catalogue as well as the argumentative nature of fallacy charges, even when the censored discourse does not exactly or explicitly contain an argument. The analyses also help understand the distinction between a rather concrete ‘linguistic’ use of the term narrative and a more abstract and elusive ‘discursive’ one, in which the difficulties of both identifying the object of censorship and the exact meaning of the fallacy charge multiply.

AbstractThis article explains the design and development of the pragma-dialectical approach to fallacies. In this approach fallacies are viewed as violations of the standards for critical discussion that are expressed in a code of conduct for reasonable argumentative discourse. After the problem-solving validity in resolving differences of opinion of the rules of this code has been discussed, their conventional validity for real-life arguers is demonstrated. Starting from the extended version of the theory in which the strategic maneuvering taking place in argumentative discourse is included, the article explains that the violations of the rules that are committed in the fallacies involve derailments of strategic maneuvering. This culminates in a discussion of the exploitation of hidden fallaciousness as an unreasonable way of increasing the effectiveness of argumentative discourse – a vital topic of research in present-day pragma-dialectics.

AbstractIn this paper I focus on the fallacy known as Complex Question or Many Questions. After a brief introduction, in Sect. 2 I highlight its pragmatic dimension, and in Sect. 3 its dialectical dimension. In Sect. 4 I present two accounts of this fallacy developed in argumentation theory, Douglas Walton’s and the Pragma-Dialectics’, which have resources to capture both its pragmatic and its dialectical nature. However, these accounts are unsatisfactory for various reasons. In Sect. 5 I focus on the pragmatic dimension of the fallacy and I suggest amendments to the accounts mentioned drawing on the study of the phenomenon of presupposition in theoretical pragmatics. I argue that the central notion in the definition of the fallacy is that of an informative presupposition. In Sect. 6 I focus on the dialectical dimension of the fallacy. This dimension needs to be explicitly acknowledged in the definition of the fallacy in order to distinguish it from a different, non-dialectical, fallacious argumentative move involving presuppositions.

AbstractWhile the role of discourse connectives has long been acknowledged in argumentative frameworks, these approaches often take a coarse-grained approach to connectives, treating them as a unified group having similar effects on argumentation. Based on an empirical study of the straw man fallacy, we argue that a more fine-grained approach is needed to explain the role of each connective and illustrate their specificities. We first present an original corpus study detailing the main features of four causal connectives in French that speakers routinely use to attribute meaning to another speaker (puisque, étant donné que, vu que and comme), which is a key element of straw man fallacies. We then assess the influence of each of these connectives in a series of controlled experiments. Our results indicate each connective has different effects for the persuasiveness of straw man fallacies, and that these effects can be explained by differences in their semantic profile, as evidenced in our corpus study. Taken together, our results demonstrate that connectives are important for argumentation but should be analyzed individually, and that the study of fallacies should include a fine-grained analysis of the linguistic elements typically used in their formulation.

AbstractIn response to an accusation of having said something inappropriate, the accused may exploit the difference between the explicit contents of their utterance and its implicatures. Widely discussed in the pragmatics literature are those cases in which arguers accept accountability only for the explicit contents of what they said while denying commitment to the (alleged) implicature (“Those are your words, not mine!”). In this paper, we sketch a fuller picture of commitment denial. We do so, first, by including in our discussion not just denial of implicatures, but also the mirror strategy of denying commitment to literal meaning (e.g. “I was being ironic!”) and, second, by classifying strategies for commitment denial in terms of classical rhetorical status theory (distinguishing between denial, redefinition, an appeal to ‘external circumstances’ or to a ‘wrong judge’). In addition to providing a systematic categorization of our data, this approach offers some clues to determine when such a defence strategy is a reasonable one and when it is not.

AbstractThis paper offers a review of the argumentation-theoretical literature on metaphor in argumentative discourse. Two methodologies are combined: the pragma-dialectical theory is used to study the argumentative functions attributed to metaphor, and distinctions made in metaphor theory and the three-dimensional model of metaphor are used to compare the conceptions of metaphor taken as starting point in the reviewed literature. An overview is provided of all types of metaphors distinguished and their possible argumentative functions. The study reveals that not all possible argumentative functions of metaphor have been taken into account, such as the role of conventional direct metaphors in standpoint and starting point. Novel direct metaphor as part of an analogy argument has received most attention, while indirect metaphor can constitute argumentative moves as well, such as the introduction of a standpoint, starting point or connection premise. The overview also shows that certain combinations of variables seem to be impossible of unlikely to occur. These results have a bearing on the analysis of metaphors in argumentative discourse and show the omission in current studies of metaphor. Being aware of these dimensions of metaphor ánd of its potential in argumentation would enrich argumentation studies and metaphor studies alike.

