Nurturing the ability to argue is of great importance in science education, despite students often encountering cognitive and emotional barriers. The aim of this study was to examine the quality of argumentation and the issues raised by secondary school students when they are asked to respond to structured argumentation tasks. We chose topics from two different socio-scientific issues of varied perceived relevance to students’ daily lives: the sale of fast food in school canteens (Group 1) and the addition of antibiotics in animal feed (Group 2). The study involved 249 high school students aged 14–16, in Poland. A total of 139 participants took part in an intervention about fast food, and 110 in an intervention about the use of antibiotics. Data were collected in the form of written arguments developed by students as part of a structured teaching intervention. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to process and analyze the data. On average, students’ arguments scored higher on the topic of antibiotic use on animal feed. Qualitative content analysis of the students’ arguments identified four thematic groups: (1) personal aspects revealing personal meanings, values, and defence mechanisms; (2) scientific aspects revealing substantive knowledge; (3) socio-cultural aspects revealing economic, sociological or cultural aspects; (4) nonsensical or incoherent arguments. A topic related to students’ personal decisions and perceived to be closest to their lives and daily experience (eating fast food in the school canteen) more often prompted arguments indicating cognitive defence, by denying the harmfulness of fast food and emphasizing possible advantages or appealing to the right to choose. Based on this finding, we discuss the need for defence mechanisms to be considered in pedagogical designs for the teaching of argumentation.

Research on conditional reasoning has long debated whether human rationality is best captured by logicist accounts or by pragmatically oriented approaches such as Relevance Theory, which highlight contextual and communicative factors. While the former predict reliable adherence to logical schemata (e.g., Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens), experimental evidence consistently reveals systematic deviations, such as endorsement of invalid inferences. The latter view attributes such patterns not to irrationality, but to pragmatic expectations that guide interpretation. This study contributes to this debate by examining how logical validity and pragmatic congruency jointly shape the evaluation of conditional arguments. We report two experiments employing a 2 × 2 factorial design. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conditional syllogisms framed in the standard 'if/then' format. Results showed that pragmatic violations slowed responses and, crucially, facilitated detection of logical invalidity, without hindering performance on valid arguments. Experiment 2 reformulated the same arguments using the Periodic Table of Arguments to replace 'if/then' conditionals with lever-based structures. Here, participants exhibited a generalized tendency to resist conditional inference, resulting in improved rejection of invalid arguments but reduced recognition of valid ones. Across both studies, pragmatic congruency alone did not predict accuracy, but interactions between pragmatic expectations and logical form systematically influenced evaluations. Taken together, the findings suggest that pragmatics does not override logic but modulates its accessibility: violations of pragmatic expectations invite deliberation. At the same time, semantic scaffolding, such as explicit 'if/then' cues, supports deductive reasoning. We propose that natural argumentation depends on this interplay, highlighting the need for situated accounts of logos.

Previous research in argumentation has closely examined distortions of the opposition—particularly the straw man—and has recently provided some experimental evidence on their effects on persuasive outcomes. However, comparatively little empirical attention has been given to the inverse practice of faithfully reformulating an opponent’s contribution. The effects of accurate and inaccurate representations on speaker ethos and perceived reasonableness also remain underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps through three pre-registered experimental studies comparing accurate reformulation, misrepresentation, and no reformulation of the opposition. Experiment 1 assesses the impact of these practices on perceived trustworthiness using a six-item, 7-point semantic differential scale. Experiment 2 examines judgments of reasonableness using a scale repeatedly employed in pragma-dialectical effectiveness research. Experiment 3 measures persuasiveness at both the attitudinal and behavioral intention levels. Participants read a series of pre-tested argumentative exchanges between two speakers in a charitable-giving context. Results show that, in the cases examined, misrepresenting the opposition negatively impacted both trustworthiness and reasonableness judgments, addressing concerns that adhering to dialectical standards may diminish rhetorical success.