AbstractArgument schemes are abstractions substantiating the inferential connection between premise(s) and conclusion in argumentative communication. Identifying such conventional patterns of reasoning is essential to the interpretation and evaluation of argumentation. Whether studying argumentation from a theory-driven or data-driven perspective, insight into the actual use of argumentation in communicative practice is essential. Large and reliably annotated corpora of argumentative discourse to quantitatively provide such insight are few and far between. This is all the more true for argument scheme corpora, which tend to suffer from a combination of limited size, poor validation, and the use of ad hoc restricted typologies. In the current paper, we describe the annotation of schemes on the basis of two distinct classifications: Walton’s taxonomy of argument schemes, and Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments. We describe the annotation procedure for each, and the quantitative characteristics of the resulting annotated text corpora. In doing so, we extend the annotation of the preexisting US2016 corpus of televised election debates, resulting in, to the best of our knowledge, the two largest consistently annotated corpora of schemes in argumentative dialogue publicly available. Based on evaluation in terms of inter-annotator agreement, we propose further improvements to the guidelines for annotating schemes: the argument scheme key, and the Argument Type Identification Procedure.

AbstractIn English discourse one can find cases of the expression ‘not for nothing’ being used in argumentation. The expression can occur both in the argument and in the standpoint. In this chapter we analyse the argumentative and rhetorical aspects of ‘not for nothing’ by regarding this expression as a presentational device for strategic manoeuvring. We investigate under which conditions the proposition containing the expression ‘not for nothing’ functions as a standpoint, an argument or neither of these elements. It is also examined which type of standpoint (descriptive, evaluative or prescriptive) and which types of argument scheme (symptomatic, causal or comparison) the expression typically co-occurs with. In doing so we aim to develop a better understanding of the role and effects of ‘not for nothing’ when used in argumentation. Finally, we show that the strategic potential of ‘not for nothing’ lies in its suggestion that sufficient support has been provided while this support has in fact been left implicit.

This theoretical expose explores the complex notion of argumentative style, which has so far been largely neglected in argumentation theory. After an introduction of the problems involved, the theoretical tools for identifying the properties of the discourse in which an argumentative style manifests itself are explained from a pragma-dialectical perspective and a theoretical definition of argumentative style is provided that does full justice to its role in argumentative discourse. The article concludes with a short reflection upon the next steps that need to be taken in argumentation theory in further substantiating the notion of argumentative style.

To adequately model mathematical arguments the analyst must be able to represent the mathematical objects under discussion and the relationships between them, as well as inferences drawn about these objects and relationships as the discourse unfolds. We introduce a framework with these properties, which has been used to analyse mathematical dialogues and expository texts. The framework can recover salient elements of discourse at, and within, the sentence level, as well as the way mathematical content connects to form larger argumentative structures. We show how the framework might be used to support computational reasoning, and argue that it provides a more natural way to examine the process of proving theorems than do Lamport’s structured proofs.

In this paper a dialogue game for critical discussion is developed. The dialogue game is a formalisation of the ideal discussion model that is central to the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. The formalisation is intended as a preparatory step to facilitate the development of computational tools to support the pragma-dialectical study of argumentation. An important dimension of the pragma-dialectical discussion model is the role played by speech acts. The central issue addressed in this paper is how the speech act perspective can be accommodated in the formalisation as a dialogue game. The starting point is an existing ‘basic’ dialogue game for critical discussion, in which speech acts are not addressed. The speech act perspective is introduced into the dialogue game by changing the rules that govern the moves that can be made and the commitments that these result in, while the rules for the beginning, for the end, and for the structure of the dialogue game remain unchanged. The revision of the move rules is based on the distribution of speech acts in the pragma-dialectical discussion model. The revision of the commitment rules is based on the felicity conditions that are associated with those speech acts.