The paper investigates whether contradictory arguments are less likely to be noticed when they are expressed implicitly rather than explicitly. It builds on the fact that—in natural language productions—contradictions are often not logical but rather—lato sensu—pragmatic in nature. The study presents an experiment using ecological and slightly modified material. In a Facebook post, Italian journalist Selvaggia Lucarelli conveyed two contradictory arguments through implicatures, presuppositions and vague expressions. This text was presented to experimental subjects: half read the original version, while the other half read a version in which the implicit content had been made explicit. Their responses to specific questions indicate that the contradiction is more easily noticed when it occurs between explicit assertions rather than between arguments that must be at least partially inferred. A strong effect is observed in relation to age and education differences among the groups. These results may provide experimental insight into the conditions under which argumentation flawed by contradictions may still achieve its intended effect, as if the contradiction were not present.

Argumentation is at the core of political communication. We study what criteria people use when they evaluate argument quality. We ask how justification content and argument source – who presents the argument – influence perceived argument quality, as well as how these two interact. Regarding justification content, we rely on criteria derived from deliberative democracy, and separate appeals to common or private interests. Regarding argument source, we study partial, impartial and reluctant sources. The promoted policy is in accordance with the interests of partial sources, it conflicts with the interests of reluctant sources, whereas impartial sources’ interests are not affected. We observed that appeals to common interest yielded higher perceived argument and justification quality compared to appeals to private interests. Our central observation was that sources did not influence perceived argument quality, unless arguments appealed to private interests. In other words, the influence of the argument source was contingent on argument content.

Abstract The use of social media influencers as a rhetorical strategy contributes significantly to reshaping Emmanuel Macron’s public image. Aimed at countering the perception of distance conveyed in his initial Covid-19 speeches, this study explores the strategy’s rhetorical mechanisms, illustrated by a surprising encounter with two Youtubers, presented as a reward. I argue that Macron’s ethos is redefined through a deliberate balance between authority and proximity – both crucial to his image repair. The influencers’ unique format enables the implementation of this dual strategy, but they go even further by functioning as intermediaries who assist the president in adapting his discourse to align with the expectations, language, and values of their followers. In this encounter, ethos serves as both a means and an end. The collaboration between the politician and the influencers raises several critical questions: How is the strategy constructed? Who holds authority, and upon which models of authority does each party construct and articulate their discourse? How does this interaction affect the president’s style and language? What are the characteristics of their interaction? This analysis explores how influencers shape Macron’s communication and reveals distinctive features of his rhetoric within this unique format. In doing so, broader questions emerge about the boundaries between rhetoric, argumentation, and manipulation.

Discussions about multimodal argumentation have long been hindered by doubts about whether non-verbal artifacts can express propositions. The opponents of multimodal argumentation have stated that semiotic modes other than language lack the precision required to express verifiable statements about the world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the account of propositions presented in speech act theory is suitable for analyzing multimodal communication, which is why multimodal argumentation can be studied in the pragma-dialectical tradition. By connecting Searle’s approach with the pragma-dialectic argumentation schemes, I suggest that the propositional act is constructed of three, and not two, elements: referring expression, predicating quality, and proposition scheme, the latter being a characterization of the relationship between the first two. I derive proposition schemes directly from argumentation schemes, noticing that the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes actually characterize the relationship within propositions, and not between them. Based on that notion, I argue that when interacting with seemingly ambiguous multimodal artifacts, the receiver automatically chooses the most probable connection between the referring expression and the predicating quality from the list of proposition schemes, explaining why multimodal communication can be easily interpreted intuitively. Finally, I analyze several argumentative examples to illustrate how the proposition schemes can be used in reconstructing the reasoning expressed multimodally.

The phenomenon of selective dispute avoidance is that there are issues we debate and issues we recoil from debating, despite the fact that they are very similar in values at stake. What accounts for this variance? That some disagreements are deep and engagements on some deep issues yields meta-argumentatively bad results is a plausible explanation. However, practical second-order rebutting reasons to these considerations are proposed, essentially that not engaging has foreseeably worse consequences than engaging. What favors engagement, then, is that only when engaged can one address the negative second-order reasons one yields on either approach. What follows is a pragmatic meta-argument for engagement, even in cases of deep disagreement.

The role of interrogative sentences in political argumentation remains largely unexplored. This study addresses this gap by introducing a new Polish-language dataset featuring diverse examples of interrogative sentences in political discourse (election debates). The dataset serves as a unique resource for theoretical research in Argumentation Mining and Natural Language Inference through the annotation of ⟨IS, C⟩ and ⟨IS, P⟩ pairs, where IS denotes an interrogative sentence, C represents its corresponding conclusion, and P indicates a premise. The annotations primarily capture implicitly expressed argumentative structures and can serve as a benchmark for large language models (LLMs), particularly those trained on Polish-language data. Furthermore, this is the first study in Argumentation Mining where annotators independently verbalize the content of conclusions and premises conveyed through speech acts constructed with interrogative sentences. Our findings reveal that interrogative sentences in political debates most frequently function as implicature (approx. 45%), normative propositions (approx. 31%), statements expressing epistemic states (approx. 20%), and presuppositions (approx. 4%). Semantic similarity analysis confirms that annotators achieve a high level of consistency in identifying and verbalizing the content implied by interrogative sentences. The dataset provides a robust foundation for developing advanced language models and for further research into the role of interrogative sentences in political discourse.

Abstract Argumentation occurring in public controversies (large, long-lasting, and complex disagreements) deserve more attention from argumentation theorists than they have yet received, primarily because they offer plentiful opportunity to discover new facts about the contemporary practice of argumentation. Drawing on the polylogue framework (Lewiński and Aakhus 2023) and the cartography of controversy (Venturini and Munk 2022), nine suggestions are offered for how to build new theoretical knowledge through observational research that combines classic techniques in qualitative social science with emerging computational techniques: (1) aim for observationally grounded theory; (2) anchor analysis in argumentative texts; (3) practice constant comparison; (4) build outward from individual texts to networks; (5) investigate the places where texts are produced; (6) pay attention to the literatures where texts accumulate; (7) leverage computational techniques for natural language processing of large bodies of text; (8) reserve judgment on matters of disagreement within the controversy; and (9) try team science. Recent argument-centered studies of controversies demonstrate aspects of this approach and show its promise for discovering interesting and novel phenomena.

Abstract A very basic intuition is that argumentation is about giving reasons. This is recognized, for example, when it is stated that the object of study of argumentation theory is argumentative practices that consist, in whole or in part, but, at least, to a significant extent, of asking for, giving, and examining reasons. But this consensus does not translate into theory. In fact, reasons occupy a modest place in argumentation theory. Logical properties can be understood in terms of reasons or in terms of inferences, and in this sense, we can contrast reasons-based theories of argument with inference-based theories of argument. I will first show that the distinction between reasons-based and inference-based theories of argument is robust, and that there is a real difference between them. I will then argue that, as far as argumentation is concerned, a logical approach based on reasons is preferable to one based on inferences.

Abstract Enthymemes are arguments that are not fully articulated, often omitting a connection between premise and conclusion but sometimes also other information that is crucial for their interpretation. This implicitness poses challenges for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. We use the concept of “argument form” as employed in the argument classification framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments to address this issue. By developing an algorithmic procedure grounded in this concept, we provide a method for explicating missing statements and connections condensed in enthymemes. Our approach contributes to understanding the pragmatics of argumentation, as it offers a formal framework for analysing how the interpretation of implicit elements in argumentation arises from apparent non-sequiturs. The algorithmic procedure we developed can function as a guideline for human annotation of argumentative discourse and is also suitable for implementation in (AI-assisted) annotation software for argument mining.