In public communication contexts, such as when a company announces the proposal for an important organizational change, argumentation typically involves multiple audiences, rather than a single and homogenous group, let alone an individual interlocutor. In such cases, an exhaustive and precise characterization of the audience structure is crucial both for the arguer, who needs to design an effective argumentative strategy, and for the external analyst, who aims at reconstructing such a strategic discourse. While the peculiar relevance of multiple audience is often emphasized in the argumentation literature and in rhetorical studies, proposals for modelling multi-audience argumentative situations remain scarce and unsystematic. To address this gap, we propose an analytical framework which integrates three conceptual constructs: (1) Rigotti and Rocci’s notion of communicative activity type, understood as the implementation of an interaction scheme into a piece of institutional reality, named interaction field; (2) the stakeholder concept, originally developed in strategic management and public relations studies to refer to any actor who affects and/or is affected by the organizational actions and who, accordingly, carries an interest in them; (3) the concept of participant role as it emerges from Goffman’s theory of conversation analysis and related linguistic and media studies. From this integration, we derive the notion of text stakeholder for referring to any organizational actor whose interest (stake) becomes an argumentative issue which the organizational text must account for in order to effectively achieve its communicative aim. The text stakeholder notion enables a more comprehensive reconstruction and characterization of multiple audience by eliciting the relevant participants staged in a text and identifying, for each of them, the interactional role they have, the peculiar interest they bear and the related argumentative issue they create. Considering as an illustrative case the defense document issued by a corporation against a hostile takeover attempt made by another corporation, we show how this framework can support the analysis of strategic maneuvering by better defining the audience demand and, so, better explaining how real arguers design and adapt their topical and presentational choices.

This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue on argumentative patterns in discourse, more in particular on argumentative patterns with pragmatic argumentation as a main argument that are prototypical of argumentative discourse in certain communicative activity types in the political, the legal, the medical, and the academic domain. It situates the studies of argumentative patterns reported in these papers in the pragma-dialectical research program. In order to be able to do so, it is first explained in which consecutive stages the pragma-dialectical theorizing has developed, what the study of argumentative patterns involves, and why the identification of argumentative patterns represents a vital stage in the development of pragma-dialectics. The description of the theoretical innovations that are introduced and the exposition of their relationship with the standard and extended pragma-dialectical theory create a conceptual and terminological framework for understanding the background and the rationale of the current research projects.

The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between persuasion tactics and properties of speech acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of these tactics, the structures that play a key role are not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the speaker’s character and trust. We use the concepts of illocutionary force and constitutive conditions related to the character or status of the speaker in order to explain the dynamics of these two techniques. In keeping with the research focus of the Polish School of Argumentation, we examine how the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of the force of ad hominem and ad baculum arguments exploit trust in the speaker’s status to influence the audience’s cognition.

A persuasion dialogue is a dialogue in which a conflict between agents with respect to their points of view arises at the beginning of the talk and the agents have the shared, global goal of resolving the conflict and at least one agent has the persuasive aim to convince the other party to accept an opposing point of view. I argue that the persuasive force of argument may have not only extreme values but also intermediate strength. That is, I wish to introduce two additional types of the effects of persuasion in addition to successful and unsuccessful ones (cf. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser in Argumentation 14(3):293–305, 2000; Advances in pragma-dialectics. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2002; Walton in A pragmatic theory of fallacy. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, 1995; Walton and Krabbe in Commitment in dialogue: basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1995). I propose a model which provides for modified versions of the standpoint of an agent needed in order to bring about two possible outcomes of a persuasion dialogue. These two outcomes I label partially-successful and over-successful. I call the potential, not yet verbalised, standpoint of an agent here the original topic t. Based on some aspects of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson in Relevance: communication and cognition. Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; Wilson and Sperber in The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2006), I explain that the modified version of the original topic t is an implicature created from the original topic t and from a specific mental topic which belongs to, what I call the beneficial cognitive model (hence BCM). I define BCMi,t as a set of topics which are within the area of agent i’s interest of persuasion with respect to t.

The aim of this paper is to propose foundations for a formal model of representation and numerical evaluation of a possibly broad class of arguments, including those that occur in natural discourse. Since one of the most characteristic features of everyday argumentation is the occurrence of convergent reasoning, special attention should be paid to the operation ⊕, which allows us to calculate the logical force of convergent arguments with an accuracy not offered by other approaches.