The aim of this paper is to distinguish some varieties of what I call ‘comparison argumentation.’ This way of arguing consists of supporting a claim about one thing on the basis of a comparison of that thing with another. The criteria that I use are the subject, the degree, and the purpose of the comparison. I do not intend to be exhaustive, but to address two specific questions: what sets arguments by analogy apart within this category and, from there, how they can be evaluated based on their distinctive features. An important aspect of my approach is the analysis of cases. I have selected a relatively large corpus of examples, mainly from the news media, and will analyse them based on argumentative connectors and other conventional indicators of comparisons.

This paper investigates the relationship between practical argumentation (PA) and Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). PA is argumentation providing justification for an agent’s action. PA has been described in terms of a three-level structure composed of practical, evaluative, and classificatory argumentation schemes. RST is a linguistic theory that models the hierarchical structure of monological discourse in terms of discourse coherence relations. RST’s Motivation relation is intended to increase an agent’s inclination to perform some action. Our investigative approach was to analyze argumentation schemes of PA in examples of RST involving Motivation and to analyze RST structure for texts that have been used as examples of PA. The results of the investigation show uses, not only of Motivation, but also RST’s Antithesis, Concession, Evaluation, and Solutionhood. In some cases the RST analysis reflects the layered composition of argumentation schemes of PA.

Abstract Metaphors abound in scientific discourse. Well-known examples include ‘the brain as a computer’ and ‘the organism as a machine’. Such metaphors, we argue, have both a theoretical and a practical aspect: they may serve as explanatory models, but also guide technological development, influence policy, reflect ideological assumptions, and reshape how we understand ourselves. These practical dimensions have prompted growing concern about the risks associated with metaphor use in science. While this concern has been widely noted, less attention has been paid to the argumentative forms such criticism may take. This article addresses that gap by reconstructing resistance to scientific metaphors—specifically computer and machine metaphors—as a form of pragmatic argumentation, in which metaphor use is challenged on the basis of its practical consequences. It further shows how such argumentation may be supported by subordinate causal arguments that appeal to the metaphor’s highlighting/hiding structure. Drawing on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, and analyzing examples from cognitive science, philosophy, and bioethics, the article demonstrates how metaphor resistance can be understood as a reconstructable form of argumentative critique—one in which metaphors become sites of normative contestation.

Abstract This study aims to analyze the perceptions of Spanish secondary school teachers in the fields of social and experimental sciences (n = 215) regarding the formative relevance of argumentative competence in the context of citizenship education. It also seeks to provide a psychometric instrument supported by robust empirical evidence of reliability and validity to achieve this goal. Based on a non-experimental, cross-sectional design, the AASES (Assessment of Argumentation in Social and Experimental Sciences) instrument,—developed ad hoc,—is administered to identify the potential relationship of sociodemographic factors with the theoretical subconstructs it comprises, the statistical association between age, origin, and gender, and the mediating role of gender in the relationship between age/place of origin and the defined latent factors, and the existence of significant differences among sociodemographic groups. The results indicate that, although a statistical association between age and gender was observed, the mediating role of gender in the relationship between age, origin, and the latent factors cannot be confirmed. SEM analyses showed that none of the sociodemographic predictors (age, origin, and gender) exert statistically significant direct or mediating effects on the latent factors. Furthermore, the comparative analyses complement the model by indicating that perceptions vary moderately by gender and age, even though these variables do not explain the latent factors in the SEM. Indeed, the analysis of variance revealed significant differences in the Critical and Ethical Skills dimension based on these two factors, with higher scores among male teachers and in the oldest age group, as well as increasing trends, with age, in the perceived importance of argumentation for the development and acquisition of critical thinking skills, informed decision-making, and ethical discussion. The findings highlight the need to incorporate specific spaces within the curriculum and teacher education programs to foster argumentative competencies and informed engagement with controversial socio-scientific issues, taking into account sociodemographic variables as influential factors in the educational process.

Abstract This work advocates for an alternative to the principle of charity when teaching critical thinking or informal logic. It provides a brief reconstruction of the principle in the context of argumentation before moving to demonstrate some of the shortcomings associated with different approaches to it in the literature. It argues for placing emphasis not on charity but on the interpretative competence that underlies charity. Doing so avoids the difficulties associated with the principle as such while still fostering the conditions for exploring the kinds of advanced interpretations the pursuit of charity typically yields.

Abstract In contemporary literature on argumentation, it is well-established that various genres of fiction can be used to present argumentation. For instance, in political satires, authors argue why a certain political situation is undesirable. Similarly, authors of fables argue—by means of animals as characters—that certain behaviour is desirable or unacceptable. Characteristically, authors of fiction create a fictional world in which their narratives take place. This collides with the sincerity conditions of the speech act complex of argumentation: preliminary conditions that should be satisfied for argumentation to be performed correctly. Firstly, these sincerity conditions require the arguer to believe that their standpoint is acceptable. Second, the arguer should believe that the statements they make to justify their standpoint are acceptable and third, the arguer should believe that these statements constitute an acceptable justification of their standpoint. As such, when argumentation meets fiction, the sincerity conditions do not align: how can authors—as arguers—actually believe that their uttered statements are acceptable, if these statements are oftentimes not true? The aim of this paper is to show both how proponents can accept propositions in fiction while still following argumentation’s sincerity conditions.

Abstract Part of the business of argumentation theory involves resolving a conceptual dispute over what argumentation and argument are in the first place. This dispute has produced various “concepts of argument.” The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to develop a complete ontology of argumentative phenomena, capable of accounting for various conceptions of argument—something, as I argue, that is badly wanting in argumentation theory; and, within this ontology, (2) to defend a position that there is but one concept of argument needed to grasp these diverse phenomena and conceptions of argument and argumentation. I move in four steps. First, I briefly sketch the discussion over arguments-as-activities and arguments-as-products. Second, I go back to the classic work of Twardowski on actions and products and adapt it for argumentation theory, producing a complex yet systematically organized conceptual ontology of argument and argumentation. This conceptual housekeeping allows me, third, to critically engage some of the recent, Frege-inspired philosophical literature on the concept of argument, while defending act-based approaches to argument(ation). Fourth, I present a positive proposal of a minimal, contrastivist concept of argument as a set of reasons advanced to support a conclusion C 1 rather than another conclusion C n .

In this study, we identify the pedagogical practices the science teachers use for successfully conducting their argumentation-based science lessons and examine the process of managing informal formative assessments. For this qualitative study, we collected data via video and audio devices from classroom implementations after conducting two professional development courses on assessment practices in inquiry settings and argumentation in science classrooms. We analysed the data from the conversation analysis (CA) perspective to conduct a data-driven study. Our results show that there are multiple pedagogical practices that teachers use to achieve lesson purposes and shape lessons. These are primarily the revealing of different claims and warrants or counterarguments about the same phenomenon or situation, prompting the class to discuss different arguments, including more than one student in interaction. Regarding the nature of answers produced by students, the teachers also make implicit or explicit positive and negative assessments, avoid explicit assessments, and give content feedback as pedagogical practices and use them for managing the informal formative assessment process. The results show that the teachers perform some pedagogical practices via the information gained by the informal formative assessment process. These pedagogical practices provide them with new road maps to achieve the lesson goal by increasing classroom interactions.

Abstract In numerous communicative practices, particularly in social media communication, it has become common to encounter messages pursuing a multiplicity of possible functions. They provide information, but sharing it is not their only or most important purpose. They appear to advocate for a particular viewpoint, yet no specific conclusion is stated, no argumentative or persuasive context surrounds them, and no dialectical exchanges follow or precede them. From a practical perspective, such messages, designated as “info-arguments,” are powerful strategies for advancing reasons, enabling the speaker to avoid the corresponding burden of proof. From a theoretical perspective, they challenge the pragmatic theories of meaning underlying argument reconstruction. Absent a specific context and considering the composite nature of an audience characterized by diverse backgrounds, how can we establish and justify that an info-argument conveys an argument? This paper proposes an analytical framework based on a dynamic and dialectical approach to meaning. In this view, the meaning of an info-argument is not represented as a pre-existing speaker’s intention manifested in a clear communication setting. Instead, it is regarded as a set of distinct, least defeasible interpretations characterizing various possible scenarios defined by several factors (or presumptions) that vary depending on the interlocutors’ backgrounds and values.

Abstract In pragma-dialectics, a study of legal reasoning analyses judicial judgements’ dialectical and rhetorical aspects. Most analytical studies of legal reasoning focus on the role of judges and their decision-making mechanisms. In our study, we focus on the strategic manoeuvring of the opposing parties. Depending on the context, parties may have to justify their decision to litigants, a professional audience, and the public in rhetorically and dialectically different ways. What makes strategic manoeuvring special in judicial trials is that rhetorical aims (winning the debate) and dialectical aims (convincing the jury), in contrast with debates where parties dialectically aim at resolving a dispute by reaching consensus, are not in conflict. We analyse the Depp ctr. Heard trial 2022, focusing on the parties’ dialectical potential in cases when rhetorical aspects play an important role in addition to objective evidence required by the legal framework. Depp’s party started the trial with a strategic movement we shall call as a ‘topical shift’, doubling their starting position, aiming at dual dialectical goals, and hence also beginning a new debate parallel with the apparently only one by introducing a not directly relevant factor into the debate. Although other factors also played a role in Depp’s victory, setting up his position in the confrontation stage this way was decisive for the trial’s outcome: Heard’s party, following a traditional route, joined actively in one of the dual debates only, effectively giving up the extra debate started by Depp. This way, analysing the trial offers wider consequences to how to understand strategic manoeuvring in judicial trials, and in general as well.

Abstract This essay explores what it is to be a principle of charity in philosophical argumentation. In it, I explore some principles of charity found in classic and contemporary literature and textbooks on logic and philosophy. I distinguish between what I will maximal and sub-maximal principles of charity. With this distinction, I taxonomize current principles of charity on offer according to their dialectical function as rules for argument interpretation and reconstruction in philosophical argumentation. Principles of charity, I argue, are best construed as pragmatic rules for argument interpretation in philosophical argumentation, not merely moral or ratio-epistemic rules. I defend this claim against some objections.

Abstract Debates have long been an effective educational method in various fields, including argumentation education. In debates in which participants are divided into affirmative and negative sides, engagement in argumentation is heightened. Numerous studies have attempted to demonstrate this, but the question of whether participation in debates leads to increased argumentativeness, or whether individuals who engage in debates inherently have a higher orientation towards argumentation, remains unresolved. In the present study, debates were conducted for 15 weeks, and argumentativeness was measured using pre-and post-tests. The results confirmed that debate participation increases argumentativeness. Furthermore, while previous research has mostly focused on argumentativeness in the first language, the present study deepens the relationship between argumentativeness in both first and second languages. Specifically, focusing on Japan, where the first language (Japanese) is high-context and the second language (English) is low-context, this research clarifies the relationship between argumentativeness in the first and second languages, as well as the impact of debate.

AbstractThis paper tries to reconcile the clash between argumentation theory and formal logic regarding circular arguments, which are regarded as the fallacy of begging the question by the former, and a benign and useful inference pattern by the latter. This paper provides a formal system which can represent circular arguments found in the literature. The formal system makes it possible to distinguish two ways in which arguments can be circular. The first type of circularity, which is vicious, is when an argument is based on an inference step which is (indirectly) supported by that inference step itself. The second kind of circularity, which is benign, occurs when one of the premises is the same proposition as the conclusion. The first type of circularity implies the second type of circularity, but not the other way round. This distinction is in line with other approaches to circular arguments. Analyzing selected examples from the literature shows the value of the formal system.

AbstractAccording to a dialectical approach to argumentation, a single argument can be seen as a dialogical "Why? Because!" sequence. Does this also apply to multimodal arguments? This paper focuses on multimodal arguments with a predominantly visual character and shows that dialogues are helpful for identifying and reconstructing arguments in multimodal communication. To include nonverbal arguments in dialectical argumentation theory, it is proposed to regard dialogue as mode-fluid. The account of multimodal argument as dialogue will be compared with Champagne and Pietarinen’s account of visual argument as movement.

AbstractIn this paper, I examine argumentative strategies that social movements can follow to counter hate speech. I begin by reconstructing the disagreement space of the abortion debate in Argentina as a polylogue, identifying the protests of the social movement Pañuelos verdes as argumentative contributions. I then describe two different forms of hate speech used in response to the movement’s protests. I argue that hate speech discredits the position of Pañuelos verdes in the abortion debate and depicts their protests as social threats. Subsequently, I discuss three argumentative strategies that social movements can implement to address hate speech: arguing with hate speakers; advocating for a dialogue with restrictions; and opting for argumentative disobedience. Arguing with hate speakers aims to make hate speakers retract hate speech by exposing the undesirability of using hateful messages in argumentative exchanges. Advocating for a dialogue with restrictions aims to impose limited bans on public speech in order to ensure equal participation of arguers in argumentation. Finally, I propose the notion of argumentative disobedience to describe communicative responses to hate speech that aim to bring bystanders in line with the position of social movements in public debates.

AbstractThe article undertakes the problem of a Wittgensteinian background of Toulmin’s model of argument. While appreciating the original character of the investigations set out by Toulmin in The Uses of Argument, Wittgenstein’s ideas taken to be forerunners of both Toulmin’s philosophical method and the particular elements of the model of substantial argument are traced backward, to Toulmin’s earlier books: The Philosophy of Science (Toulmin, The philosophy of science. An introduction, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1953) and An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Toulmin, An examination of the place of reason in ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950). The technique of pinpointing the constituents of that model in the books preceding The Uses of Argument is superposing the layout of Toulmin’s model on the crucial arguments concerning the earlier books: the scientific one based on Newtonian optics and the moral one concerning keeping promises. Such a procedure allows identifying backing for warrants and argument fields with the methods of representation in The Philosophy of Science and with modes of reasoning in An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. The former is traced to passages 6.3 ff of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, while the latter—to the concept of word-games (the later Wittgenstein’s language games). The claim regarding Wittgenstein’s background is that in Toulmin’s view of Wittgenstein, some parts of Tractatus concerning representing are in line with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on language games; as well as that the overall method of The Uses of Argument goes along with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to philosophical problems that have to be placed in the context of their ordinary use.

AbstractA convincing argument can change a discussant’s commitment regarding the acceptability of a claim, but the same effect can be achieved by examining evidence. Observing objects or events that count as evidence for or against the acceptability of a statement can change one’s commitment regarding that statement. If we speak of fallacies in the realm of convincing through argumentation, can we speak of fallacies in the realm of convincing through evidence? In this paper, we defend an affirmative answer. We introduce and discuss the conceptual implications of evidentiary fallacies as fallacies committed when evidence is fabricated or suppressed during an attempt to resolve disagreement using proof. We then apply the notion of evidentiary fallacy to two real-life examples of mis-executed evidentiary procedures. We conclude that the notion of evidentiary fallacy can contribute to a more comprehensive fallacy theory and can foster new and broadly applicable critical skills.

AbstractThis paper introduces moral argument analytics, a technology that provides insights into the use of moral arguments in discourse. We analyse five socio-political corpora of argument annotated data from offline and online discussions, totalling 240k words with 9k arguments, with an average annotation accuracy of 78%. Using a lexicon-based method, we automatically annotate these arguments with moral foundations, achieving an estimated accuracy of 83%. Quantitative analysis allows us to observe statistical patterns and trends in the use of moral arguments, whereas qualitative analysis enables us to understand and explain the communication strategies in the use of moral arguments in different settings. For instance, supporting arguments often rely on Loyalty and Authority, while attacking arguments use Care. We find that online discussions exhibit a greater diversity of moral foundations and a higher negative valence of moral arguments. Online arguers often rely more on Harm rather than Care, Degradation rather than Sanctity. These insights have significant implications for AI applications, particularly in understanding and predicting human and machine moral behaviours. This work contributes to the construction of more convincing messages and the detection of harmful or biased AI-generated synthetic content.

AbstractIn this paper, we present a model of pathos, delineate its operationalisation, and demonstrate its utility through an analysis of natural language argumentation. We understand pathos as an interactional persuasive process in which speakers are performing pathos appeals and the audience experiences emotional reactions. We analyse two strategies of such appeals in pre-election debates: pathotic Argument Schemes based on the taxonomy proposed by Walton et al. (Argumentation schemes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), and emotion-eliciting language based on psychological lexicons of emotive words (Wierzba in Behav Res Methods 54:2146–2161, 2021). In order to match the appeals with possible reactions, we collect real-time social media reactions to the debates and apply sentiment analysis (Alswaidan and Menai in Knowl Inf Syst 62:2937–2987, 2020) method to observe emotion expressed in language. The results point to the importance of pathos analysis in modern discourse: speakers in political debates refer to emotions in most of their arguments, and the audience in social media reacts to those appeals using emotion-expressing language. Our results show that pathos is a common strategy in natural language argumentation which can be analysed with the support of computational methods.

AbstractIn this paper I apply the epidemiological model of the spread of beliefs and how they become cultural representations to the field of fallacies. The model suggests that beliefs tend to replicate as a virus does in a potential epidemic, and those strains that are dominant in a given socio-cultural sphere become cultural representations. My ultimate aim is to denounce the fact that some presumptive argumentation schemes are widely applied as definitive arguments, but turn out to be instances of common and traditional fallacies. Moreover, some such fallacies have managed to colonise the human mind and become cultural representations in society today. Adopting the approach I advocate here, we could say that the fallacy has become a belief, which has then managed to replicate like a virus, and finally the fallacy has become a cultural representation. One of the great harms that results from this process is that it is very difficult to open up effective lines of argument that expose the fallacious nature of these new and perverse cultural representations.

AbstractDespite increasing interest in studying arguments from deontic authority of the general form “(1) $$\delta$$ δ is a deontic authority in institution $$\varOmega$$ Ω ; (2) according to $$\delta$$ δ , I should do $$\alpha$$ α , C: therefore, (3) I should do $$\alpha$$ α ”, the state of the art models are not capable of grasping their complexity. The existing sets of critical questions assigned to this argumentation scheme seem to conflate two problems: whether a person is subject to an authority of an institution in the first place and whether the command issued within the context of a particular institution is eventually binding. For this reason, we introduce (1) a set of Basic Critical Questions to scrutinize the former issue, and (2) a set of more detailed questions related to specific features, also referred to as “parameters”, of institutional environments (Intra-Institutional Critical Questions). We identify major elements of institutional environments in which authoritative utterances are made and the crucial parameters of arguments from deontic authority. The selected evidence from the decisions of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court helps us show how these parameters may be used to reconstruct subtypes of this argument scheme, with their associated sets of critical questions. In specific institutional contexts, such detailed schemes are capable of grasping the complexity of appeals to deontic authority and thus should be used rather than general schemes. The reconstruction of argumentation schemes with critical questions shows how particular arguments may successfully be attacked.